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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
CREATING DOMESTIC DEPENDENTS: INDIAN REMOVAL, CHEROKEE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
What, this project asks, are the impacts of the alliance between women and Native 
Americans in the nineteenth century debate over Indian Removal? How might two groups 
of people similarly excluded from patriarchal systems of government by race and gender 
turn their exclusion into arguments for inclusion and do so forcefully enough to demand 
attention without also jeopardizing their success? In what ways might this alliance change 
how scholars interpret the goals and strategies of both the women’s right and Native 
American rights movements? While arguments made by women and Native Americans 
during Indian Removal receive considerable scholarly attention, most studies-especially 
those concerned with women’s involvement- subordinate Indian Removal to abolition, or 
they create significant omissions in the narratives of both movements by adopting a 
critical approach that interprets the strategic use of racialized and gendered ideology as 
assimilation.  
In “Domestic Dependents” I employ a cultural studies approach that is informed 
by Native American Studies and Rhetoric to fill gaps and situate Indian Removal as a 
significant intersection of the Native American rights and women’s rights 
movements.  Using wide variety of texts, including historical romances written by 
Catherine Sedgwick and Lydia Child, Catherine Beecher’s “Circular Addressed to the 
Benevolent Ladies of the United States,” the Cherokee Nation’s “1829 Memorial” and 
“Letter to the American People,” and domestic fiction by E.D.E.N Southworth and 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, I argue that, during Indian Removal, white women and the 
Cherokee come together to fight for rights by situating property-- the very thing used to 
exclude them-- at the center of their arguments for their own rights and against the forced 
removal of Native American tribes. In doing this, they create an interdependent approach 
that simultaneously embraces and rejects their prescribed societal roles in order to 
construct a rhetorical strategy that relies on moments of public solidarity and strategic 
distance. These moments, in turn, provide the opportunity to rethink narratives of the 
women’s rights and Native American rights and to explore Indian Removal as a key 
moment for understanding the ways that property rights, race, and gender inform ideas of 
citizenship in nineteenth century America. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
East-west, savage-civilized, foreign-domestic, private-public, property-property 
owner, ward-citizen, duties-rights, past present. The nineteenth century rhetoric of 
expansion, American identity, and rights is marked by the use trajectories and binaries 
that aim to classify and organize people into distinct categories in order to determine who 
belongs and the terms of their belonging. Lora Romero argues that scholars’ willingness 
to accept as true the nineteenth century’s narrative of itself leads to a body of scholarship 
that “seems to have consistently organized itself around binarisms” due largely to “our 
tendency to understand both power and resistance as centralized, uniform and static”(5). 
When applied to nineteenth century rights movements, the presumed static nature of 
power and resistance contained in binarisms holds the potential to reduce arguments for 
rights to attempts to simply move from one side of the dash to the other rather than a 
complex renegotiation of the meaning of both terms. Such dyads also ignore the existence 
of a productive space between oppositional terms that allows individuals to create new 
lines of argument and positions in society. 
 This project focuses on liminality, the ability to live somewhere between, and 
what happens when groups of people use it to argue for rights. In particular I am 
interested in how all of these trajectories and pairings influence the Indian Removal 
debates, especially arguments over the status of the Cherokee Nation, and what 
embracing liminality might mean for the ways we approach women’s rights and Native 
American rights in the nineteenth century.1 What, this project asks, are the impacts of the 
alliance between women and Native Americans in the nineteenth century debate over 
1	  Throughout	  this	  project	  I	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  Native	  American	  Studies	  scholars	  and	  use	  the	  terms	  
Indians	  and	  Native	  Americans	  interchangeably	  except	  when	  part	  of	  a	  proper	  name	  or	  title.	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Indian Removal?2 How might two groups of people similarly excluded from patriarchal 
systems of government by race and gender turn their exclusion into arguments for 
inclusion and do so forcefully enough to demand attention without also jeopardizing their 
success? In what ways might this alliance change how scholars interpret the goals and 
strategies of both the women’s rights and Native American rights movements? 
While arguments made by women and Native Americans during Indian Removal 
receive considerable scholarly attention, most studies – especially those concerned with 
women’s involvement – subordinate Indian Removal to abolition, or they create 
significant omissions in the narratives of both movements by adopting a critical approach 
that interprets the strategic use of racialized and gendered discourse as evidence of 
assimilation rather than resistance.3 In “Creating Domestic Dependents,” I employ a 
cultural studies approach that is informed by Native American Studies and Rhetorical 
Studies to situate Indian Removal as a significant intersection of the Native American 
rights and women’s rights movements. I argue that during Indian Removal white women 
and the Cherokee come together to fight for rights by situating property-- the very thing 
used to exclude them-- at the center of arguments for their own rights and against the 
forced removal of Native American tribes. Arguing from similarly liminal spaces, women 
and Native Americans create an interdependent approach that simultaneously embraces 
and rejects their prescribed societal roles in order to construct a rhetorical strategy that 
relies on moments of public solidarity and strategic distance. These instances, in turn, 
2	  When I speak of women in this project, I refer, mainly to white women. While Cherokee women did 
indeed speak out against Indian Removal, their actions were largely limited to tribal proceedings and 
therefore were not as predominant a factor in the national debate over Removal and rights. Recent work to 
recover Cherokee women’s public rhetoric on Removal does however, make the relationship between 
Cherokee and white women an intriguing avenue for  further expanding this project. 
3 Examples of this approach include Alisse Portnoy’s reading of Catherine Beecher’s “Circular Addressed 
to Benevolent Women” in Their Right to Speak: Women’s Activism in the Indian and Slave Debates as well 
as Arnold Krupat’s Red Matters.	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provide the opportunity to rethink narratives of women’s rights and Native American 
rights and to explore Indian Removal as a key moment for understanding the ways that 
property rights, race, and gender inform ideas of citizenship in nineteenth century 
America.4 
The document that perhaps best embodies the goals, anxieties, complexities and 
conflicting outcomes of Indian Removal is the “Treaty with the Cherokee, 1866.” 
Proclaimed on August 11, 1866, it is the final treaty between the Cherokee Nation and 
the United States government, which means it officially brings to a close the system of 
treating with Indian tribes that dated back to the earliest colonies. It also marks the end of 
public debates over Indian Removal by codifying the process in law. One of the main 
aims of the 1866 treaty is to establish within the Cherokee Nation those institutions 
deemed necessary for a properly functioning, civilized nation5. To that end, the treaty 
establishes a federally recognized system of representative government including tribal 
governments, an inter-tribal council for all of Indian Territory, and a court system. It also 
creates a national fund for the monies of the Cherokee Nation and clearly establishes the 
geographical boundaries of their reservation. In many ways, the tribal structure outlined 
in the treaty recreates in their western territory the systems of governance established in 
the Cherokee’s 1827 Constitution—a document praised by many as a marker of their 
4	  While this project certainly covers a time span in which questions of race and the debate over slavery 
informed public discourse and literature, I will not be directly addressing these issues beyond referencing, 
where necessary, theories of race or slavery that directly impacted Indians or women. Although Ezra Tawil 
and Alisse Portnoy argue that Indian Removal and abolition cannot be separated, I feel that even though 
similar types of racial injustice underlie both movements, historic attitudes toward Indians and those views 
offered by both Anglo-Americans and Indian writers point to an understood difference between the two 
groups and rights movements that must be accounted for in my analysis.	  
5	  The terms civility, civilized and civilization are used throughout this project to refer to the stated purpose 
and goal of campaigns aimed at assimilating Indians, not to affirm the validity of the racialized and 
gendered measures of societal or individual development connected to these terms in the nineteenth 
century.	  
4	  
civilized nature. Though the institutions and correlating relationships established by the 
1866 treaty with their seemingly straightforward structures appear to offer the Cherokee 
the possibility of more control over their own affairs, in reality, they severely limit the 
ability of the Cherokee Nation to define itself as a sovereign nation.  Unlike the Cherokee 
constitution, ultimate power lies with the U.S. federal government. For example, even 
though the tribal and inter-tribal councils had the right to make laws and punish 
perpetrators, those laws could not contradict any laws of the United States, and Indian 
courts were not permitted to try cases involving white men. Similarly, limiting the 
Cherokee Nation’s access to property by establishing it as an economic ward restricted 
sovereignty. Investments concerning the national fund were managed by the U.S. 
government, which also stipulated the ways the Cherokee were allowed to spend their 
allowances.6 Perhaps the most important way that the federal government limited 
Cherokee sovereignty was by using land settlement to shift Cherokee identity from one 
defined culturally to one defined by place.  
Even though the Cherokee’s landholdings were clearly described, who might 
settle there was less so. The Cherokee themselves were able to settle on the parcels of 
land described in the treaty and the US government, by this very treaty, retained the right 
to “settle any civilized Indians, friendly with the Cherokee and adjacent tribes within the 
Cherokee country, on unoccupied lands” (946). Should these tribes of Indians “abandon 
their tribal organization” they might, after paying a sum for their own support to the 
Cherokee national fund, “enjoy all rights of native Cherokees” (947).  In realistic terms, 
6	  According to the structures laid out in Article 23 of the 1866 treaty, fifty percent of the Cherokee’s annual 
spending was dedicated to “general purposes” and the remaining fifty percent must be split between 
common schools and education (35%) and the orphan fund (15%). Notably, the Cherokee council reserved 
the rights to inspect the accounts and books kept by the government, but they did not have the ability to 
change this formula or control the investment of their money (949).	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the US government controlled who might actually live in Cherokee territory based on its 
own estimation of the degree of a tribe’s civility and the need for expediency. The idea of 
being able to simply transplant one Indian culture into the midst of another with little 
repercussion relies on a concept of race that saw all Indians as interchangeable.  Not only 
was an Indian an Indian regardless of actual differences in culture, but a person could be 
made a Cherokee simply by living in Cherokee Territory.  The reverse was also true.  
Article 19, which addresses those Cherokee residing in the Arkansas territory ceded in 
the treaty, pits the desire to retain one’s home and land against the desire to belong to the 
Cherokee Nation. In phrasing that echoes the patriarchal language of Indian Removal, the 
treaty declares that those male “heads of families” that want to move from the ceded area 
and into the new bounds of the Cherokee Nation will be rewarded with the standard one 
hundred sixty acres.  Anyone who wishes to remain on land located outside the new 
boundaries “shall be entitled to receive a patent from the United States in fee-simple for 
three hundred and twenty acres of land to include his improvements, and thereupon he 
and his family shall cease to be members of the nation” (948).  One could not be legally 
identified as Cherokee without living on the reservation. Location was tantamount to 
legal, racial, and cultural identity. To remain on the land was to inhabit a liminal space 
with no national identity or the rights of citizenship. 
This easy transfer of culture onto location is exhibited not only with the resettling 
of civilized tribes among the Cherokee or the continuing reshuffling of the Cherokee 
themselves, but also with the treatment of former slaves and free black men and women.  
Article 9 of the treaty states that the Cherokee, having abolished slavery, “agree that all 
freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of their former owners or by law, as 
6	  
well as all free colored persons who were in the country at the commencement of the 
rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may return within six months and their 
descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees” (944). Among the rights 
extended to the Freedmen was the ability to own land and participate in the tribal 
government. Thus, membership in the Cherokee Nation changed the status of these 
individuals from property to property owners and therefore people capable of rights and 
national identity, at least in the Cherokee Nation. Ultimately, the terms outlined by the 
1866 treaty made property the key determinate in legal citizenship in the Cherokee 
Nation; however, by declaring this property within the geographical bounds of the United 
States but outside legal representation, it did not offer the Freedmen or the Cherokee 
citizenship or rights as Americans. Instead the 1866 treaty drew upon what Sally L. Kitch 
describes as gender’s ability to serve as “a mechanism for conceptualizing and judging 
the diversity of human physiology and culture” and provide the “organizing principles 
that fueled the process of racialization” (4). It made them once again, as Chief Justice 
John Marshall declared in the 1831 Cherokee Nation v Georgia ruling, “domestic 
dependent nations” that inhabited a gendered and racialized liminal space. Indian 
Territory and the Cherokee Nation became that place between east and west, foreign and 
domestic, savage and civilized.  
In reading the 1866 Treaty and other texts in this project, I build on the work done 
by scholars to elucidate the ways in which gender and race have been used to sanction 
acts of cultural and physical violence, define rights, and justify imperialism. As Annette 
Kolodny argues in Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American 
Life and Letters, rhetoric concerning the land, particularly its feminization, is what made 
7	  
early colonial efforts feasible. Promotional tracts and later American pastoralism relied 
on the concept of a feminized, virgin land that would willingly give of its bounty with 
proper, European husbandry. To say that the land was virgin, unused, and untilled used 
erroneous depictions of Indians as hunters only to discount their approach to agriculture 
and declare them unfit as potential husbands because they had failed to behave in 
appropriately masculine ways to subdue the land. As suggested by Kolodny, defining 
Indians as feminine meant literature promoting American settlement also used gender to 
racially other them. Their status as gendered and racialized others supported a narrative 
of Indian identity that alternately placed Indians beneath Anglo-Americans in Christian 
social and political hierarchies or outside of these heirarchies altogether depending on 
which was most advantageous to Anglo-Americans at the moment. When justifying the 
civilizing mission, Indians were depicted as part of Anglo-American hierarchies and 
capable of adopting the ways of their civilizers. When Indians resisted the civilizing 
mission or other processes set in motion by Anglo-Americans, they became 
unredeemable savages who lived outside the bounds of white hierarchies.7 Both 
classifications almost universally resulted in stripping Indians of their status as property 
owners. In “Whiteness as Property,” Cheryl Harris describes this as a process whereby 
“[p]ossession—the act necessary to lay the basis for rights in property—was defined to 
include only the cultural practices of whites” (1721). If Indians were savage and no 
longer owned property, then large swaths of land became available to white settlers who 
might claim it on the grounds of their own civilization and right of possession—an 
7	  For a thorough history of these alternating views of Indians in the early colonies and colonial literature 
see Kathleen M. Brown’s Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs.	  
8	  
ideology developed in court cases and Indian policies.8 Not only was this process of 
taking Indian property codified by the legal system, through the process of civilizing 
Indians, generations of Anglo-Americans and the federal government participated in a 
complex system in which land, property ownership, and female and Indian identities were 
used as terms against which American citizenship and concepts of rights were defined.9  
The civilizing mission was part of a larger process of determining who might be 
granted the rights outlined in the nation’s founding documents. Both the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution provide a liberal construction of the relationship 
between citizens and the government premised on John Locke’s theories about the nature 
of the social contract. These founding documents posit that the relationship between the 
government and the governed is a voluntary one in which the governed give consent to be 
governed in exchange for certain protections. As citizens in a voluntary contract they 
might, as in the case of elections and constitutional amendments, renegotiate the terms of 
their consent. Should a government fail to fulfill its obligations or infringe upon an 
individual’s life, liberty, or property, they can rebel. Thus, citizenship becomes a 
8	  Arguably the most influential case in redefining Indian land rights in the nineteenth century was Johnson 
v. McIntosh. For history of this case and its implications see discussion in chapter two of this project as
well as Stuart Banner’s How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier and Blake A. 
Watson’s Buying America from the Indians: Johnson v. McIntosh and the History of Native Land Rights. 
For perhaps the most exhaustive history of Indian policies see Frances Paul Prucha’s The Great Father: 
The United States Government and the American Indians. Vol I. Also of note for their analysis of the 
treating process and government responses to Indian nations are Reginald Horsman’s Expansion and 
American Indian Policy 1783-1812; David A. Nichols, Red Gentlemen and White and Michael Paul 
Rogin’s Fathers and Children.One of the most prolific writers on Native American sovereignty and 
policies past and present, Vine Deloria Jr. offers a number of studies of Indian policy and legal structures 
approached from the position of Native Americans including his monograph Behind the Trail of Broken 
Treaties. and collaboration with David E. Wilkins Tribes, Treaties, and Constitutional Tribulations as well 
as his work with Clifford M. Lytle American Indians, American Justice. 
9	  	  For studies that consider the confluence of race, gender, law and rights in the native community see Beth 
H. Piotate Domestic Subjects: Gender, Citizenship, and Law in Native American Literature; Joanne Barber 
Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity and Mark Rifkin When Did Indians Become 
Straight?:Kinship, the History of Sexuality, and Native Sovereignty. Notable studies on gender and 
women’s rights include Nancy Cott Bonds of Womanhood: “woman’s sphere” in New England 1780-1835; 
Elizabeth Maddox Dillon The Gender of Freedom: Fictions of Liberalism and the Literary Public Sphere.  
And Linda K. Kerber No Constitutional Right to be Ladies. 
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voluntary relationship with the state that guarantees individuals freedom, property, and 
political participation in exchange for consent. Having rights then, comes to mean being 
able to claim for oneself those privileges guaranteed to an individual upon entering into a 
social contract with the government.  For women and Indians the ability to claim the 
status of an individual capable of consent proves one of the largest obstacles to rights.  
As Kitch contends, the idea of social contract and the benefits it afforded an 
individual had always been subject to gendered notions. She points out that “Locke 
claimed that Nature had made all men independent and free regardless of their many 
differences. But that same Nature had made women dependent and weak” (24). Similarly, 
Immanuel Kant based his political subordination of women to men on ideas that men and 
women had complementary rights, chiefly that, men had the right to protect women and 
women had the right to this protection (Kitch 24). The gender hierarchy proposed by 
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant also served as the foundation for their racial theories, which 
posited that, like women, Indians and other marginalized groups were incapable of 
participating in the social contract on equal footing with white men. In the United States, 
such “natural” gender and racial differences were codified in the legal construct of 
coverture, which made women and Indians dependents without the freedom, autonomy, 
or property necessary to fully engage in the social contract with the state—those qualities 
Elizabeth Maddock Dillon claims are essential to liberalism’s construction of the 
“modern subject” as an individual with the “capacity to consent” (2). Based on English 
law, coverture laws established a series of patriarchal relationships (child/parent, 
wife/husband, guardian/ward) that excluded women and Indians by placing them outside 
of the bounds of political participation. Coverture ensured that women and Indians 
10	  
experienced what Kitch describes as “derivative citizenship” meaning that their 
relationship to the state was always dependent upon that of a white man (175).   
 As children, wives, or wards, whose citizenship was derived from men, women 
and Indians were also incapable of property ownership because they never achieved the 
legal status of independent adults capable of engaging in contracts, including those for 
land or the earnings of their own labor. Upon marriage a woman’s real property and her 
labor became her husband’s. Similarly, treaty negotiations between Indian tribes and the 
federal government handed property over to the government and reinforced Indians’ 
rhetorical and legal position as the children of the “Great [white] Father”—the 
President.10 This loss of property was particularly damaging because, as Dillon points 
out, “historically, the notion of a political authority located in the independent agency of 
the citizen is closely linked to property ownership” (21). Without independence or 
property to exchange in the social contract, women and Indians became incapable of 
claiming rights. Therefore, citizenship conferred on them not rights but obligations. Linda 
K. Kerber argues that “obligation is the means by which the state can control the 
freedoms of individual citizens” (xxi). Paired together, rights and obligations form a basic 
understanding that the protections offered by the government obligate a citizen to behave 
in certain ways and undertake particular tasks. For example, a jury trial can be guaranteed 
only if citizens serve as jurors. When the two terms are uncoupled, as they are in the case 
of women and Indians, the result is a constriction of the terms of citizenship wherein one 
is subject to the duties but not the benefits. Thus in the nineteenth century women and 
10	  The term “Great Father” was used by both Anglo-Americans and Indians in treaty negotiations to 
describe the nature of the political relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. Meant to evoke 
ideas of kinship, in the nineteenth century, its meaning shifts along with Indian Policy. See chapters one 
and two for a fuller discussion of this term and its implications.	  
11	  
Indians found themselves subject to a definition of citizenship based only on obligation. 
Their inability to consent to be governed or own property meant they were obligated to 
the state but that the state had no obligation to them in return.   
Nonetheless, for all of the ways that American legal structures sought to exclude 
women and Indians from claiming the rights of citizenship conferred on white men, their 
presence was crucial to the definition of rights in the United States. Dillon argues that 
“liberalism does not exclude women so much as it creates and reserves a discrete position 
for women within its structure,” which in turn serves to maintain a rigid distinction 
between men and women (3).  Women and Indians become those groups through which 
rights of freedom, political choice, and property are constructed as white and male.  Dana 
D. Nelson argues that through the construction of oppositional relationships the presence 
of groups disenfranchised by a lack of property rights helped to give “the abstracting 
identity of white, national manhood…one means for stabilizing its internal divisions and 
individual anxieties” (67). In short, rights become the domain of white men only if 
women, Indians, and other groups are also present. The problem with this construction is 
that it once again returns to oppositional binaries to define rights and in doing so 
disregards the fact that in the fight for rights women and Indians had to overcome 
gendered and racialized exclusion by simultaneously inhabiting what they were and were 
not. They had to use both sides of the binary to create a space between that allowed them 
to maneuver. 
Women and Indians found that the civilizing mission and the rise of ideas of 
domesticity, both of which sought to define the terms of their exclusion, also offered the 
means of challenging it. If creating citizenship as white and male made women and 
12	  
Indians oppositional figures, then the rhetoric of domesticity made further use of women 
and Indians to couch what was at heart a patriarchal, imperialist endeavor in the rhetoric 
of the home and civilization. Amy Kaplan contends that the rhetoric of domesticity 
“became an engine of national expansion, the site from which the nation reaches beyond 
itself through the emanation of woman’s moral influence” (29).11 One of the ways 
women had long practiced their influence was in the mission to civilize the Indian. By 
raising money, writing political tracts, serving as missionaries, and in other ways 
participating in foreign missions that sought to convert Indians to Christian ways, women 
were “policing domestic boundaries against the threat of foreignness” by upholding a 
standard that Indian peoples must meet to be considered civilized and providing the 
support needed to make Indian tribes worthy of inclusion in the national family (Kaplan 
28). As women’s work with missions reveals, determining whether a marginalized group 
is being victimized by a concept or manipulating it to their own needs is complicated by 
the fact that these processes shared vocabularies, theories and strategies.  
Therefore, in examining Indian Removal, I follow the lead of Native American 
Studies scholars who insist on readings of native texts that recognizing the subversive 
power of appropriating the rhetoric and practices of a dominant discourse for new 
purposes. As Native American Studies scholars show, when analyzing the actions of 
peoples outside dominant power structures, it becomes especially important to recognize 
that the adoption of the practices and rhetoric of the dominant culture provide a means of 
11	  As Gillian Brown argues in Domestic Individualism: Imagining Self in Nineteenth-Century America, 
ideas of domesticity brought together concepts of race, gender, and class in ways that allowed men and 
women to use the home to create identity; however, as Lori Merish points out in Sentimental Materialism 
domesticity was likewise connected to the market. The ability of domesticity to both conscribe women’s 
political participation and expand it	  is also explored in works about women’s public advocacy including 
Lori D. Ginzberg’s Women and the Work of Benevolence and Ann M. Boylan’s The Origins of Women’s 
Activism: New York and Boston 1797-1840.	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resisting and/or adapting to changing circumstances in ways that benefit native 
communities and frequently ensure their continuance.12 Misreading of Native American 
texts that present natives as comfortable with white culture or espouse ideas of the 
civilizing mission result in assimilationist readings that present such ideas and their 
producers as inauthentic and discount what are valuable acts of resistance. As a result, 
historical and literary narratives of the Native American rights movement become 
marked by chronological and theoretical omissions. The accounts of Native American 
rights offered by scholars and native rights groups begin with a repositioning of Indian 
nations after the Revolutionary War, then move to the loss of property and forced 
removal precipitated by the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and the forced march west on 
the Trail of Tears for the Southeastern tribes or violent relocations of Southwestern tribes. 
Many more narratives of Indian’s rights offered by scholars and rights groups do not even 
begin until the fight for self-definition and sovereignty in the post-removal period.13 
Indian Removal remains a pivotal moment in Native American history, but it also 
remains a lacuna. 
Interestingly, Indian Removal is also a gap in the narrative of women’s rights. 
Like their Native American counterparts, actions by women in this period are also 
12	  For examples of this method see Maureen Konkle, Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and the 
Politics of Historiography, 1827-1863; Lisa Brooks, The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in 
the Northeast; Robert Allen Warrior. Tribal Secrets: Recovering American Indian Intellectual Traditions.; 
and Laura L. Mielke. Moving Encounters: Sympathy and the Indian Question in Antebellum Literature.	  
13	  Recent scholarship on tribal sovereignty and history is largely divided into two categories: pre and post 
removal. Pre-removal studies like Lisa Brook’s The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the 
Northeast and David J. Carlson’s Sovereign Selves: American Indian Autobiography and the Law look to 
recover native spaces and voices in early America. Works concerning the history and states of native 
peoples post-removal frequently raise questions about whether the reservations are colonial or post-colonial 
societies as in Elizabeth Cook-Lynn’s A Separate Country: Postcoloniality and American Indian Nations 
and how modern nations negotiate the complex relationships with the federal government in Charles 
Wilkinson Blood Struggle: the Rise of Modern Indian Nations. Literary approaches such as those offered 
by Lucy Maddox in Citizen Indians: Native American Intellectuals, Race, and Reform and Womack’s Red 
on Red: Native American Literary Separatism work to develop a theory of native literary and cultural 
production in the post-removal period. 
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frequently read through an assimilationist lens. As supporters of the missions to the 
Indians, particularly the Southeastern tribes, women had been involved in the 
development and support of the discourse of civilization. Nonetheless, they too found in 
this discourse and their work with Native peoples the means for challenging their own 
exclusion. By using the rhetoric of Christian benevolence and women’s prescribed gender 
roles, women found a means of advocating on behalf of Indians and themselves. Yet 
these uses go largely unrecognized because they repeat many of the tropes of racial and 
gender difference employed by others to restrict their rights. Thus narratives of women’s 
rights offered by the likes of the Susan B. Anthony Center, the Library of Congress, and 
scholars such as Nancy Cott and Linda K. Kerber and more recent works by Katherine 
Kish Sklar focus on the restriction of rights after the Revolutionary War, followed by 
expanded education in the 1820s, which led to the beginning of the movement proper in 
1848 with the Seneca Falls Convention.  This trajectory largely ignores the political 
activism and arguments for rights made by women during Indian Removal. To more fully 
understand the rhetorical strategies of both Indians and white women during Indian 
Removal and more fully develop the narrative of both rights movements, texts must be 
read with an eye for moments of acculturation when women and Indians create a new 
space between prescribed poles of identity by selectively employing the ideas and 
rhetoric from both.  
Adopting an approach that emphasizes selective acculturation over assimilation 
also helps to address the problems that occur when scholars attempt to connect the 
women’s rights and Native American rights movements. When scholars such as Kaplan, 
Kitsch, Sklar, and Alisse Portnoy others connect women’s rights to the fight against 
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Indian Removal, they frequently make the move to also connect it to abolition. Thus 
women’s involvement in Indian Removal is presented as a warm up for their later, and it 
is implied, more radical work in abolition and the women’s rights movement. What 
results are studies that elide the significant differences between Indian Removal and 
abolition, namely the very different rhetorical and logistical challenges posed by arguing 
for tribes who had long-recognized property rights versus a group of people considered to 
be property. Linking together these two distinct movements through the use of women’s 
involvement also recreates in scholarship pieces of the mentality that allowed the U.S. 
government to redefine Cherokee identity in the 1866 treaty by making Indians and 
African Americans interchangeable others. In the end, attempts to align women’s and 
Native American rights movements have proven as problematic as those that divide them, 
for in their attempts to create linear accounts of history both produce significant 
omissions and echo the oversimplified, straightforward trajectories of savage to civilized 
and east to west used to frame the terms of the Indian Removal debate. 
This project works to disrupt these trajectories by using the paradigm shift 
proposed by Daniel K. Richter in Facing East from Indian Country to establish Indian 
Removal as an intersection of the women’s rights and Native American rights 
movements. Richter contends that in order to understand American expansion from the 
Indian viewpoint, and I would argue any viewpoint other than the cultural dominant, one 
must abandon the accepted westward trajectory and instead stand in Indian country and 
look east. Whether that Indian country is the Arkansas reservation of the nineteenth 
century or the Ohio Valley in the 1750s, facing east creates a shift in place and 
perspective that allows critics to focus on those people and moments largely excluded 
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from official histories and challenge the rhetoric of westward movement with its 
attendant ideas of manifest destiny, the forward march of civilized nations over savage 
ones, and property as central to personhood and nationhood. Facing east not only brings 
into focus new groups and moments but it challenges the ways history and ideas move 
people. Instead of one straightforward trajectory imagined by expansionists and too often 
reinforced by historians and literary critics, facing east reveals intriguingly fluid paths 
that circle back on themselves, make abrupt turns, zigzag, and frequently cross the paths 
of others. 
As part of establishing Indian Removal as an intersection of the women’s rights 
and Native American rights movements, it is also important to make sure a variety of 
voices are included.  For, as Laura L. Mielke contends in Moving Encounters: Sympathy 
and the Indian Question in Antebellum Literature, interaction between whites and Indians 
was necessary, perhaps even vital, to native survival. Therefore, in this project I seek to 
disrupt trajectories and explore intersections. Using a wide variety of voices and texts 
including historical romances, domestic novels, legislative acts, Supreme Court cases, 
speeches, memorials, circulars, and newspaper articles, I mark moments within the fight 
against Indian Removal when the needs of women’s and Native American rights 
movements converged and diverged to allow both groups to use gender and race to 
challenge the patriarchal structures that had excluded them. While for the purposes of 
creating a clear structure, the instances I examine are indeed arranged chronologically 
and contextualized using the social, cultural, and legal history of the time, all of the texts 
examined work to in some way destabilize the straightforward trajectories of time, nation, 
civilization and expansion, by using what Lauren Berlant terms counter-memory to 
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challenge constructions of both past and present in order to ultimately revise both (6).14 
Therefore my reading of the variety of responses to Indian Removal alongside the 
legislation to which they frequently responded focuses on highlighting the ways authors 
question notions of past and present as decided, finite categories in order to explode the 
male/female, civilized/savage, domestic/public dichotomies that confined them and 
sanction their subversive actions by writing their own precedents. 
Chapter one explores how in the 1820s, when the literary market was flooded 
with republications of many Puritan texts and captivity narratives -- including Winthrop’s 
History of New England, Cotton Mather’s Magnalia Christi Americana and the captivity 
narratives of Mary Rowlandson and Mary Jemison -- Catherine Sedgwick and Lydia 
Maria Child use the genre of historical romance to reconfigure relationships between 
women and Indians in order to create counter-narratives of American history that 
critiqued the ways both groups have been marginalized. I am particularly interested in 
how in Hobomok and Hope Leslie; or Early Times in the Massachusetts, Child and 
Sedgwick shape their protest of the exclusion of women and Indians by simultaneously 
addressing the past and present through characters that challenge nineteenth century ideas 
of rights, race and gender by complicating the relationships between the individual, the 
state, and the home. 
While scholarship on Hope Leslie and Hobomok has long acknowledged the ways 
in which Sedgwick and Child re-insert women and Indians into the Puritan past, the 
scholarship too frequently concentrates almost exclusively on the role of women and in 
doing so repeats to some extent the subordination or erasure of an Indian presence seen in 
14	  As defined by Berlant in The Anatomy of National Fantasy, a counter memory is “the residual material 
that is not identical with the official meanings of the political public sphere” (6).	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the Puritan texts that Sedgwick and Child revise. In this vein, Lucy Maddox sees Hope 
Leslie and Hobomok as a female answer to William Gilmore Simm’s call for a national 
literature that made use of Indians but also “declared the Indians necessarily irrelevant to 
the future of American society” (36). Carolyn L. Karcher reads Hobomok as Childs’ 
defiant critique of a patriarchal society. Mary Kelley claims that Hope Leslie “has two 
basic concerns. The first addresses the Puritans’ subjugation of the indigenous 
population, and the second presents a tale of romance among the Puritans” (xxi). 
However, in the next breath Kelley launches into a lengthy discussion of the 
unconventional female characters presented in the text before eventually returning to 
Sedgwick’s ideas on Indians to explain how her belief that they are not inferior manifests 
itself in the text (xxix). In his work The Making of Racial Sentiment, Ezra Tawil removes 
Indians entirely from Hope Leslie in order to contend that the novel is really about 
individuals who never appear in the text—slaves.  While all of these approaches are 
useful for understanding particular aspects of the two novels, their failure to do full 
justice to the interconnectedness of gender and race in the Indian Removal debates 
ultimately removes the texts from the complicated politics and social circumstances in 
which they were produced and on which they consequently offer commentary.  
Therefore, my reading of Hobomok and Hope Leslie privileges those moments in 
which relationships between white women and Indians such as those found between 
Hobomok and Mary Conant or Hope Leslie and Magawisca, Oneko, and Nelema serve as 
the foundation for challenges to those institutions, namely the church and state, that 
excluded them both. By examining these moments, I argue that, in the novels, being 
deemed worthy or unworthy of citizenship hinges on a person’s ability to negotiate 
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productive relationships with Indian figures, and in this the women of the two novels far 
exceed the men. The message of women’s fitness for citizenship based on their 
relationships with Indians and capacity for bold action, delivered in the form of a 
historical romance, allows Child and Sedgwick to write for themselves a historical 
precedent for the actions women and Indians were taking in the nineteenth century. 
The second chapter explores how when the fight over Indian Removal moved to 
the pages of periodicals and the Eastern band of the Cherokee Nation took an active role 
in the fight, the challenge facing women and Indians became determining how two 
marginalized groups might use their exclusion from patriarchal structures, namely 
property and citizenship rights, to argue for inclusion and do so with enough force to 
demand the attention of the American people. In order to counter the laws of coverture 
and the figuration of women’s rights as duties, women must reconfigure the concept of 
duties in ways that placed their work on Indian Removal within their prescribed purview, 
which meant depicting Indians as either children or savages in need of Christian 
guidance. For the Cherokee, who had been feminized by their association with the land 
and infantilized by the concepts of the Great Father, successfully arguing for their 
property and rights required them to appropriate the patriarchal construction of the Great 
Father in order to prove their collective manhood, which meant at times publicly defining 
themselves in opposition to white women. Such acts of defining themselves through and 
against the systems that would exclude them as well as each other create two seemingly 
disparate rights movements and a rhetoric that is, on the surface, marked by an absence of 
engagement between women and Indians. However, I argue that when examined more 
closely, these instances are in fact deliberate, strategic rhetorical choices that allow the 
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Cherokee and their female advocates to construct interdependent approaches to tackling 
the issue of Indian Removal. By appearing to ignore each other, women and Indians have 
the opportunity to play to their individual strengths while they also collectively construct 
a more complete rhetoric of rights. 
 In this chapter I track the construction of these alliances by means of absence 
through accounts of U.S./Indian relations and reconstructions of the trope of the Great 
Father offered in three texts: the 1829 “Memorial of the Cherokee People,” Catherine 
Beecher’s “Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies of the United States,” and the 
“Letter to the American People” adopted by John Ross and the Cherokee leadership. 
Written in direct response to Andrew Jackson’s First Annual Address to Congress, the 
“Memorial of the Cherokee People” responds to Jackson’s version of the history of 
U.S./Indian interactions and use of the Great Father to restrict Indian Rights by offering a 
vision of an Indian father. Published a mere five days after the Cherokee Memorial, 
Beecher’s “Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies” adopts many of the same 
depictions of history as the Cherokee but counters the use of the Great Father with a 
reading of the national family that promotes shared parenting over a patriarchal family 
structure and subtly emphasizes the ability of Cherokee men to be parents of their own 
nation. In their “Letter to the American People” the Cherokee build on previous 
reconfigurations of the Great Father to directly attack the Jackson administration’s 
actions and patently reject the classification of Indians as savages or children. Published 
in The Cherokee Phoenix, the official print organ of the Cherokee Nation, and in white 
newspapers, these texts present on their pages and in their publication histories the ways 
that close relationships must be reconfigured as distant and the distant made personal if 
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women and Indians were to counter removalist arguments and call the American people 
to action. Taken as a whole, the rhetoric of rights constructed by women and the 
Cherokee Nation used moments of distance and alliance to provide Americans with the 
impetus and means for acting in support of the Cherokee Nation, and it used gender and 
race to reconfigure the relationship between duties, rights and citizenship in a way that 
made it possible to challenge the basic tenets of representational government.  
In chapter three, “Bad Beginnings,” I look at how the women’s rights and Native 
American rights movements continue to intersect and inform each other even after the 
Cherokee are removed on the Trail of Tears and women have gathered to make their 
declarations in Seneca Falls, by reading E.D.E.N Southworth’s Retribution and Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables through the lens of the 1831 ruling on the 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. Chief Justice Marshall’s ruling, which drew upon what 
Kaplan calls domesticity’s imperialistic meanings to conflate geographic location, rights, 
race and gender in ways that foreclosed many of the possibilities of assimilation and 
rights imagined by those fighting Indian Removal and cleared the way for Georgia’s 
violent possession of Cherokee land and the continuing Indian wars in the South. In 
declaring the Cherokee “domestic dependents” and confining their rights within the 
domestic bounds of the US, Marshall’s ruling also makes violence and the liminal status 
of women and Indians a seemingly permanent part of the nation. So when Southworth 
and Hawthorne write their domestic fictions and construct homes as metaphors for the 
nation, even as they seek to revise the relationships between the inhabitants, they bring 
into these homes the violence of Indian Removal and the continuing marginalization of 
gendered and racialized others. Therefore, I argue that in Retribution and The House of 
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the Seven Gables, Indian Removal, with its violent taking of property and central 
question of what constitutes civilization, provides the vocabulary and theoretical 
strategies for talking about women’s rights and challenging the nation’s handling of 
people with liminal legal status. Through the use of curses, haunted houses, and violent 
personal relationships precipitated by what Jeffory Clymer terms “the racialized violence 
of property” (79), these novels create a complex exploration of race, gender, and class 
that challenge the foundations of American history and identity. In the end, I question 
whether the reconfigurations of interpersonal relationships and the establishment of new 
homes presented in the novels actually offer new model nations because these nations are 
always already inscribed in the rhetoric of the domestic. 
Copyright © Jesslyn R. Collins-Frohlich 2014
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Chapter Two
Making Space for an Other: The Individual, the State and the Home in Women’s 
Nineteenth Century Historical Romance 
As a specific genre aimed at organizing complex processes chronologically, 
timelines provide insight into what a society deems significant and how these moments 
are used help to make sense of the past and present.  The timelines of women’s rights and 
roles in America in the eighteenth and nineteenth century offered by groups such as the 
Susan B. Anthony Center for Women’s Leadership at Rochester University, PBS, the 
government of Michigan, the Annenberg organization, and the Library of Congress paint 
a picture of the women’s rights movement as a fight against the restrictive laws enacted 
after the Revolutionary War rooted in the improvements in women’s education during the 
1820s and beginning in earnest with the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention.15 Chronologies 
by scholars such as Linda K. Kerber, Nancy Cott and Mary Beth Norton often repeat this 
narrative of post-revolutionary restriction followed by a later suffrage movement. While 
all three explore very carefully the conditions of women in the early republic, they 
frequently focus on outlining the problems faced by women and place less emphasis on 
how women were challenging social and political norms prior to the Seneca Falls 
Convention in 1848. 16 For example, Kerber’s analysis, which spans several books, 
begins with a discussion of the position of women after the American Revolution in 
Women of the Republic and takes up women’s fight for their rights during the women’s 
15	  “US Suffrage Movement Timeline, 1792 to Present.” rochester.edu.;“Timeline of U.S. Women’s 
History.” pbs.org.; “Timeline-Highlights of U.S. Women’s History.” michigan.gov.; “Women’s Rights 
Timeline.” annenbergclassroom.org. 
16 For Norton, Cott, Kerber and later Gould, the early republic is defined as the period from the end of the 
Revolutionary War to the 1830s. I too will be adopting this definition of the early republic.	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suffrage movement (1848-1920) when she deems women begin to fight for their rights in 
earnest in No Constitutional Right to be Ladies.  
 Omissions and false divisions similarly mark timelines of the Native American 
rights movement. Those offered by many scholars and rights organizations are divided 
between an early, pre-revolution focus such as those integrated into the works of scholars 
like Brooks and Matt Cohen, and a post-removal focus that emphasizes Indian advocacy 
beginning with the Indian Removal Act of 1830, which is the most prevalent starting 
point for timelines by groups such as the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press.17 Still other accounts of Indian rights offered by the American Indian Movement 
mark the passing of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 as the beginning of the modern 
rights movement.18 In the case of both women’s and Indians’ rights the most significant 
gap left in these timelines is the historical moment in which the two movements intersect: 
the debate over Indian Removal. In this intersection women and Indians create a rhetoric of 
rights in which they fight against and utilize the limitations placed on them by simultaneously 
working outside of and within prescribed norms of behavior. 
 For both women and Indians, acceptable behavior was largely determined by 
ideas of race and gender, which through complicated legal, social, and rhetorical 
maneuvering, were used to make members of both groups into political and economic 
children who depended upon a patriarchal father figure to connect them to the state. 
Though women and Indians shared a restricted role in society, turning this shared 
experience into an actual alliance was tricky because of the ways interactions between the 
17	  Lisa Brooks, The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the Northeast. Cohen. The Networked 
Wilderness: Communicating in Early New England.; “A timeline of American Indian history affecting 
reporters’ access to land, records and meetings.” rcfp.org..  
18 Wittstock, Laura Waterman and Elaine J. Salinas. “A Brief History of the American Indian Movement.” 
aimoverment.org. 	  
25	  
two groups had been shaped by popular culture. Both before and after the Revolutionary 
War, the most prevalent depiction of women and Indians together was the captivity 
narrative, which worked to reinforce perceived racial, cultural, and religious differences 
between whites and Indians.  If women and Indians were going to work together against 
Indian Removal and for their individual rights, they must find a way to turn negative, 
fictional accounts of their interactions into real alliances that reshaped the very nature of 
their relationship in popular culture. While women chose a rhetoric of Christian duty and 
Indians emphasized historic precedent in order to counter popular images of their 
interactions, both groups forged their alliance by trading on an idea of shared humanity 
that was capable of making the past relevant to the present. The Christian duty to save 
lost souls through conversion was cited as the reason for the first colonies, and women 
drew upon this to justify their rhetorical approach and make the lessons of the past 
relevant to the nineteenth century. Likewise, the past became present in the fight for 
Indian rights because tribes sought the honoring of previous treaties and promises to 
ensure their right to land and citizenship in the nineteenth century. When real alliances 
were created and past became present, women and Indians were able to protest in new 
ways.  
In this chapter I examine the role Lydia Maria Child’s Hobomok and Catherine 
Maria Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie play in effecting such alliances and constructing a new 
rhetoric of rights by reading them in the context of nineteenth century debates about 
women’s and Indian rights in order to understand how historical romance can offer 
crucial critiques of the position of women and Indians in contemporary society. I am 
particularly interested in how Child and Sedgwick shape their protest by simultaneously 
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addressing the past and present through characters that challenge nineteenth century ideas 
of rights, race and gender by complicating the relationships between the individual, the 
state, and the home. 
Set in Salem in 1629, Lydia Maria Child’s 1824 novel Hobomok explores life in 
the early colony of Salem just prior to the Pequot War by narrating events in ways that 
highlight the experiences of the women and Indians who were largely excluded from the 
colony’s official records. The novel’s central plot focuses on the life of Mary Conant, the 
daughter of one of the colony’s most prominent, and most religiously bigoted, founders. 
Like her mother, Mary leaves behind education and wealth in England in order to be an 
obedient daughter who follows her father into the new world. However, she struggles to 
be faithful to a father and religious culture that forbid her to follow her passion and marry 
her love Charles Brown because of his loyalty to the Church of England. When the 
colony banishes Brown for allegedly cultivating unrest among its inhabitants, the two 
young lovers vow to be together again. Their reunion is postponed when Brown seeks his 
fortune on an East India ship that is reported to have sunk. Despondent, Mary hastily 
decides to marry Hobomok, a Wampanoag chief who long ago sacrificed his standing in 
his tribe in order to spend time with her and protect Salem. The two are united in a 
traditional Indian ceremony, and Mary begins her life as his wife. She later gives birth to 
Hobomok’s son whom she names Charles Hobomok Conant and affectionately calls little 
Hobomok. Though she begins to feel “something like affection” toward Hobomok for his 
generosity and love of her and his son, her heart still belongs to Brown (135). Hobomok 
knows his marriage to Mary is simply a substitute or placeholder, so when Brown 
reappears after capture, not shipwreck, Hobomok quickly divorces Mary, gives up his 
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claim to his son and removes to the west. Mary and Brown marry, are accepted back into 
Salem and the Conant household with open arms, and they raise little Hobomok with all 
of the advantages his inherited English wealth can provide.  
Set seven years after Hobomok, Catherine Maria Sedgwick’s 1827 novel Hope 
Leslie takes place in 1636 just after the Pequot War and tells the story of the its namesake 
Hope Leslie in her early adult years, when she lives with the Fletcher family in Bethel 
and Boston. Hope Leslie is the eldest daughter of Alice Fletcher, Mr. Fletcher’s cousin 
and first love whom he had to leave in England because he refused to give up his Puritan 
faith in order to marry her. Years later, after the death of her own husband, Alice Fletcher 
makes the long trip from England to Boston with her two daughters, Hope and Faith, and 
their aunt Dame Grafton. When Alice Fletcher dies her two daughters and Dame Grafton 
are left to the care of Mr. Fletcher and are blended into his already large household that 
also includes Oneco and Magawisca, the son and daughter of a Pequot chief. Hope 
embraces this new family and its patriarch and stays with Mr. Fletcher in Boston to help 
him recover from an illness while her sister Faith and Dame Grafton are sent ahead to the 
family home at Bethel just outside Springfield. In the time that Hope and Mr. Fletcher are 
in Boston waiting for him to recover, tragedy befalls the family when Magawisca and 
Oneco’s father, assuming his children are mistreated servants in the Fletcher household, 
attacks the home at Bethel. In the raid the Indians reclaim Magawisca and Oneco and kill 
Mrs. Fletcher and the youngest Fletcher child. They also carry Faith Leslie and Everell 
Fletcher into captivity. Everell is eventually redeemed when Magawisca selflessly 
sacrifices her arm by taking the deathblow intended for him. Faith Leslie, however, 
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remains with the tribe where she is protected by the care of Oneco whom she eventually 
marries.  
Despite their losses, the surviving members of the Fletcher family manage to pull 
together, and in many ways, Hope becomes their moral compass. She continually 
sacrifices her own safety and social standing to pursue the course of action she feels is the 
most moral. This includes defying the Puritan authorities by testifying on behalf of the 
Indian healer Nelema when she is accused of witchcraft and then helping her escape from 
the would-be executioners. Hope repeats this self-sacrifice later in the novel when 
Magawisca, through a plot of the devious Sir Phillip Gardiner, is accused of being part of 
an Indian uprising. Though Hope is barred from the courtroom because she is female, she 
still manages to once again free a condemned Indian woman from her jailers. In her 
steadfast moral acts, Hope gains the undying love of the Fletcher family, particularly 
Everell whom she eventually marries.  
 With their Puritan settings, Indian characters, and heroines, Hobomok and Hope 
Leslie were quickly labeled by nineteenth century critics as historical romances in the 
pattern of those written by Sir Walter Scott, James Fennimore Cooper, and other writers 
who looked to the past for their plots. Literary scholars today have frequently taken the 
classification of historical romance as the entry point for criticism and have offered 
readings of the novels based on how they uphold and subvert the genre’s conventions. 
The result is a body of scholarship that largely focuses on race and gender in the two 
works. Lucy Maddox sees Hope Leslie and Hobomok as a female answer to William 
Gilmore Simm’s call for a national literature that made use of Indians but also “declared 
the Indians necessarily irrelevant to the future of American society” (36). In her 
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introduction to Hobomok, Carolyn L. Karcher reads the novel as Childs’ defiant critique 
of a patriarchal society. Mary Kelley claims that the novel “has two basic concerns. The 
first addresses the Puritans’ subjugation of the indigenous population, and the second 
presents a tale of romance among the Puritans” (xxi). However, in the next breath Kelley 
begins a trope used by many literary critics of the novel and launches into a lengthy 
discussion of the unconventional female characters presented in the text before eventually 
returning to Sedgwick’s ideas on Indians to explain how her belief that they are not 
inferior manifest itself in the text (xxix). In his work The Making of Racial Sentiment, 
Ezra Tawil effectively repeats what the Puritans did in their histories and removes 
Indians entirely from Hope Leslie in order to contend that the novel is really about 
individuals who never appear in the text—slaves.  While all of these approaches are 
useful for understanding particular aspects of the two novels, what they ultimately do is 
in some way remove the texts from the complicated politics and social circumstances in 
which they were produced and on which they consequently offer commentary.  
Of course reading Hobomok and Hope Leslie in the context of the nineteenth 
century is complicated by the nineteenth century perception of historical romance’s 
relationship to actual historiography. As both Nina Baym and Phillip Gould point out, 
historical romance was seen as residing somewhere between historic record and novels.  
It was safer than novels in that it was seen to offer the opportunity to instruct, even being 
used in place of textbooks in many instances. Historical romance also offered an intimate 
look at individuals and intrigue often judged by nineteenth century readers to be missing 
from historical accounts. Gould warns that to read the Puritan history of the historical 
romance as “an analogue for the early republic” is to misunderstand or underestimate the 
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ways in which it speaks to its contemporary moment (8). Instead, the “language of 
anachronisms” presented by historical romances makes Puritanism a metaphor for the 
early republic that allows authors to redefine and comment upon their own society and its 
issues (Gould 8). For female writers, the ability to fictionalize and romanticize parts of 
history to include women offered a way of writing women, if not into the historical 
record, then certainly into contemporary conceptions or reinterpretations of it.19 
Historical romance also gave women a socially sanctioned entry into nineteenth century 
debates on citizenship, rights, Indian Removal, and other issues of concern to the young 
republic because, as Baym contends, history was seen as a means for instruction and 
deemed a safe, dignified field of study especially for women (13).  Puritanism in many 
ways serves as both an analogue to and sometimes a direct indictment of the republic on 
which Child’s and Sedgwick’s novels offer commentary. 
In the 1820s, the debate over how to address the presence of Indians, generally 
referred to as the “Indian Question,” a series of Indian wars with the Creek and Seminole, 
and an increased demand for the cession of Indian lands dominated the political 
landscape. In the need to construct a national narrative about expansion and Indians that 
justified their taking of Indian lands, Americans actively returned to their Puritan 
histories for models of how to proceed. The republication of many Puritan texts and 
19	  As Gould, Baym, and other scholars argue, in the nineteenth century the genres of history and historical 
fiction are closely related. Writers of both genres frequently drew on the same resources to present visions 
or revisions of the past. The extent to which writers of either genre stayed true to or revised history to 
appeal to the social and political beliefs of their nineteenth century audience is less clear than the 
fact/fiction divide typically used to describe the differences in the two genres. This is also to say nothing of 
the view among many literary scholars that “historical ‘reality’ is as much created as recorded” (Gould 8). 
Given the blurring of the lines between historical reality and historical fiction during the early nineteenth 
century as well as the fact that many of the documents historians and novelist drew upon were the personal 
accounts and reflections of Puritan leaders, making a concrete distinction between history (what actually 
happened) and history (what people record or argue really happened) seems superficial at best. Therefore, I 
will be using the term history to refer to both.	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captivity narratives, including Winthrop’s History of New England, Cotton Mather’s 
Magnalia Christi Americana and the captivity narratives of Mary Rowlandson and Mary 
Jemison, highlighted the prominent role of history in the early nineteenth century 
literature. In fact, “over 85% of the nation’s best sellers during the 1820s were books of 
history” (Gould 9). The presence of so many history and history-based texts at the time 
also points to parallels between nineteenth century and Puritan concerns over faith, rights, 
the status of the republic, and how to handle the presence of Indians in the face of 
expansion. Texts by Winthrop, Mather and others, re-presented to the American public 
the ways in which Indians were removed by their ancestors and from the national 
consciousness at a time when precisely the same questions must be addressed.   
 While a return to history could be fruitful, it also risked reproducing the problems 
of the past. In eighteenth and nineteenth century captivity narratives, novels, newspaper 
accounts, sermons and official histories of early America, the relationship between 
women and Indians was problematic at best. Both groups were routinely excluded from 
written records except when their inclusion proved in some ways advantageous to 
established systems of government, church or dominant ideology. For example, captivity 
narratives reinforced the need to protect white women and punish those Indians who 
interfered with Puritan expansion. Rarely did acts of female strength or Indian civility 
appear in Puritan accounts or histories. This selective exclusion, or “structuring absence” 
as Tawil would label it, was both a function of and justification for their marginalized 
status and lack of rights (6). Returning to these depictions of history in the nineteenth 
century reinforced the exclusion of women and Indians in the contemporary moment and 
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in many ways sanctioned the continued restriction of rights by providing a cultural 
precedent. However, it also offered the opportunity for revision. 
In Sex and Citizenship in Antebellum America, Nancy Isenberg contends “equality 
was a difficult concept because it was premised on a false dichotomy. Women had to act 
exactly like men to secure equal rights, and yet they were supposedly so different that 
they had to be treated as a special sexual caste” (xii). Inclusion in this “special sexual 
caste” meant that the differences between men and women were increasingly emphasized 
over their shared attributes. These differences were institutionalized by a series of laws 
that made women perpetual children that required the constant protection of the white 
patriarchy and were legally incapable of property ownership once they married. As 
historians Carol Lasser and Stacy Robertson suggest, in the period after the 
Revolutionary War women were largely stripped of the rights and freedoms they enjoyed 
during the war. This happened in part because even though the new government heralded 
ideas of equality and virtue, it still left the “patriarchal structures of authority largely 
intact.” This meant that women were praised for their actions during the war but “neither 
the new states nor federal government made efforts to change women’s relationship 
within the household or to the government outside it” (Lasser and Robertson 2). In effect, 
women were sent back to their pre-revolutionary roles and felt little of the Revolutionary 
War’s  impact, “for most Americans remained loyal to the notion of ‘natural’ hierarchy 
within the family and within society,” thus “essentializing the inferiority of women” 
(Lasser and Robertson 3). Laws, particularly those governing marriage and property, 
were also based on British ideas of hierarchy and legal precedents such as coverture, 
which stripped married women of their legal identity by making them dependent upon the 
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presence of man for any economic or political relationship with the state. According to 
Isenberg, the concept of coverture and the economic dependence it created “fit within the 
logic of protecting private property” but was complicated in the nineteenth century by a 
relationship between “conjugal affection” and property (27). In the new republic women 
did not hold the right to vote due in part to the qualification of property ownership for 
suffrage. Therefore, coverture limited rights by ensuring women had little opportunity to 
own property and making first the father and then the husband the political and economic 
representative of women. Such a system assumed a sense of continual dependence that 
“reinforc[ed] the idea that women’s political standing remained constant from childhood 
through adulthood” (Isenberg 27). They were, legally, forever children—a position that 
was reinforced by a depiction of women as ruled by emotion, too fragile for the world of 
politics, and most happy running a household.  
Many of the attributes assigned to women that made them supposedly unfit for 
public life were essentialized by the idea of domesticity. As Cott explains, ideas of 
domesticity “reinforced women’s orientation toward interpersonal goals in the emotional 
realm rather than self-reliant accomplishment” (71). This was done by characterizing the 
spaces in which political acts and business occurred a place of “selfishness, exertion, 
embarrassment and degradation of the soul” and setting up the home as the antidote to 
such an evil world (67). So, it became improper for a woman to desire political and 
economic involvement and their exclusion was framed as a blessing. Of course, because 
single women were afforded rights to their own wages, domesticity did not fully thrive 
without the institution of marriage. The economic and political dependency created by 
marriage was a key element in the functioning of domesticity.  
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In Prodigals and Pilgrims, Jay Fliegelman contends that beginning in the 
eighteenth century United States there was a decided shift toward the concept of marriage 
as an affectionate relationship entered into by choice and less influenced by parents or 
economic concerns than in the past. He also upholds Daniel Scott Smith’s assertion that 
‘“by the end of the eighteenth century the perception of spouse as property had become 
antiquated’” by saying that an increase in the number of couples who cited “ego-
happiness” as the main reason for marriage “suggests that daughters were standing up for 
their rights” (Fleigelman 137). Certainly a woman could refuse the marriage proposal of a 
man she did not like, but she could not choose who asked her or ask someone herself. She 
also could not retain her property after marriage. So, in what Fliegelman describes as the 
debate over “whether marriage was essentially a property transfer between father-in-law 
and suitor or a sacred contract between lovers” and the larger debate “as to whether 
property or personal rights were more sacred,” the answer differed for men and women 
(135). Men could gain property, love, and personal rights through a marriage. Women on 
the other hand could gain only love because their personal and property rights were 
subsumed by their husband. This meant while men chose a spouse women “were to 
choose their bondage” (Cott 78). When combined with the ideas of domesticity, the belief 
that women had a choice in their marriage only furthered their isolation and reinforced 
the ideas and assumed attributes that excluded them.  
Indians also felt this isolation and exclusion. Like women, Indian tribes 
experienced a constriction of rights after the Revolutionary War that was reinforced 
rhetorically and legally by their inability to be civilized white men. Prior to the 
Revolutionary War, the language of treaty negotiation had long drawn upon ideas of 
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monogenesis and similarity to create a friendship between Indians and Anglo-colonials 
that relied on ideas of brotherhood. As Ivy Schweitzer shows, the “fictional fraternity” 
created by such language “implied relations of equality important in Revolutionary 
rhetoric of the time” (63). However, the rhetoric of treating took on a decidedly different 
tone after the Revolutionary War when a weak, cash-strapped United States had to 
address Indian relations and its own imperialistic goals. In 1783 American commissioners 
negotiating with the Six Nations told the tribes assembled that they were dependent upon 
the mercy of the United States for their land and existence:  
You are mistaken in supposing that having been excluded from the United States 
and the King of Great Britain, you are become a free and independent nation and 
may take what terms you please. It is not so. You are a subdued people; you have 
been overcome in war which you entered into with us, not only without 
provocation, but in violation of most sacred obligations. (qtd. in Horsman 19)  
Despite a shift in rhetoric, Indian tribes still engaged in treaty negotiations in hopes of 
rebuilding the system of trading and diplomatic relations that had been destroyed during 
the war (Nichols 11). However, restoration of diplomatic relations was also a time to 
reshape the ways Indians were depicted and incorporated into American culture and 
politics. Not only did treaty negotiations frame Indians as ungrateful dependents, but a 
shift in the language used to describe Indians as increasingly different from white men 
also led to further loss of land and rights. As demonstrated by the description of their 
supposed willingness to enter into war “not only without provocation, but in violation of 
most sacred obligations,” Indians were increasingly framed as savages incapable of 
civilization. The concept of civilization promoted by white government and society 
	   	   	  
 
	   36	  
included ideas of religion, land use, and individual property ownership that reinforced the 
need of Indians to act exactly as white men. When Indians did not live up to these 
standards, due to the conflict between traditional Indian and Anglo-American cultures it 
created, they were depicted as increasingly feminized and infantilized, which proved 
detrimental to their ability to treat and retain tribal lands.  
  In the period after the Revolutionary War, land was increasingly depicted as 
female and in need of proper husbandry. Traditional tribal use of land, which relied upon 
crop rotation and communal ownership, did not fit the ideas of proper land use 
envisioned by Anglo-American leaders and society because it did not properly subdue the 
land by fencing it in or awarding ownership to a single individual. The Indian approach to 
land use and ownership, both of which marked them as non-white, made them improper 
husbands for the land. More than that though, Indian use of land more closely aligned 
them with nature and a natural state free of civilization, which meant they were seen as 
more dependent upon emotion and therefore also more feminized. Feminization implied 
an inability of Indian tribes to claim the collective manhood required for equality and 
political participation. It also meant that they, like women, were seen as perpetual 
children who needed supervision, protection, and punishment when they resisted what the 
Anglo-American patriarchy had determined was best for them.  
 Indian tribes who participated in land negotiations with either state or federal 
governments were increasingly viewed as ungrateful children that had not learned to 
properly function or prove their manhood under the rules set by their Great Father—a 
term used by both Indians and Americans to describe the role of the American 
government in Indian/American affairs such as treaties.  Failure of the tribes to fulfill the 
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roles set out by their Great Father also gave grounds for excluding them from a civilized 
culture. In the end, the Indians’ association with the land and the feminine identity it 
extended to them became a way to justify an increasingly harsh policy of patriarchy and 
conquest as well as attempts to marginalize tribes to the point of political and cultural 
extinction. Much of this was done through a system of laws and treaties that followed the 
logic and rhetoric of coverture.  
 If the primary role of government was to protect property, then the communal 
ownership practiced by the Indian tribes presented a threat to the American government 
because it complicated land cessions and meant that, if the government refused to honor 
earlier treaties that established tribes as sovereign states, a large number of Indians might 
be able to argue for the right to vote in light of their rights as property owners. In a larger 
sense, it also questioned the concept of consent to rule that the new government relied 
upon for legitimacy. If it could not govern by consent those Indian tribes who lived 
within its expanding borders, then its ability to govern any citizens might be called into 
question. Therefore, the government increasingly emphasized the dependence of tribes on 
white supplies and institutions as a sign of consent. Indians were also more frequently 
depicted as the dependent children of the Great White Father who required his provisions 
and protection because, if Indians became children who were dependent on a father, they 
could be treated in much the same way women were. They would never reach adulthood. 
Like women, when Indians were the children of their Great White Father they were under 
his protection, and when they grew up enough to participate in treaties, they were 
expected to relinquish their property in a marriage of survival.  In this way women and 
Indians were, to varying degrees, restricted by the same legal approaches and rhetoric.   
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 By the early nineteenth century the march toward what government officials and 
many writers of the time termed extinction had been all but confirmed by those working 
most closely with Indians and justified by a growing rhetoric of national character that 
framed Anglo-American and Indian relations in terms of how Indians might be fit into 
civilized American society. Despite numerous treaties, continued cession of land, and 
noted attempts by tribes like the Cherokee to assimilate, the general consensus among 
policy makers was that an Indian presence in the heart of a new nation was an ill fit at 
best. As Monroe summarized in 1825, ‘“in their present state it is impossible to 
incorporate [the Indians] in such masses in any form whatever into our systems” (qtd. in 
Maddox 6). In 1828 John Quincy Adams asserted that ‘“the ultimate design was to 
incorporate in our own institutions that portion of them which could be converted to the 
state of civilization’”(qtd. in Maddox 6). By claiming that at best only a small portion of 
Indians could assimilate, the leaders of the new country set up a false choice that worked 
to establish a rhetoric of national character that defined itself both through and against 
women and Indians.  
 However, through the use of historical fiction and benevolent societies, among 
other means, women were able to create some control over this rather tricky alliance and 
use it to write themselves into the debate over Indian Removal. In the 1820s many 
benevolent societies made missions to the southeastern Indian tribes a priority. Women 
raised funds for Indian schools and teachers, sponsored Indian students, and 
corresponded with those they sponsored. They also took more public steps to forge their 
relationship with the Indians by regularly writing articles promoting the Indian missions 
for the widely circulated religious periodicals of the time. In these articles women touted 
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the progress made toward civilization and defended Indian rights to their land on the 
basis of their historical interactions and agreements with the government. They also 
organized speaking tours for leaders of the Southeastern tribes and saw that the speeches 
and ideas of the Indians were published (Hershberger 19-20).  Women not only used the 
issue of Indian rights to give themselves a public voice; they also used it to give voice to 
Indian concerns. Therefore, read in light of the rights issues and history of the early 
nineteenth century debate over Indian and women’s rights, the novels of Child and 
Sedgwick become part of a larger rhetoric about Indian rights, women’s role in the 
republic, and the trajectory of the nation. In this context, these novels become a narrative 
of Indian and women’s rights that highlight the potential and pitfalls of a public alliance 
of two disenfranchised groups and provide commentary on the problems and 
impracticalities of a republic where women and Indians must rely on white men to 
mediate their relationships with the state.  
  The first step that Child and Sedgwick take to construct their commentary is to 
use the genre of historical romance to blur the lines between past and present. Women 
who wrote historical romances that challenged the patriarchy and limited rights used the 
genre to make their ideas seem part of the past but also made them applicable in a time 
when Americans increasingly sought their future by calling for a “return to a tradition 
that had not existed” (Lasser and Robertson xix). Both Child and Sedgwick play upon 
this duality in their novels as they seek to make the home, women, and Indians central to 
the success of the government and the nation. Setting novels in the past gives them solid 
footing for presenting a revision of history that will resonate with a nineteenth century 
audience that is familiar with women’s work in benevolent societies and the strategies 
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used by women to gain a voice in contemporary rights issues. To this end, both women 
choose seventeenth century Puritan New England for their setting and populate it with 
characters that appear in the written records they use as resources as well as others who 
get at most a brief mention in colonial histories.20 Providing cultural referents, in addition 
to fictional characters that embody some of the same traits (positive and negative) found 
in nineteenth century Americans makes history both past and present. The presence of 
concepts such as the division of responsibility and rights by gender and the power of the 
church and state in determining what actions one should take in her daily life also make 
Puritan New England familiar to nineteenth century readers.   
I. The Church and the State 
Once Child and Sedgwick have made history both past and present, they use these 
people, events and concepts to begin challenging commonly held beliefs about religion, 
rights and gender.  As Patricia Larson Kalayjian explains, Sedgwick, and I argue Child, 
“patterns a method by which women writers could camouflage their challenges to 
hegemony, employing a technique that allows a conventional reading on the surface 
while subverting that surface through a skillful use of linguistic cues and textual 
dialogics” (64).  Rather ironically, both women couch their resistance in terms of the very 
institution that was seen to repress women and Indians in modern readings of the 
seventeenth century: religion. The church and religious life, even the most intimate 
aspects of it, were seen as public actions in Puritan New England because in many 
20	  The resources used by Child and Sedgwick reflect the vast reprinting of Puritan texts in the nineteenth 
century as well as their continued use as instructional texts. Child draws upon John Winthrop’s History of 
New England, William Hubbard’s A General History of New England, Nathaniel Morton’s New England’s 
Memorial and Winslow’s Good News from New England and The Story of the Pilgrim Fathers. Sedgwick 
utilizes John Winthrop’s History of New England and William Hubbard’s Narrative of the Indian Wars in 
New England.	  	  
	   	   	  
 
	   41	  
instances the church was the state. In the nineteenth century the church still played a 
central role in politics and the daily life of Americans, but ideas of the separation of 
church and state had reduced its ability to directly govern. Still, religion and government 
overlapped when it came to the ideologies upon which American property law and rights 
were founded. Nineteenth century tensions between the church and state gave rise to 
“new forms of communication and public institutions” that raised “crucial issues about 
the shifting, if not overlapping boundaries between publicity and privacy, political action 
and moral reform, and religious belief and public opinion” (Isenberg 9). It is these 
overlapping boundaries that Child and Sedgwick exploit to critique the restricted role of 
women and Indians in society and to further blur the lines between private and public 
actions in a way that gives women access to new spaces.  
  The blurring of lines between private and public works in the novels to question 
the gendered construction of the division between these two ideas. Therefore, my use of 
the terms private and public is influenced by Sedgwick’s explication of it in Hope Leslie, 
Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, and the many scholars who have pointed to the 
ways in which ideas of private and public are exclusionary in their gendering. In an 
exchange late in Hope Leslie, Sedgwick delivers the novel’s clearest definition of public 
and private through the character of John Winthrop. In the midst of a heated exchange 
with Everell Fletcher about the fate of Magawisca, Winthrop angrily tells Everell that in 
this matter “private feelings must yield to public good” (234).  Sedgwick uses Winthrop’s 
assessment to present nineteenth century rhetoric of private and public in language that 
evokes Habermas’ theory of private and public spheres.  According to Habermas, a 
public is constructed of individuals who come together to engage in debate in order to, as 
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Joan Landes contends, protect commercial economy and promote the commodification of 
culture (Landes139). The ability of this public to engage in debate is predicated on the 
assumption that participants are disinterested, meaning they value the aims of the public 
over their own individual needs. In addition to being a theoretical space for debate, the 
public sphere as Habermas describes it also has concrete locations such as salons, 
coffeehouses, and other spaces beyond the home. The private sphere on the other hand is 
the intimate domain of the family and the home. Individuals in the private sphere are 
interested and motivated by voluntary, personal and emotional connections. As Elizabeth 
Dillon, Nancy Cott, Nina Baym and Joan Landes each explain, divisions between private 
and public have been complicated by ideas of natural hierarchy, liberalism, domesticity 
and legal constructs such as coverture, which have all served to gender the two spheres 
and exclude women, at least ideologically, from the public.21 Women are seen as 
subordinate to men in concept of natural hierarchy and cannot own property or vote due 
to coverture laws, thus they are excluded from the public sphere and placed in the private 
sphere, which is increasingly aligned with the home and concepts of domesticity. 
 However, as the exchange between Everell and Winthrop signals, there is a 
certain liminality to the spheres, and men as well as women are capable of public and 
private acts because such acts are defined not simply by the space in which they occur but 
also by intent. If the concern of the private is interested and rooted in voluntary and 
emotional connections, then Everell’s appeal on behalf of Magawisca is certainly a 
private action motivated by and made in the private setting of a home. In contrast, 
Winthrop’s appeal to the idea of the public good is a public act made in a private setting. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  See Dillon, Gender of Freedom; Cott, Bonds of Womanhood; Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be 
Ladies; Joan B. Landes “The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist Reconsideration.”	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For Sedgwick and Child, both the nature of the action and the place in which it occurs are 
central to their purposeful blurring of lines between private and public. Therefore, I am 
using the terms private and public to reflect both the physical spaces implied and the 
motivations of the actions associated with each.  
The first place that Child and Sedgwick challenge the concepts of private and 
public is in their discussion of the marriages and nature of the voluntary connections 
made in the two novels. In Hobomok all of the women follow husbands or fathers to 
Salem, and all of them find their lives seriously limited by this choice. For Mrs. Conant 
and Lady Arabella, following their husbands into the fledgling colony means a loss of 
wealth, social standing, comfort, and ultimately their lives. While the reason cited in the 
text is a constitution weakened by the trials of life, the implied cause of their deaths is 
their husbands’ insistence on following religious doctrine at all cost and despite the perils 
to which this exposes women with no viable alternatives. In Hope Leslie, Sedgwick 
complicates the narrative of female obedience by first relaying the story of the failed 
union of Alice and Mr. Fletcher, who cannot be married because Fletcher will not 
compromise his religious beliefs or remain in England in exchange for Alice’s hand. 
Once Fletcher arrives in Boston, Winthrop “persuade[s] [him] to unite himself with an 
orphan girl, a ward of Mr. Winthrop, who had, in the eyes of the elders, all the meek 
graces that befitted a godly maiden and dutiful helpmate”(14). This woman, as the 
faithful Mrs. Fletcher, follows her husband into the wilderness where she will eventually 
fall victim to the violence between Indians and Puritans.  
The younger generation of Puritans fares only marginally better in their options 
and marriages. In Hobomok, Sally Oldham gets to marry her chosen partner, Mr. Collier, 
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but not without harsh interference from the colony’s elders. Mary Conant is denied 
marriage to Brown because of the religious intolerance of her father and the colony, and 
in a rash, desperate move she marries Hobomok. In Hope Leslie, Faith Leslie remains 
with the Pequot after her capture and adopts Indian culture and Catholicism when she 
marries Oneco. Esther Downing, the intended bride of Everell Fletcher, remains single at 
the end of the novel. Rosario, the shamed lover of Sir Phillip Gardiner, is killed in an 
explosion. Magawisca puts aside her love for Everell in order to remain true to her 
culture and family, for it is only in this role that she has any social or political power. 
Only Hope Leslie is successful in love, but this is in spite of the machinations of the 
colony’s elders. While marriage and traditional gender roles might be seen as peripheral 
to the arguments of equality made in the novels, they are indeed central because they 
demonstrate the extent to which the lack of a divide between church and state denied 
women the ability to negotiate their own relationships. In each case of marriage, the 
partner and outcome of the union is highly influenced, if not outright dictated, by the 
church. The church’s interference in the institution of marriage, which would by the 
nineteenth century be considered a private decision, is not simply an anachronism. It is an 
indictment of women’s continued lack of rights under the laws of coverture because of 
the ways that the state, like the church of the seventeenth century, finds it proper to 
interfere in the private relations of women in order to ensure that their unions uphold 
traditional values and by extension the government.  
 In their attempts to govern marriage, colonial elders use religion to make all acts 
public, even those that occur in the home. In Hobomok, Sally Oldham refuses the 
proposal of marriage made by Mr. Hopkins via a message delivered by James Collier and 
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instead gives her hand to Collier. In response, an enraged Hopkins gives vent to his fury 
by running to the church elders and leveling a public charge of deceitfulness. To prove 
his innocence, Collier must not only face the vengeful accusation of a man in whose 
emotional reaction “resentment was uppermost,” but he must also tell the tale of his 
private life before a panel of minister judges lest they be suspicious of his “good faith” 
(54). Despite his belief that “things appertaining to love are of too slight a nature to be 
brought before the church, that they should discuss upon,” the hearing proceeds and the 
ministers even send a letter to Plymouth requesting that Sally corroborate Collier’s 
account and confess her role in the ordeal (54). Sally’s truthful response and accounting 
of her actions garners the ire of the ministers who declare that “were she within [their] 
jurisdiction, [they] should give her public reproof therefore” (56). Even though the judges 
eventually dismiss the charges against Collier and give permission for Collier and Sally 
to marry, they still insist on passing judgment on the lovers’ conduct. As Child remarks 
to her nineteenth century audience via her narrating ancestor, “in these degenerate times 
when even plighted love is broken with such frequent impunity” the interference of the 
church in such a matter would be laughable, “but in those days, the church kept careful 
watch upon the out-goings and in-comings of her children, and suffered not the pollution 
of a butterfly’s feather to rest upon her garments” (53). The interference is literally made 
light of in Child’s comparison to a butterfly wing. Use of the pronoun her in reference to 
the church, makes it appear like a vain mother who will not see her own status impacted 
by a child’s misdeeds. It also mocks gender roles by turning the ministers who would use 
their high station to intrude in the love life of their congregation into laughable 
busybodies who exhibit the very traits that supposedly make women unfit for public life. 
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However, these busybodies are far from harmless because they have the power to very 
severely impact the lives of those upon which they intrude. 
  This type of intrusion into and publicizing of the private choices and emotions of 
an individual in the name of the church/government is repeated numerous times in Hope 
Leslie when Governor Winthrop, the embodiment of both the church and state, seeks to 
marry couples in a way that is advantageous to the colony, even if it is not the way the 
affections of the teenage characters run. Winthrop seeks to once again align a Fletcher, 
Everell, with his niece Esther who is likewise deemed appropriately submissive and 
religious by Winthrop and the other Puritan leaders. To this end, Winthrop and Esther’s 
father Mr. Downing have conspired to make sure Everell and Esther are placed in close 
proximity. Mr. Downing invites Everell to stay with his family prior to his departure to 
England, and upon his return Winthrop arranges for Everell to stay at his own home 
while Esther is also there. When Everell returns from England, Downing writes to 
Winthrop to vouch for his in-tact Puritanism and high mettle, but he cautions that the 
“stricter brethren often remark that he has little of the outward man of a ‘pilgrim indeed’” 
(150). Downing’s solution is to marry Everell to Esther because she meets the criteria of 
“a member of the congregation…who may, in all likelihood, accomplish for him that 
precious promise of the apostle ‘the believing wife shall sanctify the unbelieving 
husband’” (150). Yet, his scheme does not end there. In order to guarantee the match 
between Everell and Esther, the headstrong Hope Leslie must also be married to ensure 
she is not an option for Everell. Downing cautions Winthrop against what he sees as 
Everell’s unfortunate affection for Hope Leslie who he deems “wanting in grace” but of  
“rare comeliness.” He is also concerned by the possibility that “he hath been assiduously 
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courted by Miss Leslie’s paternal connexions” so that Everell might marry her and 
remove to England (151). In short, Downing worries that others with intentions not as 
pure as his own might also attempt to arrange Everell’s marriage in a way that might 
serve selfish purposes. To comfort Downing and ensure the match between Esther and 
Everell, Winthrop suggests that Hope Leslie marry Sir Phillip Gardiner, a newly arrived 
Puritan whose outward appearance shows him a true believer. That the governor should 
play matchmaker seems laughable, but the manner in which he uses his elevated position 
and authority to achieve what he wishes in the private lives of his constituents is not. For 
instance, in an attempt to convince Mr. Fletcher of the wisdom of the matches, Winthrop 
shows him Downing’s letter in order to appeal to his sense of propriety. By essentially 
blackmailing Mr. Fletcher and persuading him that his own judgment in the management 
of the lives of his children is flawed, Winthrop pursues his own desire as that of the state. 
Eventually, Mr. Fletcher concedes to Winthrop’s judgment despite his own misgivings 
about the matches. Thus the arrangement proves once again that no decision is out of the 
reach of the state and church or the men who serve as its representatives.  
As the plot of Hope Leslie proceeds, the validity and rightness of Governor 
Winthrop’s judgment of Gardiner and his interference in the marriages of Everell and 
Hope Leslie is questioned and ultimately found to be in error. However, the match of 
Everell and Hope Leslie is, in the end, deemed prudent for the colony and families 
involved once the true merit of Hope Leslie’s moral judgment is revealed. Therefore, her 
waywardness is forgiven by the colony’s elders and her considerable wealth is welcomed 
into the community, for in some ways it almost seems safer for the colony that she be 
under the watch of a husband than left to her own devices. Unlike Esther whose choice to 
48	  
remain unmarried is cloaked in the language of religious devotion and seems to imply a 
continuation of her dedication to the church, an unmarried Hope Leslie might pose a 
threat. She has property, which places her in a position to claim autonomy and therefore 
continue to practice her own moral code and act in any way she sees fit without the 
checks of a father or husband.  However, it is debatable whether marriage to Everell will 
actually make Hope Leslie conform to Puritan ideals of feminine behavior. So, Sedgwick 
does leave the possibility for subversive actions. 
The treatment of marriage as a matter of state concern can also be read in the 
historical documents written during the colonial era. As Winthrop commented in his 
Journal, just as a woman becomes the subject of her husband “in a way of liberty, not of 
bondage” and “a true wife accounts her subjection her honor and freedom…so too 
brethren it shall be between yourselves and your magistrates” (qtd. in Kerber 9). In his 
exertion that the relationship between the individual and the state is the same as that of a 
marriage, Winthrop effectively sums up the very problem that Child and Sedgwick are so 
concerned with, which is that in the nineteenth century the concept of marriage as a 
metaphor for governance severely limits women’s rights and freedoms in the name of 
Christianity and the greater good. At the heart of the marriages in both novels is the idea 
of continuance and material prosperity, not of the couples involved, but of the institutions 
of church and state. Except for the case of Esther and Mary Conant’s temporary union 
with Hobomok, marriage in the two novels reinforces the ideas of coverture and 
traditional gender identities.   
However, to read Child’s and Sedgwick’s depiction of marriage as a mere 
repetition of problematic unions between individuals and between individuals and the 
49	  
state is to overlook the larger purpose of their depictions of private choices as subject to 
public scrutiny and the implications it held for women involved in rights advocacy in the 
nineteenth century.  The breaking down of the barriers between public and private by the 
colony’s elders not only helps to define what is meant by private and public, but it also 
opens the door for a potential expansion of rights facilitated by the understanding of the 
relationship between the state and an individual as created by an interconnected 
collection of private and public actions. It also weakens gender barriers by redefining 
what concerns and actions are appropriate for men and women.  If men, as capable 
leaders, can use the religion and a concern for the betterment of society to meddle in and 
control the composition of the home through marriage, then surely women can use these 
domestic concerns to find footing in the public, or republic, as it were.  
Of course the sincerity of the actions of colonial leaders, which is continually 
questioned by Child and Sedgwick through their narrators, complicates any direct 
analogues between the ways in which women in the nineteenth century used benevolent 
societies and religion to find a public role and advocate for rights. As women who were 
active in both the fight against Indian Removal and Women’s Rights, it seems that Child 
and Sedgwick would be hesitant to align the often self-serving and repressive motivations 
of the men who interfere in marriage in the novels with the formation of benevolent 
societies. Therefore, their depiction of these male interjections is a form of veiled social 
critique in which Child and Sedgwick question the ability of men to act on behalf of 
others. Despite the fact that Winthrop and others deem character judgment as essential to 
leadership, none of the pairings end in the way that the men expected. Mr. Conant’s 
denial of Mary’s marriage to Brown leads her to marry an Indian. Mr. Downing and 
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Governor Winthrop’s plans to marry Hope Leslie to Sir Phillip Gardiner fails because the 
two men prove such terrible judges of character—a key qualification that they cite in 
order to have the authority to interfere. Esther remains unmarried because of a basic 
incompatibility between her religious goals and those traits found attractive by Everell. 
The failure of each of these pairings hinges in large part on the inability of the men to 
understand the workings of human nature, particularly emotion. The lack of this 
connection serves as a critique of men and an endorsement of women’s ability to move 
between private and public because of their ability to accurately judge character. After 
all, only Magawisca and Hope Leslie accurately judge the character of Sir Phillip 
Gardiner.   
II. The Individual and the State
Child and Sedgwick both expand their critique of women’s limited roles and of 
the state in their construction of the home as a public space in Puritan New England. In 
many ways the home and its inhabitants are held up as a microcosm of the colonies in 
which they reside and are frequently compared to the actions of the colonial government. 
This means that sometimes they serve as cautionary tales and other times as exemplars 
when compared to views held by society at large. Whether the home becomes an example 
or an admonishment depends largely on where the views held by its inhabitants lie on 
two axes: eastern to frontier attitudes and low to high brow views of Indians. As 
described by Robert Burchell, the axis of eastern to frontier attitudes traces a shift in the 
way nineteenth century white Americans viewed Indians based on whether they saw them 
as able to assimilate. Frontier attitudes were fueled by the desire for Indian lands based 
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on ideas that Indians were an inferior culture that “would inevitably give way to the 
higher, peaceably if possible, violently if not” (112). In many ways, frontier views 
dominated the rhetoric of treating and other official policies in the 1820s. On the other 
end of the continuum was the eastern view that Indians shared a common humanity with 
whites and therefore assimilation was not only possible but ensuring it occurred was the 
responsibility of white Christians (Burchell 112). Not surprisingly, the eastern view was 
most commonly adopted by northern women involved in the fight against Indian 
Removal and often drove their framing of the “Indian Question.” Therefore, in presenting 
the homes as a microcosm of the larger debate over Indian rights, Childs and Sedgwick 
pay careful attention to where they are placed on the axis and how this impacts the ability 
of the home to either reinforce or counteract potentially negative interactions with 
Indians. In the commentary offered by Child and Sedgwick, the home, which was 
typically depicted as a female space, represents the proper relationship between 
individuals and the state.  
   In order to use the home to offer a vision of proper interactions between 
individuals and the state, both authors begin by locating home in a space just removed 
from, but still vital to, the functioning of the town and local government. Both the Conant 
and Fletcher households lie just outside the boundaries of town and on the edges of the 
wilderness. They are geographically and metaphorically placed between the frontier and 
the coast and therefore able to incorporate both or neither frontier or eastern attitudes of 
Indians. In Hobomok, the Conant home lies far from the center of the colony at Plymouth 
because Mr. Conant had a falling out with the church elders over religious doctrine and 
practice. Still, in the fledgling town of Salem, which has no church until the middle of the 
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novel, the Conant home serves as the hub of all religious and political debate. It is also 
the place where diplomacy and the path of the town are decided. For the Fletcher family, 
their decision to reside outside the boundaries of town is likewise dictated by the 
patriarch, but is not dependent upon religious doctrine. Instead, it is based upon a desire 
for privacy and a space away from the colony’s rulers. Mr. Fletcher makes his home at 
Bethel, just outside Springfield, humorously “deeming exposure to the incursions of the 
savages very slight, and the surveillance of an inquiring neighborhood a certain evil” 
(17).  By establishing his home outside the town Fletcher ensures that he can run it 
according to his personal dictates—a situation that echoes Mr. Conant’s move to Salem. 
For both families, establishing a home outside the watch of an “inquiring neighborhood” 
holds the potential for more flexibility than the strict adherence to Puritan ideology that 
would supposedly occur within the town proper. One of the key features that distance 
from town and Puritan leadership affords is more fluid and intimate relationships between 
members of the household and Indians predicated on an understanding of a shared 
humanity and necessity. According to Child and Sedgwick, on the frontier both groups 
must respect each other in order to live in peace, or sometimes simply to stay alive. 
Indications of how the two families feel about their Indian acquaintances is first 
made obvious in their descriptions of them.  Child describes Hobomok as “cast in 
nature’s noblest mould. He was one of the finest specimens of elastic, vigorous elegance 
of proportion, to be found among his tribe. His long residence with the white inhabitants 
of Plymouth had changed his natural fierceness of manner into a haughty, dignified 
reserve” (36).22 Magawisca is described in similar terms in Hope Leslie. 
22	  As Karcher points out in her introduction to the novel, the description offered by Child mimics that 
offered of the historical Hobomok by Morton and Winslow. Hobomok is described by these men as “being 
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slender, flexible, and graceful; and there was a freedom and loftiness in her 
movement which, though tempered with modesty, expressed a consciousness of 
high birth. Her face, although marked by the peculiarities of her race, was 
beautiful even to an European eye. Her features were regular, her teeth white as 
pearls; but there must be something beyond symmetry of feature to fix the 
attention, and it was an expression of dignity, thoughtfulness, and deep dejection 
that made the eye linger on Magawisca’s face. (23) 
 These descriptions reinforce the “noble savage” type and echo the cataloguing of 
features presented by naturalists of the time who took great interest in describing the 
various features of native groups. Yet the listing of features possessed by Hobomok and 
Magawisca also assume the shared humanity and culture that is necessary in the 
argument for rights. Both have been exposed to Puritan culture and language. Therefore, 
they are capable of negotiating between white and native cultures. In Child’s and 
Sedgwick’s depictions, not only can these Indians successfully inhabit the space between 
Indian and white, but their presence also proves invaluable to the families with which 
they are linked. Hobomok is a frequent visitor at the Conant house and is permitted much 
time alone with Mary, a luxury not allowed Charles Brown.  During this time together 
Hobomok tells Mary of his tribe and teaches her to make a wampum belt for him. Mary 
has also done Hobomok a great service when she saves his mother from death after 
Indian healers had decided she was a lost cause. Hobomok returns the favor by betraying 
his own kinsmen and bringing news of Corbitant’s murderous intentions for Salem to the 
Conant household where the leaders of the town are congregated.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a proper lusty young man, and one that was in account amongst the Indians in those parts for his valour” 
(qtd in Karcher xxii).	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Prompted by his love for Mary and his understanding that most events and 
knowledge pass through this household, Hobomok immediately heads to the Conant 
home when he hears of Corbitant’s plot. When he arrives, his news is received by Mr. 
Conant, Mr. Oldham, Mr. Graves and Governor Endicott along with Mary and her 
mother. Upon hearing the news of Corbitant’s plan to attack, Endicot asks Hobomok for 
further information concerning the relations between Indian tribes. Hobomok replies that 
the Narrangansets are friendly to King Charles, which paints them as loyal to the English 
but also offensive to the Puritans. This prompts Mr. Conant to praise the strength of 
English numbers and faith and to go on to claim that this faith will protect them from 
being killed by Indians (37). The real worry according to Mr. Conant is not the Indians 
but that “false prophets and false Christs are abroad in the land” (37-38). From here the 
discussion moves away from the immediate issue that needs to be resolved and takes up 
the ideas of whether the elect are upheld in all cases, use of saints vs. scripture in writing, 
theories of “inward outpouring” and the mysteries of scripture. The men cease their 
discussion only when Hobomok returns to tell them that he suspects Corbitant and his 
followers are waiting in the woods to ambush the town.  They then gather a party and 
surprise their would-be attackers before they can do any damage. The next day the 
captured Indians are returned, like scolded children, to Sagamore John. Ultimately, 
violence is adverted and the Puritans are saved from their own incompetence in dealing 
with life and death matters because of the peaceful interactions between Hobomok and 
the leaders of Salem—a testament to what Child sees as the potential outcomes of native 
assimilation.  
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A somewhat idealistic and oversimplified depiction of cultural exchange and 
assimilation, Child’s idea of Hobomok’s actions repackages an old stereotype of Indian 
loyalties offered by Hubbard in his General History of New England. Hubbard claims 
that “they are indifferently affable and courteous, yet subtill and strangely revengeful, 
and malicious. A small kindness will oblige them for an whole generation; and as little an 
injury, or suspicion thereof, will worke in them a deadly hatred and opposition” (28). 
This dichotomy plays out in the novel in the choices and emotions of the two 
Wampanoag chiefs, Corbitant and Hobomok.  In an interesting absolution of white fault, 
Child makes the hatred toward whites felt by Corbitant the result of Indian actions. 
Slighted by Hobomok’s refusal to marry one of his kinswomen, Corbitant takes revenge 
on Mary and her people because she is the object of Hobomok’s love. This means that 
goodness and badness of Indians is a result of their individual nature. So, some might be 
converted and others may remain hostile, but white action is connected only to the good 
Indians and positive outcomes. A bad outcome, as in the case of Corbitant’s actions, is 
the sole fault of the Indian. It is Indian humanity and motives that are questioned, not 
those of their white counterparts. 
In Hope Leslie, Sedgwick paints a more complicated picture of Indian-white 
relations by making both her white and Indian characters question each other’s humanity 
and the outcomes of cultural exchange. When the daughter of a Pequot chief, Magawisca, 
arrives at the Fletcher household Mrs. Fletcher is skeptical to say the least. Magawisca’s 
expression of “dignity, thoughtfulness and deep dejection” (23) combined with her lavish 
native dress causes Mr. Fletcher to react “with a mingled feeling of compassion and 
curiosity” and leads Mrs. Fletcher to think that her husband “might as well have brought 
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a wild doe from the forest to plow the fields, as to give [her] this Indian girl for 
household labour” (24). Her reaction, which is described by the narrator as “rather that of 
a housewife than a tender woman” centers first on the practical concerns of having Indian 
children in her house. Beyond more mouths to feed, their presence means the Fletcher 
household is forced, as a good Christian home, to overcome their own biases in order to 
treat Magawisca and Oneco fairly. Only after she reconciles the practical can Mrs. 
Fletcher begin to see Magawisca as human. These reactions of curiosity, practicality, and 
ultimately compassion are both motivated and hindered by religion and popular concepts 
of Indians that it conveys. Mrs. Fletcher, the first to speak to Magawisca, immediately 
lets her know that she should consider herself lucky to “have been taken from the midst 
of a savage people and set in a Christian family” (24). When Magawisca does not 
respond to this insulting assessment of her life and culture, Jennet reinterprets for her: 
“Mistress Fletcher means…that you should be mightily thankful, Tawney, that you are 
snatched as a brand from the burning” (24). The reactions of Mrs. Fletcher and Jennet, 
though different in their harshness, reflect prevailing notions, both Puritan and nineteenth 
century, about the dichotomy of savagery and civilization and the cultural discrimination 
on which it was based. The fact that these two women describe Magawisca’s separation 
from her tribe as being “taken from the midst” and “snatched like a brand from the 
burning” also highlights an assumed lack of positive familial ties among Indians. 
However as Burchell points out they also show a pro-Indian position in that their 
insistence that a Christian home will do her good shows that they see her as capable of 
civilization through assimilation (116).  Still, these assertions would taint the whole scene 
if not for Everell’s command that Jennet hush. As if to apologize for Jennet and assure 
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Magawisca she will be treated kindly, Mrs. Fletcher repeats the tenet of the civilized vs. 
savage dichotomy in her promise that Magawisca will have no hard work and that she 
“will soon perceive that [their] civilized life is far easier—far better and happier than 
[her] wild wandering ways, which are…but little superior to those of the wolves and 
foxes” (24). Everell responds to his mother’s harshness by countering that perhaps the 
Indian tribes must act like wolves and foxes because of the way they have been hunted by 
white men. His assertions of white cruelty are almost immediately confirmed when 
Digby and an Indian enter and show Mr. Fletcher a scalp that the Indian has recently 
taken that must, on the order of Mr. Pyncheon the magistrate, be taken to Boston to 
collect the reward offered for the scalp of a Pequot chief.  Upon hearing this, Magawisca 
fears the scalp is that of her father, the Pequot chief Mononotto.  When she is assured the 
scalp is not her father’s, she charges the Indian who brought it to take a message to her 
father that “his children are servants in the house of his enemies” but also hesitates to 
fully trust the Indian to deliver the message and makes him swear on his future prosperity 
that he will faithfully do her bidding (26).  
These initial exchanges with members of the Fletcher household and Magawisca 
show the difficulty of the concept of native assimilation and the prejudice inherent in it. 
The constant revision of responses that moves from cruel and dismissive assessments of 
Pequot culture toward a justification of Indian actions based on white’s actions recreates 
for readers the spectrum of ideas about Indians in the nineteenth century. Even though 
progress has been made and there is something like sympathy evolving, the abrupt ending 
of this evolution with the violent presence of an Indian scalp shows the ground yet to be 
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covered, and Magawisca’s insistence that the visiting Indian swear on his future 
prosperity highlights what is at stake for both Indian and Puritans. 
The assessment of the situation is just as conflicted for Magawisca. Despite her 
ability to speak English and her long exposure to Anglo-American customs, Magawisca’s 
experience has made her a skeptic of the humanity of her white counterparts, but it has 
also made her wary of those Indians who might assimilate enough to engage in violence 
on behalf of the whites. The root of her skepticism is laid out in her retelling of the 
Pequot War, which contradicts Puritan accounts of it. In Magawisca’s first-hand account 
of the attack on her home, she emphasizes the ways the Puritans engaged in the very acts 
that they use to characterize the “savagery” of Indians. As Magawisca explains, the 
colonials are guided to the village by the traitor “Wequash; he from whose bloody hand 
my mother had shielded the captive English maidens—he who had eaten from my 
father’s dish, and slept on his mat.” Once there they, unprovoked, surround and attack a 
village of sleeping women and children. The few young warriors that were in the village 
defended their homes and people and temporarily fought back the English. However, the 
English responded by burning the homes of the Indians, with many of them still in the 
wigwams, using a brand taken from Magawisca’s family hearthstone “where the English 
had been so often warmed and cherished” (49). Later, after the tribe has had a few days to 
recover, they are once again tracked down and ambushed in a swamp. Women, children, 
and the elderly are fired upon at will as they sit waiting for their warriors to return. 
Magawisca’s family is saved only because one of the white soldiers remembers her 
mother’s kindness to him. To repay this kindness, Magawisca, Oneco, and their mother 
are taken to Boston where they are held captive until their mother dies.  
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While Magawisca makes it a point to emphasize the violence of the English 
actions, it is her continued depiction of the violation of Indian trust and kindness that is 
most important to the tale. Each act of English violence is facilitated by the betrayal of a 
kindness extended by Magawisca’s family, so war is not an action between two faceless 
nations but a personal affront. When Mononotto and Sassacus return from the tribal 
council after the massacre, all eyes are upon Mononotto because he was friendly to the 
whites and had always counseled tolerance. His wife and children had survived when so 
many others had not. As Magawisca explains “He had been the friend of the English; he 
had counseled peace and alliance with them; he had protected their traders; delivered the 
captives taken from them, and restored them to their people” and now he found himself 
considered a traitor to his own people (50). Kindness to the English had not prevented 
violence or created a profitable alliance; it led to murder. This also brings up what the 
novel’s narrator admits is “the most serious obstacle to the progress of the Christian 
religion, in all ages under all circumstances” which is “the contrariety between its divine 
principles and the conduct of its professors; which instead of always being a medium for 
the light that emanates from our holy law, is too often the darkest cloud that obstructs the 
passage of its rays to the hearts of heathen men” (51). With this admission, Sedgwick 
upholds the righteousness of the Christian faith and places blame on misguided believers. 
She is enacting an absolution of white guilt similar to the one offered by Child. Sedgwick 
essentially argues that all Christianity cannot be held accountable for the actions of a few. 
However, at the same time Sedgwick makes it possible for the few to save the reputation 
of the many by having one white man who held on to his humanity in the battle save 
Magawisca and the remainder of her family. Therefore, Magawisca finds herself in the 
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position of having to reconcile her experiences of violence at the hands of whites with the 
fact that a white man also saved her life. Depending on how she negotiates her response 
she can either become an Indian who continues violence and confirms the bad stereotypes 
of her tribe, or she can become the exception that is used to promote a shared humanity. 
Regardless, Magawisca finds herself caught between two worlds and does not know who 
she should trust, so she hedges her bets by sending a message to her father and working 
her best to fit into the Fletcher household.  
 The result is a carefully negotiated peace in which Magawisca and the Fletchers 
can respect each other as exceptions to the rules and care for each other for the same 
reason. So, when Magawisca hears that her father is planning an attack on the Fletcher 
household, she finds herself trapped between two worlds not simply because of past 
deeds but because of shared devotion. She loves her father but distrusts his ability to read 
the true nature of her role in the Fletcher household. She loves Everell and other members 
of the Fletcher household but feels guilt at choosing them over her father. Her ability to 
broker peace between the two of them is hindered not by her dual allegiance but by each 
side’s unwillingness to accept it or understand her warnings and pleas. Three times 
Magawisca attempts to warn the family that something is afoot so that they might be 
saved. And in an interesting rewriting the biblical parable of Peter’s denial of Christ, 
three times the Fletchers refuse to understand her. First, Magawisca sadly exclaims, “how 
soon the flush of the setting sun fades from the evening cloud!” When she is called a 
“bird of ill-omen” for her comment she explains that though the Fletchers call an owl a 
bird of ill-omen Indians hold him sacred for “he is [their] sentinel, and when danger is 
near he cries, ‘awake!’ ‘awake!’” (62). The Fletchers respond to her warning by telling 
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her she is unkind for not sharing in their excitement at the return of Mr. Fletcher. Later 
they brush off her cryptic warnings as mere melancholy and instead ask her “Magawisca, 
you are neither a stranger, nor a servant, will you not share our joy? Do you not love us?” 
(62). She replies, “love you! I would give my life for you.” Still, the family does not 
understand the importance of her warning or her response. After she has delivered her 
third warning, her father and a group of Indians appear and commence their attack. In the 
midst of this violence Magawisca pleads with her father to stop his warriors by 
exclaiming “the mother—the children—oh they are all good—take your vengeance on 
your enemies—but spare—spare our friends—our benefactors”(63). Mononotto is 
blinded by his rage and too acutely remembers the destruction of his own village to heed 
his daughter’s pleas. The Fletchers must be the stand-ins for all English so that revenge 
can be exacted. In both cases, the two sides of the civilized/savage divide between which 
Magawisca is caught fail to realize or acknowledge that they share parts of each other on 
a grand scale. While they can make exceptions for individuals or in their particular 
homes, those exceptions do not translate to a social tolerance.  
In Hobomok and Hope Leslie the tolerance expressed in the home is not 
necessarily upheld by Puritan leaders or the members of the household itself when faced 
with scrutiny from the larger community. In the case of Hobomok, his acceptance in the 
Conant household shows an appreciation for his ability to negotiate two cultures and a 
trust based on his loyal devotion to the settlement and family. However, his presence is 
also acceptable because he, to Mr. Conant’s mind, can never fully integrate because he 
cannot marry or procreate with Mary. According to eighteenth and nineteenth century 
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ideas of human development, Indian men were sexually underdeveloped.23 Therefore, 
unlike Charles Brown who is seen as a potential sex partner, Hobomok can be an 
amusing companion to Mary and is granted unsupervised time with her. Read in the 
context of nineteenth century debates about race and intermarriage, Mr. Conant is unable 
to conceive of the possibility of his daughter marrying an Indian because such a union 
defies accepted sexual and racial norms and also contradicts the presumed purpose of 
interracial marriage. As Maddox explains, nineteenth century attitudes toward 
intermarriage emphasized the importance of making Indian women ready to marry white 
men (39).  A marriage between a white woman and an Indian was taboo because not only 
it was offensive to concepts of female delicacy, but it also served no economic purpose. 
There would be no gain of property or social position if a white woman married an Indian 
man. However, because the majority of Indian societies were still largely matrilineal at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, marriage between a white man and Indian 
woman meant access to much desired Indian land. So, while he is willing to invite 
Hobomok into his home, Mr. Conant is unwilling to call him family.  
23 In Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon’s Historie Naturelle he says of the Indian that “the organs
of generation are small and feeble. He has no hair, no beard, no ardour for the female. Though nimbler than 
the European, because more accustomed to running, his strength is not so great. His sensations are less 
acute; and yet he is more timid and cowardly. He has no vivacity, no activity of mind” (25-26). In Notes on 
the State of Virginia, Jefferson refutes some of de Buffon’s ideas regarding Indians declaring “they are 
formed in mind as well as in body, on the same module with the `Homo sapiens Europaeus.' The principles 
of their society forbidding all compulsion, they are to be led to duty and to enterprize by personal influence 
and persuasion. Hence eloquence in council, bravery and address in war, become the foundations of all 
consequence with them. To these acquirements all their faculties are directed. Of their bravery and address 
in war we have multiplied proofs, because we have	  been	  the	  subjects on which they were exercised. Of 
their eminence in oratory we have fewer examples, because it is displayed chiefly in their own councils. 
Some, however, we have of very superior lustre” (61). However, like de Buffon, Jefferson includes his 
description of Indians in his section on the variety of animals. He also explains that special exceptions must 
be made for the difference in culture.	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When after her disappearance, Mr. Skelton delivers the news that Mary is not 
dead but has become the wife of Hobomok, Mr. Conant replies that he “could more 
readily have covered her sweet face with the clods than bear this” because he “had made 
up [his] mind to her watery grave… but to have her life in the bosom of a savage and 
mingle her prayers with a heathen, who knoweth not God, is hard for a father’s heart to 
endure” (133). The implication is that Mary’s decision to marry Hobomok is worse than 
her committing the sin of suicide. Both are considered sin, and intermarriage is the worst 
of the two because it is not final. While suicide would have been a tragedy and a sin, its 
finality would have given Mr. Conant the ability to keep his public role and reputation 
undamaged. However, by marrying Hobomok Mary is alive and therefore continually 
able to remind the public of the transgressions of the Conant family, especially after she 
has a child. Because of the community’s ideas about Indians’ religion, culture, and 
humanity, Mr. Conant would rather socially disown his child than be seen as accepting 
her marriage to an Indian. Mr. Conant does write Mary to urge her to consider her 
marriage unlawful and return to him, but Mary realizes what Mr. Conant will not 
articulate which is that “she should only be considered an outcast among her brethren” 
(136). Mary also knows that her vows to Hobomok were her choice and as such they 
were not “any less sacred than any other voluntary promise” (136). Her father’s pleas to 
have her see them differently are founded on the premise that because Hobomok is not 
white, then promises made to him are less binding than those made to whites. Hobomok 
has humanity but not equality under Puritan doctrine—the implication being that laws 
and promises can be upheld or broken when advantageous to the colony or individual. 
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Lack of equality under the law and fickle application of justice also characterize 
the instances in Hope Leslie when the morals and relationships of the home conflict with 
Puritan ideologies and government. Interestingly, in Hope Leslie, these conflicts are at 
times between home and town, as in the case of Nelema’s trial and between one home 
(Bethel) and another home (Governor Winthrop’s residence) as in Magawisca’s trial. In 
Nelema’s trial, the dictates of the Puritan theocracy are allowed to invade the Fletcher 
home because Mr. Fletcher cannot reconcile his faith with the necessities of frontier 
living. The whole incident begins when a poisonous snake bites Mr. Cradock while he is 
on a hike. Hope immediately runs to the home of Nelema, the local Indian healer, for 
help. Nelema comes to the house with a bag of herbs and chants over Cradock while she 
waits for the herbs to take effect. Her singing and dancing is part of a traditional Indian 
healing practice, but to Jennet who is watching through the peephole, Nelema is 
practicing witchcraft.  After danger has passed for Mr. Cradock, Jennet runs to tell Mr. 
Fletcher of the evil she witnessed. Mr. Fletcher largely dismisses Jennet as a busybody 
and seeks no punishment for Hope. However, his Puritan teachings say that he cannot 
ignore the possibility of witchcraft and local law makes him subject to investigation, so 
when the elders of the village hear of the event, Fletcher allows Nelema to be arrested 
and carried before the “triumvirate, Mr. Pynchon, Holioke, and Chapin” (108). These 
men take the word of “Jennet and some of her gossips” who “imputed to [Nelema] all the 
mischances that happened for the last seven years” as the truth of the matter because it 
matches their own opinions of Indians and Indian culture as savage (108-109).  
When Hope is called as a witness and refuses to testify against Nelema she too 
finds herself threatened that she might be “found in the folly of Balaam,” and when she 
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does respond that Nelema is innocent and that she thought it “better to mistake in 
blessing than in cursing” Hope is told that her opinion is regarded “but as the whistle of a 
bird” (109). So, her words have enough importance to condemn Nelema but not to call to 
task the elders of the community. Digby, who speaks out against the proceedings of the 
court and their decision to deem Nelema worthy of death, is also “summoned before the 
magistrates, and publicly reproved” as well as threatened (109). Mr. Pynchon warns him 
to “speak no more against godly governors and righteous government, for ‘to such 
scoffers heaven had sent diverse plagues—some had been spirited away by Satan—some 
blown up in our harbors—and some like poor Austin of Quinnepaig taken into Turkish 
captivity” (109). This over-the-top threat points to Mr. Pynchon’s own overinflated sense 
of self-importance. It also shows that the court is motivated not by justice but by the 
justification of their right to judge. As social inferiors, one by virtue of gender and the 
other by lack of property, Hope Leslie and Digby are deemed as unworthy witnesses. 
Therefore, their testimony is inconsequential. Likewise, Nelema is not even called to 
testify in her own defense because the word of an Indian cannot be used against whites. 
In the end, the judges disregard any testimony that contradicts their seemingly 
predetermined sentence because there is nothing in the law that says they must listen to a 
woman, an Indian, or a white man without property. Each of these people is subject to 
punishment under the law but not its protection. 
The disconnect between the reality of Nelema’s healing of Mr. Cradock, which 
those within the household deemed a necessary step for saving a family member, and the 
magistrates interpretation of it once again points to a problematic relationship between 
individuals and the state. The magistrates are blinded by a narrow interpretation of 
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religion, a rigidity that does not allow for exceptions, an inability to accurately assess the 
character of those levying the charges, racial prejudice, and a good dose of self-
importance. The council of magistrates also seeks to control individuals in a way that 
allows them to follow their own sense of right and wrong even when it flies in the face of 
reason or Christian charity. In combination these attributes lead to a restrictive, punitive 
religion and government that defines difference as potentially dangerous degeneration. 
Therefore, while the home might uphold a position on Burchell’s axes that tends more 
toward high brow, eastern notions of the relationships between Anglo-Americans and 
Indians, the government holds a decidedly more frontier and low brow estimation of the 
same relationships.   
This point is reiterated and expanded when Hope and the Fletcher family later 
move into the residence of Governor Winthrop. As the home of the governor and a place 
where he entertains diplomats and makes state decisions, the Winthrop home is decidedly 
a public, government space as much as it is a private, individual one. In showing how 
Winthrop runs his household and the decisions he makes for those housed in it, Sedgwick 
explores the danger of too much individual power in a single man.  Not only does 
Winthrop take it upon himself to meddle in the personal lives of Everell, Esther and 
Hope, but he is also shown to be a dupe who cannot assess the true character of the 
people he encounters. Winthrop relies so narrowly on the performance of piety that he 
cannot discern a person’s intentions. When Sir Phillip Gardiner, a poor schemer and 
Church of England faithful who associates with the worst papists and pirates of the 
colony, arrives Winthrop, and by extension the other Puritan leaders, are immediately 
taken in by his portrayal of Puritan godliness. Gardiner successfully inserts himself into 
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society and the good graces of Winthrop by donning Puritan dress, manners, religious 
ritual, speech and praise for the elders. When Gardiner follows Hope Leslie to a secret 
meeting with Magawisca and later spins a lie about an Indian uprising based on what he 
saw, he gains the confidence of Winthrop because he speaks the same language of 
prejudice and fear of Indians as Winthrop, and does so in the tongue of a Puritan. 
Gardiner’s deception and the rumors about Magawisca as the leader of an Indian 
rebellion might not be so threatening or cause such a chain of events had not the lie been 
given to the governor who runs his home and the colony according to the dictates of his 
own political and religious ideas—ideas that are surely proven foolish and empty by the 
ability of such a dubious character to so effectively mimic them.  
Of course, Sir Phillip’s success also relies on his ability to play upon the 
prejudices he knows Winthrop has, particularly his narrow view of Indians. These views 
are most clearly expressed when a contingency of Indian leaders is invited to the 
Winthrop home for dinner and is clearly snubbed. As the narrator describes it, in addition 
to the main dining table “a side-table was spread, but in a manner so inferior to the 
principle board, which was garnished with silver tankards, wine cups, and rich china as to 
indicate that it was destined for inferior guests” (145). The anticipated discrimination is 
confirmed when the Indian chief Miantunnomoh, his two counselors, and interpreter are 
asked to take their seats at the side table instead of with Winthrop and his white guests. 
When Miantunnomoh and his company refuse to sit, a flustered and somewhat indignant 
Winthrop demands to know what the problem is. In a chastisement that recalls 
Magawisca’s assessment of the English concept of equality and reciprocity,  the 
interpreter explains that the chief “expects such treatment from the English saggamore, as 
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the English receive in the wigwam of the Narrangasett chief” where “when the English 
stranger visits him, he sits on his mat and eats from his dish” (146).  Winthrop is 
appropriately shamed and admits his fault by moving the Indian party to the main table. 
Yet his motives are questionable. Does this action reflect his personal beliefs or is it a 
smart piece of diplomacy? Can the two be separated in this instance? Winthrop’s apology 
only muddles the distinction for he claims that the chief deserves a place of honor due to 
his generosity toward the English as reported by Roger Williams. No intimacy is implied 
in this explanation and the second-hand nature of the information points to a lack of 
actual interaction with the tribe beyond the dinner and matters of state being discussed 
that evening. The lack of personal connection between Winthrop and any of the Indians 
at the meal, or presented in the entire novel, means that he is once again unable to judge 
their true character and makes bad decisions about Indian affairs. By making Winthrop a 
dupe who can easily be manipulated because of his prejudices, Sedgwick too questions 
the fitness of even “great” men to make decisions by depicting them as having the same 
characteristics that supposedly make women unfit for public life. Of course Winthrop’s 
inability to judge character also makes him unfit for navigating the private home as well. 
  Winthrop’s dual role as governor and head of household means that state affairs 
are intimately tied to familial ones, and his ability to dictate the outcomes of both 
centralizes power in a way that proves detrimental to the freedoms of those who dwell in 
the household. One of the freedoms at stake is the ability of the individual to form 
relationships with Indians that are not in keeping with the official policy or rhetoric of the 
state. This means that the personal relationship the Fletcher household has with 
Magawisca and their pleas for reasonable treatment of her go unheeded. When 
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Magawisca is captured, she is brought to Winthrop’s home before being sent to jail, 
which gives him the opportunity to make a private decision that will influence the state. 
He can follow the dictates of his own emotion and the advice of his housemates who 
know Magawisca more intimately. However, he does not take this opportunity and 
instead upholds the impersonal state position. When Everell’s excitement to see 
Magawisca alive is tempered by the realization that she is being guarded, he demands 
that Governor Winthrop explain. The exchange between Everell, Magawisca, and 
Winthrop that follows demonstrates the heartlessness that comes from a lack of personal 
interaction and the danger of too little division between the male individual and state: 
“It means, sir,” replied the Governor coldly, “that this Indian woman is a prisoner 
of the  Commonwealth.”  
“It means that I am a prisoner, lured to the net, and betrayed” 
“You a prisoner—here Magawisca!” Everell exclaimed,— “impossible; justice, 
gratitude, humanity forbid it. My father—Governor Winthrop, you will not surely 
suffer this outrage.” 
Everell’s appeal to justice, gratitude, and humanity falls upon deaf ears because the state 
does not officially recognize Indians as being worthy of or legally entitled to any of these 
sentiments. Angry at Everell’s interjection, Winthrop replies,  
You will do well, young Mr. Fletcher, to bridle your zeal; private feelings must 
yield to public good; this young woman is suspected of being an active agent in 
brewing the conspiracy forming against us among the Indian tribes; and it is 
somewhat bold in you to oppose the course of justice—to intermeddle with the 
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public welfare—to lift your feeble judgment against the wisdom of Providence, 
which has led by peculiar means to the apprehension of the enemy. (234) 
Winthrop’s response labels the concepts of humanity and gratitude as private emotions, 
not values to be upheld by the state and offers an alternative concept of justice that 
emphasizes dealing fairly with the state and not the individual, since public good must 
always supersede private feelings. The hierarchy of private emotion versus public good 
highlights the very hypocrisy of Winthrop’s statements because they also assert that 
“feeble” individual judgment cannot stand “against the wisdom of Providence,” which 
means that his own judgments have the potential to be equally feeble and wrong. 
Winthrop too is but one man who cannot fight Providence, but because he is in control of 
the home and the state he can define providence in any way he chooses and ignore any of 
the facts he chooses by deeming them emotional. Just as a complimentary 
recommendation of chief Miantunnomoh by Roger Williams earned the Governor’s kind 
treatment, it would stand to reason that the character recommendations for Magawisca 
provided by his closest friends would carry at least equal weight. A reasonable man 
might also question the means by which Magawisca came to be captured. However, 
because unkind treatment of Magawisca is as expedient to state aims as kind treatment of 
Miantunnomoh, Winthrop proceeds with his imprisonment and trial of Magawisca.  
In the end, the homes of Conant, Fletcher, and Winthrop and their interactions 
with the state highlight the very discrepancies between households that are run according 
to individual morals and the supposed public good of the state and show how the 
differences between the two make the fight for equality difficult. For while an individual 
or group of individuals can be an exception to the public rules and forge alliances that are 
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advantageous to both, unless the state rhetoric and actions are aligned with the 
individuals no sustained positive interaction occurs. The marriage of Hobomok and Mary 
Conant cannot last; Mononotto cannot have an alliance with whites and ensure the 
survival of his tribe and family; the Fletcher household cannot take in Magawisca and 
Oneco without violence; Magawisca cannot love both the Fletchers and her family; 
Nelema cannot heal Cradock without risking her own life, and Magawisca cannot bring 
together the Leslie family without the potential loss of her own. As this list of impossible 
relationships indicates, the majority of the impact from negotiating the discrepancies 
between individual morals and state interests falls upon the women and Indians of the 
two novels. Although the home has become a public space, the state does not recognize 
the rights of these two groups or their presence, and their causes are always mediated by 
a man. So, even though women and Indians can forge beneficial relationships and 
maneuver to the benefit of society, their impact is limited because they do not have the 
full, official rights of participation that would allow them to restructure their relationship 
with the state so that the ideas of justice, gratitude, and humanity they practice are no 
longer incongruous with the state. 
III. Renegotiating Relationships
In order to fight the “justice” of the state and argue for the humanity of both 
women and Indians, these two disenfranchised groups must align to fight against a 
patriarchal society that largely excludes them. Interestingly, when the women in 
particular fight back, they fight not just for a new understanding of Indian/white relations 
but for more freedom of choice for women in terms of their ability to enact autonomy in 
72	  
their lives. Working within more traditional roles, Mrs. Conant seeks to maintain balance 
by influencing her husband to act charitably toward Mary and her love of Brown. When 
her husband rails against England, its church and wealth, Mrs. Conant tempers his wrath 
by reminding him of their own past and her choice to give up familial connections and 
wealth to follow him into the wilderness (108). Additionally, when Mr. Conant is away, 
she allows Brown and Mary to meet at their house.  On her deathbed, Mrs. Conant makes 
her husband promise that, if Brown ever returns to the colony, a marriage to Mary will go 
unopposed. Mrs. Conant’s pleas and actions are also supported by Widow Willet who 
allows the couple to meet at her house. The women of Salem are able to overcome 
prejudice that the men cannot. When the help of her mother and Widow Willet are not 
enough to persuade Mr. Conant to overcome his prejudice and treat his daughter with 
compassion, Mary enacts a full retreat from Puritan society.  
With her marriage to Hobomok Mary breaks cultural taboos and at least 
temporarily relinquishes her social status, wealth, faith, and family in order to escape the 
restrictive bounds of the Puritan patriarchy. In the wigwam of Hobomok she can dictate 
her own life in a way that was unavailable to her in Salem or her father’s home. Mary’s 
eventual return to Salem and her family and social status as well as her marriage to 
Brown is facilitated by Hobomok’s willing departure and divorce when Brown returns. 
This points to the temporary nature of her escape to Indian culture and certainly 
complicates our understanding of Indian/white relations in the novel and its nineteenth 
century implications. Still, a return to society could not occur without her marriage to 
Hobomok because only through personal loss is Mr. Conant able to understand the 
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impact of his prejudice. Mary must throw in her lot with the Indians before she is able to 
renegotiate her role in society.  
Likewise, Hope Leslie must break cultural norms and prejudices to correct the 
misjudgments of the Puritan elders. For Hope this comes in the form of two jailbreaks. 
Early in the novel when Nelema is convicted of witchcraft, Hope, with the help of Digby, 
orchestrates Nelema’s escape. Hope makes certain to be in the home of Mr. Pynchon 
where Nelema is being kept, and during dinner she simply happens to notice where the 
key to Nelema’s cell is hidden. According to the explanation of events Hope gives in her 
letter to Everell, after dinner Digby comes to escort her home but is dismissed because 
there is no pressing reason she must return to Bethel. That night she goes to bed like 
usual and hears nothing of Nelema’s escape until one of the Pynchon girls wakes her the 
next morning. Of course there is the small matter of Hope’s mysterious dream that night 
in which she stands in the Pynchon garden with Nelema who promises never to forget her 
kindness and to ensure that Hope will see her sister again. It is the keeping of this 
promise by Nelema that precipitates Hope’s second jailhouse delivery.  
As part of her promise to Hope that she should see her sister Faith again, Nelema 
seeks the help of Magawisca, who in addition to being undyingly devoted to Everell, is 
Faith Leslie’s sister-in-law. Magawisca’s capture while fulfilling the promise of reuniting 
the sisters and the Puritan leaders’ misinterpretation of the actions and character of those 
involved means that Hope Leslie once again finds herself in the position of defying 
Puritan leaders in order to bring about true justice. She, as a woman, must step in when 
male leaders have erred. To this end she breaks into the jail by convincing the jailer 
through appeals to the help she rendered his family that she and Mr. Cradock should be 
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allowed to see Magawisca even though they do not have a pass from the governor. Once 
in the cell she makes Cradock change places and clothing with Magawisca and then 
walks her out the front door and to the pier where Digby is waiting with a boat.  
For Mrs. Conant, Mary Conant, Hope Leslie and Magawisca the stimulus for their 
acts of resistance is an offended sense of justice and the impact of the patriarchy on their 
personal lives. In the case of Mary Conant and Hope Leslie in particular, their ability to 
act and demand change is very closely tied to Indians, thus echoing nineteenth century 
rights debates that offered women an alternative concept of the relationships between 
Indians and the state, women and the state, and women and Indians. Mary Conant’s 
marriage to Hobomok offers a viable alternative to the restrictive relationships of Puritan 
society, and he proves worthy of her affection not only because he dotes on her but 
because he too sacrificed his cultural standing to be with her. Hobomok negotiates a 
middle ground between Indian and Anglo cultures that makes him a respectable figure in 
the Puritan community. He is able to adapt to change, honor a true sense of justice, and 
overcome prejudice leveled at him from both whites and Indians in a way that his white 
counterparts are not. This too is a key element of the nineteenth century women’s 
depiction of Indians that becomes relevant to the fight over Indian Removal. Not only do 
the Indians most intimately tied to the heroines of the two novels overcome prejudice, but 
in their interactions with whites they are trustworthy, honest, and deserving of fair 
treatment. In fact, they often act more honorably than the Puritans. Hobomok sacrifices 
standing in this own tribe to protect the woman who cured his mother and her people. 
And in the end he is willing to walk away from Mary and his son so that she might be 
happy. Such selflessness is unseen in the Puritan men. Nelema also risks much in her 
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willingness to heal Mr. Cradock, and she faithfully keeps her promise to Hope Leslie. 
Magawisca loses her arm at the hands of her own father in order to push Everell out of 
the way and take what was meant to be his deathblow. Each Indian character is deemed 
worthy of the risks taken by the white women who would defend them. Not only is each 
Indian character faithful and self-sacrificing, but they are also able to show the error of 
Puritan doctrine through their innate sense of justice. Hobomok shames Mr. Conant and 
other Puritan leaders by reminding them that god and justice are bigger than racial 
distinctions, and Magawisca defends herself in court in a way that points out the 
falsehoods of Gardiner.  
 Lest the relationship between the heroines and Indians seem too idealized, it is 
also important to examine the conflicts in these relationships. Mary Conant is unable to 
entirely reconcile herself to her new life with Hobomok. When Sally Oldham extends an 
overture of friendship, Mary will not immediately accept on the grounds that she is 
ashamed of her life and fall from grace (130). Even after the birth of her child Mary still 
sees Hobomok with a love of appreciation but not one of passion like that felt for Brown. 
Her willingness to quickly accept the divorce of Hobomok and the marriage proposal of 
Brown also indicates uneasiness with life as an Indian. Though she can find happiness in 
her home and son, she is still concerned that she is culturally neither fully white nor fully 
Indian and therefore subject to prejudice from both. She is doubly othered and susceptible 
to losing standing as a white woman and an Indian. Thus she supports ideas about 
passionate marriage as well as strictly gendered ideas about intermarriage. 
 Hope Leslie also struggles to negotiate the two cultures in her relationship with 
her own sister and with Magawisca. Magawisca had long been a figure of heroism in 
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Hope Leslie’s eyes and in the Fletcher household because of her rescue of Everell. So for 
Hope, Magawisca is tied to the family through the bonds of a shared past and sacrifice. 
She and Hope are also tied because they share a sister. Yet, Hope, like Mr. Conant, 
cannot reconcile herself to a definition of family that includes a full mixing of cultures. 
Her sister’s loss of English, marriage to Oneco, and conversion to Catholicism are an 
affront to her Puritan values that cannot be fully or easily accepted—not necessarily 
because of religious reasons but because of the distance they create between her and her 
sister. This distance is furthered by Faith’s refusal to return to Hope or the Fletchers.24 
Hope’s relationship with Magawisca is likewise impacted by her hesitance to fully accept 
Magawisca’s decision to return to her father and Indian culture instead of staying in 
Boston. In Hope’s mind someone so like herself in conviction and belief (many critics 
have pointed to the ways in which the two women twin each other) should easily be 
accepted, and willing to be accepted, by white culture.  
 The problem at the heart of these relationships between women and Indians in the 
two novels is precisely the problem that made advocating on behalf of Indians so tricky 
in the nineteenth century: cultural identity. No matter how much women and Indians 
highlight their shared attributes, differences cannot be overcome without some loss of 
status for one or both sides of the alliance. If Magawisca stays in Boston she will be seen 
as a second rate citizen who as a woman and Indian is doubly othered. If Magawisca 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The choice made by Faith Leslie and the family’s difficulty in dealing with her adoption of Indian culture 
and Catholicism echoes the narrative of Eunice Williams told in John Demos’ Unredeemed Captive.  In 
1704 Eunice, along with several other family members, was captured by Indians in Deerfield and marched 
north to Canada. Over time the release of all of the other family members was secured, but Eunice’s was 
not released at first because she was a favorite of her captors and later because she refused to return. 
Despite repeated attempts by her family to persuade her to return to Deerfield, Eunice refused to leave her 
Indian husband and the tribe. She remained with the Mohawks for the rest of her life, but in her later years 
she did make contact with her Puritan family. The story would have been particularly familiar to Sedgwick 
who was a relative of Eunice Williams.	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returns to her father, even if he is regarded as a shadow of his former self, she still has 
social status and some rights. Of course this also works in the other direction. If 
Magawisca stays, then Hope becomes closely aligned with her in a way that might cause 
her own status to be questioned. Likewise, if Faith Leslie were to return to Puritan 
society, she would never be considered fully white again, and she would face religious 
persecution. Staying in Boston would also mean total isolation of the type she felt in the 
Winthrop household would pervade her life.  
In the end, all Indian characters return to their native culture or simply fade away 
into the west never to be seen again, which points to the difficulty white women who 
advocated on behalf of Indians had imagining whites and Indians as part of one family. 
The lines that must be crossed to promote such an idea of a national family meant that 
women might lose societal standing and run the risk of being doubly othered. There is 
much at stake in this alliance, but Hobomok and Hope Leslie point out there is also much 
to lose if the relationships between Indians, women, and the government do not improve. 
If the national rhetoric regarding Indians continues to adopt the lowbrow, frontier notions 
of racial inferiority and official policy demands cession of lands over all other political 
goals, the result is literally the physical and cultural death of entire tribes of people. 
However, a road forward is difficult to navigate because the ability of either women or 
Indians to participate in the discussion is limited by their shared inability to achieve full 
political participation. This has prompted many critics of Hobomok and Hope Leslie to 
claim that they address what might have been in Indian white relations. Yet I would argue 
that the novels are both a look to the past, and a vision for the future. They offer an 
argument for restructuring the republic in a more inclusive way and models of the 
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responsibilities and sensibilities of female and Indian citizens beyond the founding 
generation.  
In the case of Mary Conant, she manages to avoid the passive death of her mother 
and is ultimately able to choose her husband without sacrificing her wealth and social 
standing to do so. By marrying Hobomok she is, in the end, able to enact social change 
within her family and the community. Her marriage to an Indian clears the way for her to 
choose her own partner by essentially presenting an alternative so disgraceful that the 
economic and religious differences that made a marriage to a rich follower of the Church 
of England unacceptable seem trivial. Of course, she has made all of this happen at 
Hobomok’s expense. He is the one that sacrifices his family, culture and home to Mary’s 
happiness. While his choice to divorce Mary and leave Salem upon Brown’s return has 
all of the characteristics of the romantic hero who would sacrifice his own happiness for 
the woman he loves, Child’s plot also points to a willingness on the part of women to 
utilize Indians in the fight for their rights while disregarding the rights of the Indians 
themselves. Yet the plot might also be read in a more positive light as the relationship 
necessary for a new, more inclusive society where the son of a white woman and an 
Indian chief might become fully integrated into society.  
The question of which way the conclusion of the novel should be read lies largely 
in the willingness of the nineteenth century audience to accept the marriage between 
Hobomok and Mary. It is also partly influenced by the reality that Child cannot erase the 
fact that the Puritans had effectively removed Indians from the Northeast by cession of 
land, disease, and violence. If Child has Hobomok stay with Mary, she offends nineteenth 
century ideas of sexuality even further by making the marriage permanent. By making 
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him leave she upholds the trajectory of Indian/white relationships in New England and 
makes him a figure whose loss is to be mourned because of his superior character. In the 
end, perhaps the most meaningful fight against removal that Child can offer is that to 
remove the Indians would mean the loss of greatness and the ability to mutually benefit 
from a positive relationship with Indian tribes. 
In Hope Leslie, the vision of the future is more multi-faceted and offers a wider 
variety of potential relationships between men, women, Indians, and the government by 
offering three heroines: Hope Leslie, Magawisca and Esther Downing. As what Jennifer 
Camden terms the “secondary heroines” Magawisca and Esther are “seemingly 
representative of the possibilities available to American identity in the seventeenth 
century” (144). As such, Camden reads Magawisca’s return to her tribe as closing the 
door on the possibility of interracial marriage and creating a separation between home 
and the state as well as between Indian and American nations (141, 143). Magawisca’s 
decision to leave Everell and Hope does indeed mark the end of an Indian presence in the 
novel. However, it does not entirely preclude the possibilities of intermarriage or positive 
future relations. After all, Faith Leslie links Hope and Magawisca forever through the 
bonds of figurative and genealogical sisterhood. Also, Magawisca’s choice is not solely 
the product of racial discrimination on the part of the Puritan community. She does not 
want to stay in Boston any more than the government wants her to. By returning to her 
nation, she returns to her family and leadership of the tribe. In this way she does not 
separate private and public or domestic and national concerns. Instead she finds the most 
valuable way to combine them in her own leadership. Finally, Magawisca’s decision to 
return to her tribe as a leader means that she can use her time with the Fletchers to broker 
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a better relationship between Indians and the Puritan government. Magawisca becomes a 
potentially positive outcome for cultural exchange without complete assimilation. Also, 
she is a woman who can deal with the power structure within her tribe and with the 
Puritan government without having to express her opinions through a male mediator.  
Ironically, the freedom and status granted to Magawisca on her return to her 
family and tribe is more extensive than that available to the novel’s heroine Hope Leslie. 
Throughout the novel Hope has defied the principles and decisions of the Puritan 
establishment that she felt were unjust. In the end, this earned her a good reputation in the 
community because her heart was pure even if her actions were not always acceptable. 
Yet, these traits were also seen as something that would be tempered by marriage.  In her 
marriage to Everell, Hope Leslie has been able to experience a truly mutual agreement 
between lovers, and this marriage is blessed with the wealth inherited from her family. 
Nonetheless, Hope is restricted by the ideas of coverture, because she cannot influence 
the politics or economy of the nation except through her husband. Everell of course 
seems amenable to all of Hope’s ideas, and actually appears to rely on her for actions that 
he cannot render.  For example, Everell’s attempts to free Magawisca are easily thwarted, 
but Hope’s scheme works brilliantly because, unlike Everell, Hope can use her 
connection to people through acts of benevolence to secure what she wants. In this 
relationship, Hope is the stronger of the two and more capable of negotiating the public 
space. Yet she must rely on Everell to be her mouthpiece after marriage if she wants to be 
socially accepted. She has in some ways won both a direct line to the state and a loving 
marriage. Still, Sedgwick seems hesitant to praise this as the ultimate goal of the fight for 
rights, for her description of their marriage is offered secondhand by Esther and is limited 
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to a single sentence addressed to “that large, and most indulgent class or our readers, the 
misses in their teens” in which she urges them to fill in the details of the wedding to suit 
their own fancy. For Sedgwick, ending at love seems insufficient.  
The final model offered by Sedgwick is that of rigid Esther Downing whose strict 
adherence to the rules throughout the novel proves disenchanting to Everell and 
detrimental to a fully developed sense of justice. In the end, Esther remains single and 
vows not to “give to a party what was meant for mankind” (350). Though she gets the last 
line of the novel and seemingly Sedgwick’s praise for her benevolent actions, Esther’s 
choice to remain single is not without its complications.  Her choice not to marry means 
that Esther would, in a nineteenth century context, get to control her own finances.  She 
also avoids the “vast deal of misery” Sedgwick sees as connected to marriage. However, 
this does not mean that she fully escapes the restrictions of coverture or the demands of 
domesticity.  Instead she replaces the family and home in which she would perform her 
domestic duties with the Boston community.  
 While the novels do offer a vision of the future through the paths taken by their 
heroines, this future is still complicated by the historical setting of the novels. The 
intersection of rights movements during the fight against Indian Removal made any 
alliance between women and Indians potentially fruitful and potentially dangerous.  For 
women, Indian Removal became an opportunity to prove their fitness for citizenship by 
showing they could participate in political discourse as part of fulfilling their traditional roles. 
If their efforts failed, women risked further exclusion because it would confirm the 
reasons they were excluded and make advocating for rights, theirs or the Indians, an 
inappropriate activity for women. Therefore, as authors and supporters of women’s and 
Indian’s rights, Child and Sedgwick are also limited by their own restricted role in 
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society. Without the right to vote, women had to rely upon their ability to influence the 
beliefs of the men in their lives, and they must couch their opinions in traditional gender 
roles that emphasized private, domestic relationships. Child and Sedgwick find 
themselves subject to the same problematic relationship between men, women, the home, 
and the government that their female and Indian characters face. Unsurprisingly, the 
models for the future put forward by Child and Sedgwick are centered on the women who 
embody these traits while at the same time attempting to defy them. The result is a series 
of imperfect but progressive models that demonstrate the difficulties faced by women and 
Indian nations advocating for rights in the nineteenth century. 
These imperfect models will be put to the test when in the 1830s women are 
called upon to act very publicly on behalf of the Cherokee and other southeast Indian 
tribes who face removal. In creating a rhetoric that advocates for rights, both women and 
Indians must draw on the gendered and racialized models of civilization used to 
discriminate against them to validate their own words and actions. Women must draw on 
domesticity and traditional gender roles to expand their role as nurturers in a way that it 
encompasses their membership in benevolent societies and their public speaking, petition 
writing, and circulation of print articles on Removal. Indians and their female advocates 
must also appropriate the discourse of civilization to prove the worthiness of Indians to 
act as sovereign nations and retain their land. Though their arguments draw upon the 
same doctrine and aim for the same objective—the prevention of Indian Removal—the 
centrality of property to the debate means women and Indians cannot move on exactly 
parallel paths to achieve their goals. Women, who have no property rights, are fighting to 
gain them for the first time. Indians on the other hand are dealing with a loss of property 
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rights due to their feminization. This means that while women might still write on Native 
American rights as part of the fight for their own, Indians cannot and do not fully address 
women’s rights in the same way because explicitly arguing for women’s rights would 
jeopardize their own campaign for rights by reinforcing their feminization. As a result, in 
the Indian Removal debates, women’s writings about Indians and Indian advocacy in and 
of itself build a rhetoric of rights in which the women’s rights and Native American 
rights movements implicitly intersect. 
Copyright © Jesslyn R. Collins-Frohlich 2014 
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Chapter	  Three	  
Alliance and Intersection: Negotiating Race and Gender in the Fight Against Indian 
Removal 
When Elias Boudinot stood in front of Northern audiences and delivered his 1826 
“Address to the Whites,” at Philadelphia’s First Presbyterian Church, he faced the whites 
in the crowd as the embodiment of the success of the “civilizing” mission supported by 
benevolent societies.25 Educated at the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign 
Missions (ABCFM) school at Cornwall, Connecticut, married to a white woman and fully 
committed to the cause of Christianizing the Cherokee Nation, Boudinot was neither 
wholly savage nor wholly white and as such he represented both the assumed benefits 
and the uncanny doubleness of assimilation. Thus, far from simply arguing for funding 
for a printing press and type, Boudinot’s presence and his speech embody the complex 
intertwining of gender, race and political exclusion that problematized representation for 
Indians and women involved in the Removal debate. To convince his audience of white 
men to support the cause of an Indian newspaper, Boudinot must balance ideas of cultural 
and racial similarity and difference, independence and dependence. In many instances 
this meant accepting, and even playing to, those views of Indians that had led to their 
exclusion.  
Boudinot begins this complex balancing act by acknowledging that his audience 
might be tempted to “throw back their imaginations to ancient times, to the ravages of 
25	  Born Buck Watie, Elias Boudinot was the son of two full-blooded Cherokee parents and could count 
several prominent Cherokee men including Major Ridge and John Ridge as family. He had first obtained an 
education at the Moravian mission school in the Cherokee Nation and then later at the American Board 
school in Cornwall, Connecticut. At the Cornwall school he met and later married Harriet Ruggles Gold. 
He lived most of his life in the Cherokee Nation where he served as editor of The Cherokee Phoenix until 
he was forced to resign the post during the controversy over the New Echota Treaty, which he along with 
several of his prominent family members had signed. After the Cherokee were removed Boudinot would be 
killed for his signing of the treaty, which was seen as a betrayal of the Cherokee Nation.	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savage warfare, to the yells pronounced over the mangled bodies of women and children” 
and form “an opinion inapplicable and highly injurious to those for whose temporal 
interest and welfare” he advocates (69).  By evoking the most feared and sensationalized 
depictions of Indians as savages, Boudinot reminds his audience of what is at stake in 
their “civilizing” mission. He also establishes a point of comparison to highlight 
Cherokee assimilation, for he then offers himself as an example of the successful 
adoption of Christian civilization. Boudinot asserts, “You here behold an Indian, my 
kindred are Indians and my fathers sleeping in the wilderness grave- they too were 
Indians. But I am not as my fathers were- broader means and nobler influences have 
fallen upon me” (69). By defining himself, and by extension the contemporary Cherokee 
Nation, as an exception to savagery, Boudinot sublimates the threat of violence. He also 
points to a patriarchal organization and shared manhood that would counter the basis of 
the tribe’s political exclusion. By presenting himself as an exemplary, Boudinot depends 
on his own physical presence to confirm his adultness and maleness. He cannot in person 
be characterized the way Indians are in theory. However, he does not entirely disabuse 
his audience of all stereotypes or depict Indians as white, for maintaining some of these 
differences and the racial and gender hierarchies they imply produces tangible benefits. 
 To gain the support of his white audience, Boudinot must prove that the Cherokee 
are exceptional among their peers for their civilization and Christianity, but not so 
exceptional or independent as to no longer warrant the patronage and political support of 
white Northerners.  Thus he describes the Cherokee as “rapidly improving in all those 
particulars which must finally constitute the inhabitants an industrious and intelligent 
people.” As support for his assertion he provides a detailed list of the number of various 
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livestock, spinning wheels, wagons, plows, blacksmith shops, ferries, schools and roads 
within the Cherokee Nation.26 He also points to the parallel between traditional Cherokee 
faith and the Christianity so many of them have adopted. In addressing those aspects of 
assimilation most likely to be seen as evidence of a settled life and agriculture, Boudinot 
makes a subtle argument for the rights of the Cherokee to retain their land on the basis of 
their similarity to white men. As part of his argument Boudinot elides areas of conflict 
such as the Cherokee Nation’s continued use of communal property rights and the true 
nature of their religion.27 Such strategic omissions work to build similarities between 
whites and the Cherokee. Nonetheless, Boudinot must also be careful to keep just enough 
difference to maintain the threat of savageness, because such ideas make the Cherokee 
cause seem urgent and thereby justify white support. Therefore, he holds up the printing 
press, not as an opportunity for Cherokee autonomy, but as a way to more widely 
disseminate Christian gospels and promote the causes of benevolent societies.  Boudinot 
proposes the Cherokee present themselves to the world in their own words through the 
publication of a newspaper in which they “may exhibit specimens of their intellectual 
efforts, of their eloquence, of their moral, civil, and physical advancement, which will do 
quite as much to remove prejudice and to give profitable information” (77). The aim of 
such efforts by the Cherokee is to show their fitness for rights and independence as the 
same as whites’ precisely by showing their ability to be a pitiable other. They must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The figures used by Boudinot to prove Cherokee civilization are drawn from both the 1810 census 
conducted for the federal government by Return Jonathan Meigs and a census conducted by the Cherokee 
in 1824.	  
27	  In her edited collection of Boudinot’s writing, Theda Perdue points out that “Boudinot was so thoroughly 
Christianized that he did not understand the religion of his own people. The Cherokee did not believe in a 
‘Supreme Being’ or an ‘evil spirit’” (Editor, 81). 
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simultaneously uphold and defy the concepts of gender and race that would exclude them 
from gaining rights in the patriarchal legal and social systems of the United States.   
 When the debate over Indian Removal moved from the pages of novels to 
periodicals and political speeches, the Eastern Cherokee were actively engaged in 
defining themselves and their right to property for the American public.28 The question 
and challenge for the Cherokee and the white women who would support them was 
determining how groups of people excluded from patriarchal systems of government 
might use their very exclusion to argue for inclusion and do so forcefully enough to 
demand attention.  They must also grapple with determining how two marginalized 
groups might align without jeopardizing the success of both. As political others, the 
Cherokee and the white women involved in the fight against Indian Removal had been 
excluded along similar lines and faced similar obstacles. For women, the legal concept of 
coverture gave them few rights and depicted them as children in need of male 
guardianship. This child-like legal status combined with the increased enfranchisement of 
white men and changes in the structures of political parties worked to define female 
citizenship in terms of duties, not rights, and reduced opportunities for public, political 
participation (Zagarri 156-157). The increased exclusion of women from direct political 
involvement meant the activities available to them became those associated with the 
morality of the country. They became the national conscience that operated from above 
the political fray largely because they were excluded from it. The Cherokee Nation had 
also been excluded through the use of gender and race. Gendered concepts of civilization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In 1817 approximately 1,500 to 2,000 Cherokee decided to move west as part of a treaty that offered 
lands west of the Mississippi and government help in exchange for lands in the southeast (Anderson ix). 
The Cherokee who chose to remove acted in defiance of tribal government, and were eventually stripped of 
claims of alliance with the	  Cherokee who remained. Those who remained were designated the Eastern 
Cherokee and engaged in the fight against Indian Removal. 	  
	   	   	  
 
	   88	  
and proper land cultivation had feminized the Cherokee. The feminization of the tribe 
combined with the paternalistic rhetoric of the “Great Father” used to describe the 
relationship between the US and the Cherokee Nation meant that, like white women, the 
Cherokee were victims of a patriarchal legal system that viewed them as child-like and in 
need of white, male guidance.  
 For both women and Indians the rise of benevolent societies offered a way to 
productively, if not somewhat problematically, negotiate their exclusion and the benefits 
of an alliance.  Benevolent groups operated on the basic premise that by doing good 
works and sacrificing of their own time and money they might create a more perfect 
society.29  To this end, these groups engaged in local and national campaigns aimed at 
alleviating a number of societal ills such as poverty, drunkenness, unfair wages, and 
public health. Given the religious affiliations of many benevolent societies, they also 
engaged in national and international missionary efforts like the ABCFM work with the 
Cherokee as well as political issues seen important to the moral character of the US.  
Each of these benevolent causes depended on first identifying an aspect of society, 
usually a group of people, in need of perfecting and then building support for the cause 
by developing feelings of public sympathy for the object of the campaign. As Glenn 
Hendler explains, cultivating sympathy or compassion depends on a person’s ability to 
“feel like” the subject through a process that asks them “to compare his or her emotional 
experience analogically” with those they are to help, but do so “in a way that maintains a 
degree of difference between the subject and object of sympathy” (5). The fact that those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  For discussions of the origins, rhetoric, and reach of nineteenth century benevolent societies and 
women’s involvement in them see Anne M. Boylan. The Origins of Women’s Activism: New York and 
Boston, 1797-1840; Hershberger, Mary. “Mobilizing Women, Anticipating Abolition: The Struggle against 
Indian Removal in the 1830s”; Susan Ryan, The Grammar of Good Intentions: Race and the Antebellum 
Culture of Benevolence. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2003; Bolt, Christine. The Women’s Movements in the United 
States and Britain from the 1709s to the 1920s. Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1993. 
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identified by a benevolent society as in need of aid frequently differed from its largely 
middle class, female members in race, social class, economic status, or gender meant 
difference was inherent in most campaigns. Therefore, sympathy creates affective 
connections that are also frequently marked by condescension and the need to see the 
object of sympathy as racially or culturally different.30 However, as Meilke points out, 
this does not mean that all attempts to foster sympathy between individuals through 
benevolent causes was disingenuous (4). It does however mean that as a rhetorical tool, 
ideas of sympathy can come to stigmatize or further marginalize those it aimed to help, 
especially when utilized by another othered group such as women. As the case of 
women’s benevolent work on Indian Removal reveals becoming the object of female 
sympathy held the potential to confirm the feminization of Indians.  
Therefore, though they shared similar positions and had been put in those 
positions by similar, but in no way identical, constraints, too close an alliance between 
white women and the Cherokee could prove detrimental to both groups’ argument for 
rights. This was in part because of their different aims and the consequences of the 
outcome for each group. White women involved in the anti-removal movement were not 
only fighting for the prevention of forceful relocation of southern tribes but also sought a 
socially sanctioned avenue for developing a national political voice and a platform for 
entering the discussion about the gendering of property and citizenship. In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Lauren Berlant, The Female Compliant: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American 
Culture. Durham: Duke UP, 2008; Jane Tompkins, Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American 
Fiction, 1790-1860. New York: Oxford UP, 1985; Shirley Samuels Ed., The Culture of Sentiment: Race, 
Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America. New York: Oxford UP, 1992 ; Cindy 
Weinstein, Family, Kinship and Sympathy in Nineteenth Century American Literature. New York: Oxford 
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Ellison, Cato’s Tears and the Making of Anglo American Emotion. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999; Julia A. 
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achieve both of these goals, women had to play to the concepts used to exclude them by 
employing their restricted political role as an entry point into national participation. As 
the moral force that acted from above the political fray, women could gain political 
influence by showing the question of Indian Removal to be a moral one, not a question of 
legal premise. However, in order to make Removal a socially acceptable, moral cause, 
women must make the Indians in question part of a white woman’s religious domain. To 
this end women needed to depict the Cherokee as savages capable of civilization through 
Christian benevolence or as children in need of parenting. Such characterizations, 
however, could simply reinforce the exclusion of the Cherokee and harm their chances of 
effectively fighting Indian Removal by undermining their right to political participation.  
 While women were fighting for a political voice, the Cherokee were fighting for 
the political definition and survival of a nation, for which success meant proving a 
collective manhood. If Indians had been classified as female and child-like by patriarchal 
systems, then only when they became symbolically male and adult could the Cherokee 
gain the ability to challenge their exclusion through political and legal means. 
Establishing manhood meant upholding (at least publicly) patrilineal systems of 
inheritance, private property and Christianity—all of the elements of civilized adulthood 
that had been used to demonstrate the Cherokee’s previous lack of fitness for inclusion. 
Yet such moves toward manhood meant ignoring and at times excluding the white 
women who might support them because an alliance with a group of people who were 
female and lacking in legal rights meant that the Cherokee might also been seen that way 
by association.  
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 Nonetheless, both white women and the Cherokee needed each other in order for 
their individual goals to be achieved. Women needed the Cherokee to be a cause that 
would prove their fitness for not just the duties but also the rights of citizenship by 
showing they could participate in political, public debates independently of men. The 
Cherokee needed women to provide them access to Northern social networks and 
benevolent groups in order to gain the support of white men and women.  Therefore, 
women’s depiction of Indians as in need of Christian guidance in order to achieve 
civilized adulthood provided the Cherokee a platform for gaining political support from 
benevolent societies by proving how much progress they had already made. Such acts of 
defining themselves through and against the systems that would exclude them as well as 
each other create two rights movements that, on the surface, are marked by absences. 
However, when examined more closely these absences are in fact deliberate rhetorical 
choices that allow the Cherokee and their female advocates to construct interdependent 
approaches to tackling the issue of Indian Removal. These seeming absences give each 
group the opportunity to play to their individual strengths and collectively construct a 
more complete rhetoric of rights. Thus it becomes important to examine those moments 
in which the two movements intersect. 
 In exploring the interconnectedness of the two movements it is important to 
remember that intersections between rights movements were not simply political or 
national. For many white women advocating for Indians’ Rights, these intersections 
between their search for rights and Indians’ rights were the result of personal, local 
relationships and connections that reflected of the complicated questions of race and 
gender that shaped the national debate. Perhaps the best example of this is the web-like 
	   	   	  
 
	   92	  
set of connections that tied together three of the anti-removal campaign’s most prominent 
figures: Elias Boudinot, Jeremiah Evarts and Catherine Beecher.  Their lives intersected 
with the presence of the ABCFM school in Cornwall, Connecticut. Established in 1817, 
the school aimed to “civilize” and “Christianize” Indian men so they might return to their 
tribes and spread the gospel. As a member of the board of ABCFM, Evarts participated in 
decisions related to the group’s missionary activities, including the establishment of the 
school. He also became editor of the group’s official publication, the Missionary Herald. 
Evarts would later go on to work with Elias Boudinot to translate the Bible and hymns 
into the Cherokee language. For his part, Boudinot was a student at the school from the 
age of fifteen until 1826, when he graduated and married Harriet Gould, the daughter of a 
prominent white family. The Boudinot-Gould marriage caused intense public outrage and 
effigies of the couple were burned in the town square. The governing board of the school, 
of which Catherine Beecher’s father Lyman was a member, publicly denounced the 
marriage as “criminal” and an “outrage on public feeling” (Report on the Foreign 
Mission School, June 1825). Catherine Beecher would herself become directly involved 
in the fight against Removal after Jeremiah Evarts, a long-time friend of her father, spoke 
to her about the Removal crisis.  
 As the relationships between these three individuals show, alliances across race 
and gender could be complicated and carried potential negative outcomes for each. The 
closeness of the relationship between Evarts and Boudinot might lead some to wonder to 
what extent the Cherokee editor wrote his own articles or could remain connected to the 
Cherokee people. The outcry over the Boudinot-Gould marriage had shown Catherine 
Beecher that too close an association with an Indian man would not be tolerated by her 
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own family or the educated elite whose daughters she hoped to enroll in her school. 
Clearly, while an alliance between Indians and whites was necessary for fighting Indian 
Removal, so too was space. Seeming disconnects between the aims of women and the 
Cherokee offered both groups the distance needed to define themselves against, not only 
the patriarchy that had excluded them both, but also each other as necessary.  
 Such spaces and intersections between the rights movements are most clearly 
displayed in periodicals of the time, which offered women and Indians a wide audience, 
the ability to write and borrow from numerous articles, and access to extensive networks 
of people. They also provided the opportunity to translate such personal relationships, 
with all of their complications, into public causes, without jeopardizing the character of 
individuals or the aims of the movements they represented. Denominational periodicals 
were unique in their ability to give women and Indians an opportunity to present public 
arguments in a forum that was socially sanctioned because of its ties to benevolent 
causes. Such publications offered a way for women to use their exclusion from overtly 
political acts to their advantage. Such journals also gave the Cherokee the opportunity to 
speak to white audiences in their own words through reprinting speeches, letters, and 
memorials written by the nation. Through the circulation of religious and other 
periodicals, voices that might otherwise have been absent from the larger political debate 
over Indian Removal could become powerful and aligned in the mind of the readership. 
And perhaps no other periodical more aptly combines the interests involved in resisting 
Removal than The Cherokee Phoenix. 
The Phoenix was unique among the periodicals of the time, for from its inception 
it represented an alliance between the Cherokee Nation and the ABCFM. Its funding had 
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also been obtained by Boudinot’s speaking tour and his ability to convince audiences of 
white Northerners that the Cherokee were a cause of advocacy and sympathy. However, 
the paper was also to function as the official print organ of the Cherokee Nation and 
argue for Cherokee sovereignty. Balancing such needs meant that, as editor, Boudinot 
must simultaneously appeal to Cherokee and white audiences. He must also account for 
the fact that he was writing to a readership of white men and women who must be 
continuously persuaded of the rightness of fighting Indian Removal as well as members 
of the Cherokee Nation who would participate in their own defense. Boudinot 
accommodates such demands in the structure of The Phoenix. From the beginning, The 
Phoenix was a dual language newspaper with a dual audience of Cherokee and whites.31 
Articles were written in both the Cherokee syllabary and in English and placed alongside 
each other in a way that structurally and visually showed the parallels between the two 
cultures. The content was also selected with such an alliance in mind. Boudinot published 
official tribal documents such as the Cherokee constitution, letters received from federal 
Indian agents, memorials sent to Congress, the proceedings of the Congress and the 
House of Representatives, as well as the views of Cherokee who traveled across the US, 
death notices, items for sales, and findings of the Cherokee courts.  Historical accounts of 
white and Indian interactions and the reports of missionaries in the Cherokee Nation were 
also routinely published. This range of items proved important for informing the 
Cherokee of events pertaining to the fight against Removal as well as creating a more 
complete picture of the Cherokee Nation for the paper’s white readers. It also sought to 
unite the different groups invested in the fight against Removal by erasing from its format 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  In reports of his visits to Indian country, Boudinot’s father-in-law Benjamin Gold claimed that the 
Phoenix “is respected throughout the United States and is well known in Europe” and that the “office 
regularly received over one hundred newspapers from publishers far and wide” (Parins 8).	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gender and race barriers that might be interpreted as disunity among the pro-Indian 
movement. Thus articles by white men and white women are placed alongside each other 
as well as articles written by Cherokee men and women. At a time when even most of the 
periodicals published by benevolent societies were segregated by gender, such a move is 
both radical and practical. It creates a unified front and ensures that the Cherokee 
continue to receive support from all who might give it. Ultimately though, Boudinot’s 
formatting of the paper and selection of articles lays out an extensive argument for 
continued support for Cherokee rights on the grounds of their civilized nature.   
This argument begins as early as the first edition of the paper, in which the first of 
a multi-part printing of the Cherokee constitution is published alongside a note on the 
Cherokee alphabet, a translation of the Lord’s Prayer in English and Cherokee, and 
article on Indian emigration that features excerpts of a letter from Secretary of War 
Thomas McKenney and Boudinot’s rebuttal (Cherokee Phoenix 1.1). In later publications 
such as the March 20, 1828 edition, Boudinot pairs an explanation of Cherokee laws with 
an article containing a speech to the Cherokee by George Washington. The contents of 
these two editions allow an association of the Cherokee Constitution and laws with one of 
the US’s most revered founders and begin to create a rhetoric of civilization where 
Christian ideas and American concepts of government can not only be appropriated by 
Indians but can be used as a rebuttal to the unjust actions of Indian Removal. Boudinot 
also seems to hope that the proximity of these items on the page will, with the support of 
his white readership, translate into political proximity.  He draws upon the tropes of 
history and precedent as justification of Indian sovereignty that is used throughout the 
debate over Removal. Evoking a founding father and signer of the US constitution in the 
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same issue as the Cherokee laws also lends gravity to the passing of the Cherokee 
constitution and civil laws as the founding of a legitimate nation. Equating Cherokee 
actions and white actions reminds white readers of the strides being made by the 
Cherokee and helps define what is at stake for the ideologies of both if the Cherokee are 
removed.  
The Phoenix also sought to foster the relationship between white men and women 
and the Cherokee through its practice of reprinting articles concerning Indian affairs from 
other newspapers across the country. In reports of his visits to Indian country, Boudinot’s 
father-in-law Bejamin Gold claimed the Phoenix “office regularly received over one 
hundred newspapers from publishers far and wide” (Parins 8).  Like other editors of the 
time, Boudinot engaged very actively in the reprinting of articles from other newspapers 
that he received.32 He frequently reprinted, with commentary, articles from local southern 
newspapers that espoused a pro-Removal stance. He also borrowed from northern 
periodicals accounts of meetings, rallies, speeches and other political functions in which 
white northerners came out in support of the Cherokee. In addition to reprinting from 
other papers, particularly those that would promote the Cherokee cause, Boudinot 
routinely published Cherokee texts that would be republished in Northern periodicals, 
especially those affiliated with the ABCFM and other religious and benevolent 
societies.33 This borrowing brought even more perspectives to the readers and helped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  	  In The Newspaper Indian: Native American Identity in the Press 1820-90, John M. Coward explains that 
“before the telegraph (and well into the telegraph era), news circulated largely through the mails. Editors 
used the post office to establish exchanges with editors in distant cities. By clipping items from exchange 
papers editors could obtain regular accounts of national and international news, materials otherwise 
difficult to obtain.” The fact that such exchanges were free meant that “many editors filled their columns 
with exchange material” (14).	  
33	  Fortified by a worldview that emphasized justice and the idea that society could be made better by 
sacrificing for the greater good, these groups, which were often affiliated with a religious denomination and 
organized by women, embarked on regional and national campaigns. Many times these campaigns focused 
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Boudinot further shape the debate over Indian Removal as a national concern, not just a 
local, Indian problem.  By presenting a collage of articles Boudinot was able to shape the 
Cherokee image for a large audience of whites. Reprinting from a wide variety of white 
sources also had the effect of helping whites literally and figuratively see themselves in 
the paper. Their voices, ideas, and words became important and the sharing of the page 
reinforced their belief in the cause and in their ability to influence questions of national 
policy in the name of Christian morality. 
Active borrowing, the paper’s dual purpose, and an association with the ABCFM 
also offered practical advantages in terms of circulation and audience. According to 
Theda Perdue, in 1827 Boudinot had “hired agents in a number of states to accept 
subscriptions from whites for the Cherokee Indian newspaper. By July, he could boast 
thirty to forty subscribers in Mobile, Alabama and a like number in Troy, New York as 
well as scattered subscribers throughout the United States. A year later, a copy of The 
Phoenix had even reached Baron William de Humbolt in Berlin” (15). While this reach is 
by no means insignificant for a dual language paper, it falls far short of the number of 
subscribers enjoyed by white denominational periodicals. As Mary Hershberger explains, 
“religious organs were by far the most widely circulated of all periodicals at the time.” In 
addition to a larger readership, these periodicals also appealed to a more diverse 
readership than the “primarily male and elite” one aimed at by “the traditional party and 
secular periodicals.”  Thus, “At a time when the esteemed North American Review had a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on specific social causes such as temperance or the alleviation of poverty in a particular city. Just as 
frequently, they worked on a national scale to engage in missions and organize around political issue like 
Indian Removal.  See Anne M. Boylan The Origins of Women’s Activism: New York and Boston, 1797-
1840; Mary Hershberger “Mobilizing Women, Anticipating Abolition: The Struggle against Indian 
Removal in the 1830s.”; Susan M. Ryan The Grammar of Good Intentions: Race and the Antebellum 
Culture of Benevolence and Lori D. Ginzberg Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics and 
Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States.	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circulation of only 3,000, thirty religious periodicals reported subscription lists of 3,000 
or more, with fifteen of those having over 5,000 subscribers each” (18). For example, the 
Christian Advocate and Journal boasted 25,000 subscribers and the Zion’s Herald, which 
would eventually be merged with the Christian Advocate Journal, had 6,000 subscribers. 
The official organ of the ABCFM, The Missionary Herald, had 14,000 subscribers 
(Hershberger 18). Access to these titles, as well as having his material borrowed by them, 
meant that even if The Phoenix’s subscription numbers were limited, the ideas and 
articles it contained had the potential to reach an audience of men and women, Cherokees 
and whites far beyond those listed among its subscribers.  
 This chapter plots the interdependence of the Cherokee and women’s rights 
during the fight for Indian land rights and examines the public arguments of women and 
Indians and how the complicated relationship between gender, race and political power 
represented in the texts functions as a rebuttal to, not just Indian Removal, but legal and 
social arguments that excluded them from the rights of citizenship, particularly political 
participation and property. I will address the 1829 “Memorial of the Cherokee People,” 
Catherine Beecher’s “Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies of the United States,” and 
the “Letter to the American People” adopted by John Ross and the Cherokee leadership. 
Each text was printed in The Cherokee Phoenix, as well as at least one other white 
newspaper. At least two of the three also enjoyed circulation in pamphlet or leaflet form. 
These texts and their authors also illustrate the complicated, interpersonal connections 
that drove the anti-Removal campaign.  They serve as junctures when for a time each 
group adopted and promoted the rhetoric of the other. Given their appearance in The 
Cherokee Phoenix, wide circulation and the relationships between the authors, these texts 
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together offer an opportunity to explore the dialogue created between women, Indians 
and their audiences during Indian Removal and understand the interconnectedness of two, 
at times, seemingly disparate rights movements. 
 
I. Assimilation and Exclusion 
 In many ways, the rhetorics employed by anti-removalists and removalists were 
formed by differing interpretations of the history and outcome of white attempts to 
assimilate the Cherokee, as much as they were by contemporary events. After all, as 
scholars of Indian relations point out, the federal government’s nineteenth century 
scheme to remove Indians ahead of western expansion was nothing new.34 As early as the 
first colonial governments, Indian policy frequently sought to gain tribal land by 
advocating a path of Indian assimilation.35 The regularity with which white settlers and 
land speculators ignored government policy and encroached on Indian land was also an 
old tale. Stuart Banner explains, “What was new was the speed of the process and the 
attention being paid to it…For the first time, the details of Indian land acquisition became 
enmeshed in national party politics and in debates about constitutional law” (192). One 
key reason the fight over Removal became a national debate is the Cherokee themselves. 
The Cherokee Nation’s willing integration of Christianity and settled agriculture into 
their traditional tribal structure as well as a relatively high number of bicultural members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  See Ronald N. Satz “Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Indian Policy of Andrew Jackson;” David A. Nichols 
Red Gentlemen and White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American 
Frontier; Reginald Horsman Expansion and American Indian Policy 1782-1812; William G. McLoughlin 
Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic; Francis Paul Prucha The Great Father. 
35 For perhaps the most extensive exploration of the relationship between the US and Indian tribes, see 
Prucha’s The Great Father.	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made it difficult to paint them as “savages” standing in the way of civilization.36 Their 
ability to use the press to organize a very public campaign against Removal also made 
them a new type of adversary.   
 Considered by white, nineteenth century observers to be the most civilized of the 
Southeastern Indian tribes, the Cherokee were early adopters of an assimilation policy. 
After the Revolutionary War, the federal government established a series of trading posts 
throughout Indian Territory known collectively as the factory system. The aim of the 
factory system was to “control and regulate geographic areas and certain populations” by 
establishing a federal presence that, if it chose, could enforce terms of treaties and 
assimilate Indians through trade (Rockwell 92). Yet it was the latter part of this stated 
purpose that proved most appealing to Indian agents and the presidents under which they 
served. The factory system was viewed as a way to move Indians from a subsistence 
economy built upon hunting to one of settled agriculture and wealth attainment.  
Advocates reasoned that in the transition to “civilized” farmers, Indians would come to 
value individual ownership over collective property rights and realize they did not 
actually need all of their tribal lands (McLoughlin 35-36). In many instances, the 
philosophy of assimilation inherent in the factory system was reinforced by the teachings 
of missionary societies. These groups used the money available from the federal 
government to settle among the tribes and establish schools where Indian children were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  In  “Mixed Blood” Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South, Theda Perdue refers to those 
members of the Cherokee tribe who are of mixed white and Cherokee ancestry as bicultural because they 
had special experience in bringing together and living within two different cultures. 
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given basic educations in reading, writing, history and mathematics and taught the 
gendered duties of farming and domesticity.37  
 The Cherokee accepted the factory system, the mission schools, and the policy of 
civilization because these institutions represented a way to survive in a changing world. 
By the 1820s the Cherokee had an established agricultural tradition, a successful stake in 
the deerskin trade, a network of towns that provided protection from invasion, and a 
centralized leadership (Perdue 33-35).  The use of white agricultural practices also meant 
the Cherokee population had been spread across tribal lands. As Douglass Wilms 
explains in his study of Cherokee land use, Cherokee law said “each family has the right 
to clear and cultivate as much land as he pleases, so long as he does not go nearer than a 
quarter mile to his neighbor” (10). In fact, some Cherokee had proven so successful at 
farming that they also “adopted the whites’ system of black slavery and had established 
extensive plantations, rivaling their white counterparts” (Prucha 185). A convenient by-
product of this policy was that, theoretically, the Cherokee Nation could protect more 
land from white settlers because it was considered a developed farm, not a wilderness. 
Thus, the nation more closely resembled prosperous white settlements than the Indian 
country imagined by those in charge of the factory system. In fact, the Cherokee proved 
so successful in adopting agricultural and trade practices that the factory system began 
losing money and was eventually ended in 1811.   
 Another Cherokee development not accounted for in official government attempts 
at assimilation was the rate of intermarriage. A significant number of whites, mostly men, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 As early as 1799 Christian missionary groups had taken up residence among the Cherokee and begun 
establishing schools. In the nineteenth century groups such as the American Board of Commissioners, 
motivated in part by politics and by philanthropy, moved beyond the civilizing mission and became key 
allies in the fight over Indian Removal.	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had married into the Cherokee Nation.  Following the traditionally matriarchal structure 
of the tribe, the children of such unions were considered full Cherokee. These bicultural 
Cherokee were uniquely suited to bridge the gap between traditional Cherokee and white 
cultures and as such were “more amenable to adopting white agricultural practices than 
the full bloods, who tended to be conservative.” As interactions with encroaching settlers 
increased, these bicultural men and women rose to power in the Cherokee government 
and “played a crucial role during the nineteenth century” (Wilms 3).  In addition to, or 
perhaps because of, the economic, geographic and demographic composition of the tribe, 
the Cherokee were also able to in many instances negotiate the terms upon which the 
institutions of “civilization” entered their territory.   
For the Cherokee Nation, contact with white settlers and the process of 
assimilation was by no means without significant problems; however, because the 
institutions of assimilation were frequently based on a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the true nature of tribal life, the Cherokee were better able to control the impact. The 
result was a blending of cultures that allowed the tribe to adopt those practices they found 
helpful and disregard the rest. As Theda Perdue explains, the Cherokee adopted white 
practices in ways that were particularly economically advantageous: “By the end of the 
eighteenth century a number of Cherokees had accumulated substantial capital” and in 
the early nineteenth century “they began to look for ways to invest that capital” (34). 
While the decision of these wealthy Cherokees to invest in livestock, equipment, and 
infrastructure might have been seen as a triumph for the factory system and Christianity 
because it moved them toward a white system of commodities and agriculture, it did not 
have the desired effect of increasing the reliance on individual property rights. If 
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anything, the adoption of white practices taught the Cherokee the value of their land and 
the practicality of communal ownership. The Cherokee realized that “the practice of 
holding land in common freed capital for investment elsewhere” (Perdue 36). Far from 
making them willing to sell or cede their land, the factory system and Christianity had 
offered the Cherokee the means, education, and motivation to resist. In the nineteenth 
century the Cherokee Nation consolidated its leadership, made it illegal for any one 
person to sell land, and adopted a written constitution. According to supporters of 
Cherokee rights, the history and actions of the Cherokee proved their collective manhood 
and right to sovereign status. They had done all that the government asked and should be 
rewarded accordingly. 
At the same time that the Cherokee Nation began to more closely resemble a 
white settlement, demands that the government open more land to accommodate 
westward expansion and the pervasive practice of land speculation led to increased 
clashes between white squatters and Indian tribes. This increasing tension placed new 
emphasis on the failure of assimilation to cause the Cherokee to willingly give up more 
of their landholdings. Such pressures combined to make the federal government to re-
examine, and ultimately rewrite, the history and legal premises upon which it based its 
interactions with Indian tribes. The long-established process of gaining land by treaty, 
which underscored the push for assimilation, had been based on the understanding that 
Indians owned the land; therefore, tribal lands could be acquired only by a formally 
negotiated treaty with the federal government. After the government procured the land it 
could be sold to white settlers or the states in which the territory lay. However, this chain 
of legal ownership had not stopped land speculators from selling investors “preemptive 
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rights” to land before the Indians had even ceded it. This meant speculators would sell 
“not land, or even the right to buy land from the Indians, but rather the prospect of being 
the owner of the land once the government bought the land from the Indians (Banner 
160).  Land speculators created a system in which Indian land could be sold many times 
over even while Indians still legally owned it. In a sense that seemed very real to 
speculators and buyers of preemptive rights, Indians started to feel less like fee-simple 
owners and more like tenants (Banner 161). Though this shift in thinking about Indian 
land ownership flew in the face of all official government policies, it became legal 
precedent in the Supreme Court’s 1823 ruling on Johnson v. McIntosh.   
In his majority opinion John Marshall, himself a land speculator, used the shifting 
concept of Indians as occupants of federal land to erroneously rewrite legal and cultural 
history. First he asserted that “[w]hile the different nations of Europe respected the right 
of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and 
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the 
soil while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to 
convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.” He then 
argues that “The British government, which was then our government and whose rights 
have passed to the United States, asserted title to all the lands occupied by Indians within 
the chartered limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a limited sovereignty over 
them and the exclusive right of extinguishing the title which occupancy gave to them” 
(Johnson v. McIntosh 21). The assertion of the right to grant occupied lands opens the 
way for speculators, and Marshall’s later claim that it “has never been doubted that either 
the United States or the several states had a clear title to all the lands within the boundary 
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lines described in the treaty” gives individual states power to bypass the federal 
government and extinguish and grant land rights on their own. The impacts of the ruling 
were widespread and shaped the focus of Indian policy as well as the arguments of those 
on both sides of the Removal issue.   
 For Andrew Jackson and those advocating the removal of the Cherokee, 
Marshall’s ruling provided a legal precedent for their argument that the land had never 
actually been owned by Indians but had always been the property of the federal 
government. It also justified an Indian policy based on the idea that the Indians were 
simply occupants who could be evicted at any point. Marshall’s ruling also enflamed 
debates over states’ rights by creating a legal gray area that made it possible for states or 
individuals to ignore treaties and dispossess Indians without the consent of the federal 
government. Anti-removalists would frame this policy gap and Georgia’s violent 
exploitation of it as a sign of the federal government’s weakness and lack of 
trustworthiness.38 Finally, for both groups the Johnson v. McIntosh decision made the 
history of the relationship between Indians and whites a central tenet of their arguments. 
This history became encapsulated most fully for both groups in the image of the President 
as the “Great Father.” For each group, their interpretation of the “Great Father” hinged on 
the ways they used it to navigate the racial and gender hierarchies implied by the term. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Between 1828 and 1832 Georgia would seek to make the Cherokee relinquish their lands through a 
combination of harassment and a very public argument over states’ rights. In 1828 Georgia made a move to 
annex Cherokee land into four counties. In 1829 Cherokee laws were declared illegal; Cherokees were not 
allowed to testify in their own defense or as witnesses in cases involving white men. By 1830 white men 
such as missionaries who might come to the aid of the Cherokee would be required to get a permit and take 
an oath to the state of Georgia before being allowed to live on Cherokee land. In addition to such legal 
maneuverings, Georgia also unofficially encouraged white settlement of Cherokee land and formed the 
Georgia Guard whose stated purpose was the enforcement of Georgia laws but actual activities were more 
squarely aimed at making life in Georgia so miserable that the Indians would agree to Removal.  
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The variances in these interpretations can be seen in Jackson’s “First Annual Address to 
Congress” and the responses to it penned by the Cherokee Nation and Catherine Beecher.  
 
II. To Parent a Nation:  The Great Father and Patriarchy in the Indian Removal 
Debate 
 Perhaps no one embodied the attitudes that must be challenged by anti-
removalists more than Jackson himself. A veteran of Indian wars, negotiator of 
exploitative treaties and a staunch believer in states’ rights, by the time Jackson was 
elected president he had already been actively involved in the removal of Indian tribes 
from the Southeast.39 He had also developed a rhetorical approach to the Indian question 
that combined tropes of benevolence, paternalism, and cultural superiority to read history 
in a way that depicted Indian Removal as the only viable option. In his first address to 
Congress on December 8, 1829 Jackson opens his discussion of Indian affairs with his 
explanation for why the Indians retain their “savage ways” and remain in “a wandering 
state.” According to Jackson, the problem is in the American approach, which on the one 
hand professes “a desire to civilize and settle them,” but on the other, loses “no 
opportunity to purchase their lands and thrust them farther into the wilderness.”  He does 
however allow for exceptions for “a portion… of the Southern tribes” who “having 
mingled much with the whites and made some progress in the arts of civilized life, have 
lately attempted to erect an independent government within the limits of Georgia and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  As Robert V. Remini explains, at the end of the War of 1812, Jackson was assigned the task of executing 
Article IX of the Treaty of Ghent. This article said that all land taken from Indian tribes after 1811, 
including the approximately twenty-three million acres Jackson wrestled from the Creek Nation during the 
1814 Creek War, must be returned. Citing the presence of Indians in the Southeast as a threat to national 
security, Jackson simply ignored the article and continued removing the Creek (47). Though the federal 
government never officially	  endorsed Jackson’s actions, it also did not stop him because removing the 
Indians was expedient to westward expansion, and they feared the reaction of western settlers and Southern 
voters to whom Jackson was a war hero (Remini 47).	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Alabama.” The tribes in question, largely the Cherokee Nation, offer evidence that the 
civilizing project has been a success, but Jackson is unwilling to acknowledge this 
because it came after “having mingled much with the whites” and presents a challenge to 
the US government.   
 Jackson’s discounting of what advocates of Indians’ Rights would deem 
successful assimilation reveals two important tenants of removalist rhetoric. The first is 
the need to solve the problem that adoption of white practices and interracial 
relationships posed for patriarchal concepts of property ownership.  Both of these factors 
make it difficult for Jackson to deny the Cherokee right to land ownership based on either 
their lack of “civilized” agricultural practices or white influence. The presence of 
bicultural Cherokee men who most clearly represent the fusion of white and Cherokee 
practices prove particularly problematic reminders of the complications interracial 
relationships caused for racialized, patriarchal concept of property laws. These men, 
though they frequently had white fathers, had primarily obtained their property through 
the Cherokee Nation’s matrilineal inheritance patterns, not its more recent adoption of 
patriarchal inheritance. The presence of a patrilineal system and their status as free 
individuals meant that arguments such as the “condition of the mother,” which had been 
used to deny the biracial children of enslaved black women property rights or citizenship, 
could not be used with the Cherokee. Since removalists cannot exclude Cherokee men on 
the basis of gender, they must find another means to avoid the problems caused when 
patriarchy and race do not uphold policy. The solution then lay in the other restriction to 
conferring property and legal manhood: age. Therefore Jackson returns to the notion of 
the Cherokee as children incapable of achieving even “some progress in the arts of 
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civilized life” without the guidance of white men. The Cherokee’s status as children and 
Jackson’s emphasis on states’ rights instead of assimilation work together to further 
exclude the Cherokee by making them incapable of participating in the legal systems that 
will determine their status.  
 Once Jackson has ensured Cherokee exclusion, he spends a significant amount of 
the speech explaining the case of states’ rights in reference to the claim of sovereignty of 
the Cherokee Nation. He then tells Congress that he has unequivocally “informed the 
Indians inhabiting parts of Georgia and Alabama that their attempt to establish an 
independent government would not be countenanced by the Executive of the United 
States, and advised them to emigrate beyond the Mississippi or submit to the laws of 
those States.” Ironically, Jackson’s statements to the Cherokee and his suggestion that 
they remove repeats the very contradiction in policy he points to in the beginning of his 
remarks on Indians, which is that despite advocating civilization, the main motivation 
was the taking of Indian land. Jackson seeks to relieve the tension of this contradiction by 
framing Indian Removal as a benevolent act, and the only feasible option.  In Jackson’s 
estimation “it is too late to inquire whether it was just in the United States to include 
them and their territory within the bounds of new States, whose limits they could control. 
That step cannot be retraced. A State cannot be dismembered by Congress or restricted in 
the exercise of her constitutional power.” In short, history is history. Therefore, the only 
solution to a problem that is so “deeply interesting to our national character” is to take the 
“remnants” of tribes that were once “possessors of these vast regions” and move them 
west so they will be able to avoid “the whites with their arts of civilization, which by 
destroying the resources of the savage doom him to weakness and decay.”  Jackson 
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bolsters his claim that such acts are benevolent by asserting that “[h]umanity and national 
honor demand that every effort should be made to avert so great a calamity.” Yet he 
tenders no offer to protect Indians from either the states or the whites who would figure 
so prominently in their supposed demise.  Instead, he promises removal will be voluntary 
and ample amounts of land will be set aside for them in the west.   
 Never in his discussion of Indian Removal does Jackson waver from his position 
that Indians are wandering savages or children.  In fact, in many ways, his remarks echo 
the rhetoric of not only removalist but of the anti-removalist as well.  The tropes of a 
once powerful people who had been reduced through contact with whites and of a native 
culture that was more savage than civilized are present in the majority of arguments made 
by whites during the debate over Indian Removal. For most whites involved in the Indian 
Removal debate there was an implied racial hierarchy to their view of the Indians. While 
some envisioned the possibility of Indians assimilating into white culture, this concept 
still implied that Indian culture was somehow inferior, that Indians would have to 
“improve” in order to be fit for white, civilized society. Depending on who was crafting 
the argument, such racial and cultural differences could become reasons for sympathy or 
scorn, for both relied on perceived distance to create an emotional response. The 
challenge for anti-removalists was to counter removalist rhetoric in a way that maintained 
implied differences but moved its audience toward sympathetic responses.  
After Jackson’s first address to Congress, the Cherokee wasted no time 
responding to the discussion of states’ rights and framework for benevolence outlined in 
the speech. On December 18, 1829 the Cherokee leadership penned a memorial to 
Congress, and the same memorial appeared in The Cherokee Phoenix January 20, 1830 
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with the attribution “Cherokee Nation December 1829.”  By presenting their grievances 
in the form of a memorial, the Cherokee leadership uses the form’s understood purpose 
as a direct petition to Congress to respond to specific elements of Jackson’s speech. They 
question Georgia’s right to claim Cherokee land, their place in civilization, and their 
relationship with the government by reconfiguring Jackson’s own language to offer a 
careful plotting of Cherokee/US interactions that expose as false the premises upon which 
Jackson bases his interpretation of events. In doing so, the Cherokee also outline an 
argument for Cherokee sovereignty that relies on defining the tribe as worthy of 
sympathy and capable of claiming collective manhood as the basis of their challenge to 
the gender and racial classifications used to exclude them. 
 Just as Jackson’s message to Congress sought to define the issue of Indian 
Removal for a national audience, so too did the Cherokee response. The publication 
history of the memorial and its rhetorical framework and content all point to an intended 
audience of both Congress, Northern supporters of the Cherokee (male and female), and a 
more generalized American public. In order to appeal to all potential audiences, the 
Cherokee must walk a fine line between making assertions of sovereignty and showing 
that they understand and respect the procedural, social and racial constraints present in 
the rhetorical situation. As memorialists they must also observe the common tropes used 
in such documents. Therefore, the Cherokee begin their memorial with a formal address 
and quickly follow by introducing themselves as memorialists who “humbly make known 
to your honorable bodies, that they are free citizens of the Cherokee Nation” who bring 
their case to Congress because they know that those in Congress are “generous and just.” 
By couching the first assertion of Cherokee sovereignty in terms of humility, the 
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Cherokee show reverence while at the same time claiming a status equal to members of 
Congress, for they too are male representatives of an independent nation. They then seem 
to weaken their own claim to equal status by likening themselves to “weak and poor 
children” who “are accustomed to look to their guardians and patrons for protection.” 
However, after claiming that Congress is “generous and just” in nature such a claim of 
feigned inferiority frames the potential actions of Congress in terms of morality. If 
Congress helps the Cherokee, they prove themselves worthy of the accolades. If Congress 
denies the Cherokee they prove their own lack of benevolence. The Cherokee present not 
simply a petition but a moral and political challenge to Congress. By adopting, and 
complicating, the patriarchal language of the Great Father used by Jackson, the Cherokee 
are creating the potential for exposing the holes in the argument that Removal is an act of 
benevolence, namely the true motivations for moving Indians and the unjust legal 
wrangling by which such ends are being achieved.  
 After challenging Congress to act in a way that lives up to their assumed status, 
the Cherokee provide an answer to Jackson’s narrative of Indian land loss and tribal 
extinction that draws upon a history of successful Cherokee assimilation.  According to 
Jackson, the Indians were stripped of their land by “persuasion and force” and because 
they had been surrounded by whites who “with their arts of civilization, whereby 
destroying the resources of the savage doom him to weakness and decay.”  While he 
admits Indians were sometimes driven off their land by force, Jackson places the blame 
largely on the inability of Indians to keep up with a far superior civilization.  In order to 
challenge racialized and gendered definitions of civilization, the Cherokee offer a lengthy 
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rebuttal of this theory that focuses on the ways the whites and the federal government 
have betrayed the basic tenets of fairness in both personal and legal actions.  
 First, the Cherokee recount the history of early interactions with whites in a way 
that emphasizes the kindness with which the Indians treated whites and the fact that the 
Indians were the original owners of the land. As the Cherokee explain, “When the 
ancestors of the people of these United States first came to the shores of America, they 
found the red man strong--though he was ignorant and savage, yet he received them 
kindly, and gave them dry land to rest their weary feet.  They met in peace, and shook 
hands in token of friendship.  Whatever the white man wanted and asked of the Indians, 
the latter willingly gave.”  As the “lord” of the land, the Indian was kind to the white 
man, but such kindness became weakness because the whites were unwilling to 
reciprocate. The implication here is that treating people justly and with charity is the 
hallmark of a civilized, Christian society; therefore, instead of being reduced to 
“remnants” by a superior civilization, the Cherokee and other Indian nations have been 
reduced by the “sweeping pestilence” of white incivility. 
 Nonetheless, the Cherokee must be careful not to portray all white men as part of 
the problem or they risk alienating those white men and women who might support them. 
They must point out those specific cases and specific men who have failed them.  
Therefore, they begin to outline their complaints about Georgia and Jackson’s policies by 
making it clear that they see those in Congress as allies. The memorialists explain that 
congressmen are addressed as “brothers” because that is the “usage adopted by our 
forefathers, and the great and good men who have successfully directed the Councils of 
the nation you represent.” Such a statement connects current congressmen with past ones 
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and reminds them of the long history of Indian interaction with Congress. It is also aimed 
at reminding the Congressmen that they are “the immediate representatives of the 
American people” and as such have certain responsibilities to those people.  
 The Cherokee’s application of the term “brother” also reconfigures other key 
relationships implied by the rhetoric of the Great Father. In the Cherokee version of 
patriarchal structure established by the Great Father, the President remains father of the 
country, but Congress itself, as we see above, inhabits the same position as the Cherokee 
memorialists. Claiming such similarities makes both groups children who must claim 
their manhood by using their roles as representatives of a nation to defend the will of 
their people even when it means going against the Father/President. Consequently, 
Congress has the duty to stand with their Cherokee brothers if that is what the American 
people demand. Such a construction of the role of the Congress implies that claiming 
manhood also relies on the ability to stand up to a father figure when he is wrong.  
Congress and the Cherokee can truly become brothers and represent their respective 
nations by challenging Jackson’s stand on Georgia’s actions and Indian Removal. In this 
moment, the Cherokee use the terms of their exclusion to forge a new relationship with 
the white patriarchal government in order to show themselves as both aggrieved children 
and champions of the people’s wishes, whether those people be the Cherokee Nation or 
the whites that support it.  
The Cherokee lay the ground for such a dual attack in their description of 
Jackson’s response to Georgia’s ultimatum that the Cherokee sell their land and remove 
or become citizens of a state where they would have no rights.  According to the 
memorialists, “when we first heard of this we were grieved, and appealed to our father 
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the President, and begged that protection might be extended over us.  But we were doubly 
grieved when we understood, from a letter of the Secretary of War to our Delegation, 
dated March of the present year, that our father the President had refused us protection, 
and that he had decided in favor of the extension of the laws of the State over us.” 
Repeated use of the words “protect” and “grief” offers the expected actions of a father 
contrasted with the emotions of a child who has been rejected. Jackson has failed to 
provide the most basic functions implied in a father/child relationship and espoused in his 
own rhetoric. Since he is the President, paternal failure is also policy failure and calls into 
question the ability of both Jackson and the government to uphold the most essential 
elements of white manhood implied by the notion of the Great Father, namely a superior 
ability to protect and guide the lives of their “children.” 
Therefore, in place of the failed white father, the Cherokee offer their own 
concept of fatherhood, which bequeaths to them the right to remain on their land and 
gives their white “brothers” in Congress a rationale for standing up to Jackson. First and 
foremost, the Cherokee father makes Cherokee land ownership not only legal but divine: 
“The land on which we stand we have received as an inheritance from our fathers who 
possessed it from time immemorial, as a gift from our common father in heaven.” Their 
land rights come, not from a white man or man-made laws, but from authority with which 
no one can argue. After all, such a construction repeats biblical narratives offered as 
justification for white land ownership and dominance.  Land rights are further 
substantiated through patrilineal inheritance in which Cherokee forefathers pass it on to 
their male children.  And it is “This right of inheritance we [the Cherokee] have never 
ceded, nor ever forfeited.” Creating an inheritance that is patrilineal and predates white 
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land ownership in the new world, works in two ways. First, it makes the Cherokee father 
older and more powerful than the Father/President because presidents serve limited 
terms. Secondly, establishing the Cherokee right to land as determined by god and 
patriarchal inheritance allows them to directly counter the most controversial part of the 
Johnson v. McIntosh ruling and removalist rhetoric because it allows them to assert their 
collective manhood and constructs a history that gives them the right, as men, to speak on 
legal matters.  
In their memorial, the Cherokee challenge the removalists’ use of the Johnson v. 
McIntosh ruling to declare Indians tenants at will instead of fee simple owners of their 
own land by demanding they be shown what legal precedent there is for the latter reading 
of Indian land rights. For as the Cherokee are quick to point out, no evidence of a change 
in Indians’ ability to own their land outright is contained in the treaties that ended the 
Revolutionary War or any treaties thereafter that were seen to supersede it.40 To insert it 
years later when it would benefit the U.S. is illegal and immoral. 
If so, why was not this forfeiture declared in the first treaty of peace between the 
United States and our beloved men?  Why was not such an article as the following 
inserted in the treaty: "The United States give peace to the Cherokees, but; for the 
part they took in the late war, declare them to be but tenants at will, to be 
removed, when the convenience of the states within whose chartered limits they 
live shall require it." That was the proper time to assume such a position.  But it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  In their argument against Jackson’s interpretation of the treaties established between the Cherokee and 
the US, the Cherokee base their interpretation on the language offered in the Treaty of Holston, which still 
gave the US “the sole and exclusive right of regulating their trade” but guaranteed “all their lands not 
herein ceded” (McLoughlin 24).	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was not thought of nor would our forefathers have agreed to any treaty whose 
tendency was to deprive them of their rights and their country.  
In addition to mockingly presenting the lack of legal evidence for Marshall’s ruling or 
the shift in land ownership it precipitated, the Cherokee go on to argue their own 
interpretation of the situation using the US’s own legal history and actions to point out 
flaws in the current logic.  
According to a narrative of Indian land cessions based only on what is stated in 
treaties, not only does the US recognize their “right of inheritance and peaceable 
possession,” but their “rights as a separate people are distinctly acknowledged, and 
guaranties given that they shall be secured and protected.”  Therefore, the actions of 
Georgia and Jackson mean that either the treaties do not represent the will of the 
government, or advocates of Removal are purposely breaking laws.  The memorialists 
very pointedly ask, “If we were but tenants at will, why was it necessary that our consent 
must first be obtained before these Governments could take lawful possession of our 
lands?” They then provide what they see as the “obvious” answer based upon the history 
of Indian land cessions. They assert “these governments perfectly understood our rights-
-our right to the country, and our right to self government.  Our understanding of the 
treaties is further supported by the intercourse law of the United States, which prohibits 
all encroachments upon our territory.” In the estimation of the Cherokee, Jackson’s 
actions are not simply based on faulty logic; they are illegal. 
In using the idea of the Great Father to offer a patent rejection of the removalist 
line of argument, the Cherokee publicly challenge the ethics of such a position and point 
to the discrepancy between legal treaty and action that has come to characterize their 
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dealings with Jackson and his cabinet. Once again, they question the ability of their 
“father the President” to protect his children.  They also propose that his blatant disregard 
for the law of the nation he represents is an appropriate moment to challenge his ability to 
lead, for he has become not simply a neglectful father but an abusive one. Therefore, the 
“matter of national character” to which Jackson refers in his speech has become nothing 
less than fitness of the President to lead and to represent the will of the people.  
Convincing Congress and the larger audience of the American people of the need 
to challenge Jackson and Removal in the name of justice for Indians was complicated and 
required a tacit acknowledgement that Indians must be men but also sympathetic. The 
Cherokee, as a nation, must strike the same balance that marked Boudinot’s “Address to 
the Whites.”   They must seem simultaneously similar enough to the whites to convince 
them they are a worthy cause, and different enough to flatter white sensibilities and the 
racial and gender hierarchies upon which ideas of benevolence are built. Both are 
required for white to act. Therefore, in the closing summary of their argument, the 
memorialists once again adopt a language of deference to and praise of Congress and 
more importantly the American people.  This language recalls the opening of the 
memorial by once again emphasizing the potential for actions based on honor and justice. 
It also introduces more overtly the theme of Christianity that has been subtly present 
throughout the memorial in mentions of a common divine father. Here it becomes the key 
to balancing manhood and sympathy in the fight for native rights and making the 
Cherokee cause a national one. In the concluding paragraph, the image of the father is 
once more transformed, this time into a figure that is both Christ-like and Indian and 
whose presence justifies Indian land ownership. According to the Cherokee, the land is 
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“our fathers gift—it contains their ashes—it is the land of our nativity, and the land of our 
intellectual birth.”  Evoking the images of fatherhood and the language of the nativity and 
birth creates a shared, Christian narrative of cultural origin that also echoes commonly 
espoused ideas about the Christian character of the American nation. The connection 
between a shared Christianity and a shared right to nationhood is carefully plotted in the 
memorials remaining lines. After establishing a common cultural and national origin, the 
Cherokee then “pray” that the “honorable bodies” of Congress will “deliver and protect 
them from all these and every encroachment upon their rights.” With this explanation of 
their desires the Cherokee then lay out the reasons for such actions in terms that echo the 
Declaration of Independence and more directly link nationalism and Christianity. The 
Cherokee assert, “Their existence and future happiness are at stake- divest them of their 
liberty and country, and you sink them in degradation, and put a check, if not an end soon 
to their present progress in the acts of civilized life, and in the knowledge of the Christian 
religion.” Words like happiness, liberty and country evoke nationalist language but frame 
the consequences in terms of Christian aims of civilization and salvation. The two entities 
become more thoroughly integrated in memorialists’ final appeal. Here Removal is 
described as “in the highest degree oppressive” and at direct odds with the ideals and 
assumed actions of “the people of these United States, who, perhaps of all those under 
heaven, are the most religious and free.”  The memorialists thus conclude that such a 
contradictory action “cannot be expected.” After all, a Christian nation certainly cannot 
want Indians to fall back into savagism and paganism. At stake here is not only the fate of 
the Cherokee Nation but the credibility of the United States’ status as a Christian nation. 
Therefore, the Cherokee place the onus on the American people and their representatives 
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when, in the final two sentences of the memorial they play the supplicant and challenge 
the American people to live up to their own ideals. The memorialists state, “You 
represent a virtuous, intelligent and Christian nation.  To you they willingly submit their 
cause for your righteous decision.” In such a statement, the need to appeal to an audience 
of white men and women means that the Cherokee are able to make strides in claiming 
cultural manhood in their memorial but are unable to fully claim it. They must still wait, 
like children, for the decision of a higher power. While the inability to fully embody 
patriarchal ideals seems like a failure, it is in fact a moment of intersection between 
Indian’s rights and women’s rights that creates an alliance between the rhetorical 
approaches. Given the memorial’s circulation beyond the halls of Congress, use of the 
familiar pronoun “you” reads as a deliberate attempt to directly address the American 
public in a personal way. This combined with the use of Christian deference leaves open 
the possibility of sympathy, and therefore gives white women a means of entering the 
debate by placing Indians within the purview of their benevolent work. 
A mere seven days after the Cherokee Memorial is presented to Congress and 
only seventeen days after Jackson addressed Congress, Catherine Beecher’s response to 
both texts appears in Evarts’ The Christian Advocate and Zion’s Herald as “ A Circular 
Addressed to the Benevolent Ladies of the United States.”  The quickness of Beecher’s 
response and its similarity to the approach offered by the Cherokee speaks to the urgency 
with which she wrote as well as the personal nature of the connections between herself, 
Evarts, and Boudinot. Like her Cherokee counterparts, Beecher bases her response on an 
historical narrative of successful Cherokee assimilation and interrogates the concept of 
the “Great Father” in order to craft a rhetoric that draws upon the very concepts used to 
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exclude her to reframe women’s political actions as justifiable. Unlike her fellow 
Cherokee activists, as a white woman, Beecher was part of the cultural dominant and 
need not prove her ability to adopt Christianity or other trappings of “civilization.” 
Instead, women had been so thoroughly engendered by these institutions that their 
challenge lay in proving that a civilized society could indeed accommodate and even 
benefit from the political action of women. They were not a threat from without but a 
rumbling from within.  
 Like the Cherokee, women inhabited a place in American society that was 
increasingly constricted by new understandings of their relationship to the government. 
As Rosemarie Zagarri explains, the enfranchisement of most white men by the nineteenth 
century meant that increasingly citizenship became equated with the right to vote. As 
citizenship and voting rights were conflated, political parties began to focus more of their 
energy on those citizens who could actually vote. Therefore, women who had in the past 
enjoyed a very public role in political parties were forced to the margins (156-157). Such 
marginalization was ultimately justified by applying biological essentialism to concepts 
of citizenship and rights in a way that defined rights differently for men and women. 
White men benefitted from a reinterpretation of Lockean principles that separated rights 
from duties in a way that allowed rights to be seen as entitlements naturally owed to 
individuals not “part of a network of mutual obligations.” At the same time that Locke 
was being used to extend the rights of men, Scottish Enlightenment ideas from the likes 
of Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid were being used to constrict the rights of women 
by reinforcing the connection between rights and duties through a system in which 
“inequality was a given” (Zagarri 174).  By using biological essentialism to paint women 
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as intellectually inferior to men, the discriminatory application of political theories could 
be upheld as a natural extension of biology, which could not be challenged. Therefore, 
citizenship for men meant rights and for women it meant fulfilling their duty of creating 
unity by serving as the nation’s moral compass. Yet, as Elizabeth Dillon argues, even 
though “biological essentialism operates within liberalism to establish the extrapolitical 
status of white women,” (15) placing women in such a position is not an unfortunate 
consequence of liberalism, but a necessity. For, “the fictive autonomy of the idealized 
male participant of the public sphere depends on white woman’s theoretical and material 
status as private” (Dillon 18). In short, though seemingly excluded, white women were an 
essential part of the narrative of liberalism because they provided the support system 
necessary for men’s political action. In the fight over Indian Removal, women’s work 
with benevolent societies offered the opportunity to use their extrapolitical role in new 
ways. 
 Since women were excluded from voting rights, benevolent societies and 
Christianity offered an opening in the conversation by giving women an “opportunity for 
moving out of the home without bringing on themselves the censure of men” by giving 
them a supposedly non-political a way to discuss Removal (Bolt 34). Trading on the idea 
of women as morally superior because they were, as Catherine Beecher claims, 
“protected from the blinding influence of party spirit, and the aspirates of political 
violence,” middle-class Christian women framed the cause of Indian Removal as one of 
Christian duty.  Still, to ensure a middle-class white woman could conceivably work on 
the behalf of marginalized groups without becoming marginalized herself, her moral 
status and religion dictated she still uphold gender roles. This means that while religion 
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could open doors for participation it could also be limiting. For, as Lori Ginzberg 
explains, “in a political culture suffused with the assumption that men acquired their 
rights through a political compact and that women gained theirs by virtue of Christianity, 
women’s full citizenship could seem respectable only if it was gendered, if it seemed to 
uphold rather than undermine sexual difference” (43). Religion also “served as a 
justification…for limiting women’s standing and authority in political debate” by 
depicting those “who bore responsibilities of a religious nature” as undesirous of or 
potentially “diminished by full political rights” (42). If such effort was made to equate 
women with religion as a way of denying political rights, then clearly there was the 
potential for religion and the concept of duties to also deliver those rights. After all, 
religious, benevolent work offered women access to capital and extensive networks of 
similarly minded men and women as well as the ability to influence large numbers of 
people through socially sanctioned activities. Most importantly, religion and a position 
above the fray of politics gave women a moral platform from which to challenge their 
exclusion from the full rights of citizenship.  It was this potential that women who stood 
against Indian Removal hoped to unlock.  
 Entering into the debate on Indian Removal through the door of religion and 
benevolent activities gave women a terminology and the ability to avoid the negative 
backlash that could occur if women simply advocated for their own rights. Instead, they 
could use the rhetoric of benevolence and duty to argue for both Indian rights and their 
own. Managing these terms could be tricky though. In order to gain the right to speak on 
the topic, women must pay homage to the popular notions of gender roles, but, because 
such roles mandated silence, they must also find ways to subvert them forcefully enough 
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that the public would listen. In her “Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies,” Catherine 
Beecher makes an argument for women’s intervention in the debate on Indian Removal 
that hinges largely on the ability of women to participate as part of their “duties.” Alisse 
Portnoy contends that Beecher’s use of the word duties “suggested obligation rather than 
rights” and that she “confirmed the exclusion of women from politics, going so far as to 
affirm submission to the men who governed the nation” (47). Beecher’s actions would 
have been in keeping with views held by many other reformers who “insisted that social 
reform represented an extension of their feminine role, not a challenge to it” (Zagarri 
145). Yet as Beecher’s involvement in the debate over Removal indicates, the problem 
with such a claim is that women were engaging in political acts to fulfill their “duties.” 
Benevolence, with its public campaigns and community organizing aimed at changing 
policies, was political. Therefore, documents like “Circular Addressed to Benevolent 
Ladies” need to be read with an eye for how the tensions between the stated purpose and 
the actual impact of a rhetorical act manifest themselves in public documents. So, even 
though much is made of Beecher’s characterization of women and the ways in which she 
upholds conservative values of gender difference and domesticity, to focus only on the 
relatively small part of the circular that specifically addresses women’s right to 
participate in politics, is to ignore the significant rhetorical moves Beecher makes 
throughout the piece and the larger implications of her “Circular Addressed to 
Benevolent Ladies.” 
 In many ways, Beecher used gender to create an opening and an audience. Having 
been a public figure who had published widely by the time she wrote the “Circular 
Addressed to the Benevolent Ladies,” Beecher knew that her work would find a much 
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larger audience than the one implied by its title and that its relevance could also be 
determined by her gender. Since she had been encouraged to join the fight against 
Removal by Jeremiah Evarts, Beecher knew there was indeed a receptive audience of 
men and women available to her. However, her choice to circulate and publish her 
circular anonymously also seems to acknowledge the precarious nature of using moral 
rectitude as justification for breaking gender norms in the name of politics. By remaining 
anonymous, Beecher could avoid any public ridicule that might arise from her actions. 
Initially, the “Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies” was distributed largely by mail 
and through networks of women, which ensured Beecher’s public persona went 
untarnished. 
   These tactics proved equally helpful in gaining an audience and negotiating the 
gender politics behind the layout of many nineteenth century periodicals. When the 
circular appeared in the December 25, 1829 issue of the Christian Advocate and Zion’s 
Herald, unlike other articles written by women, it was not included in the women’s 
section of the journal but appeared among the articles written by men (Portnoy 56). This 
choice speaks to its importance as well as its status as an exception to the assumed rules 
of gender segregation. Interestingly, these gender distinctions did not apply in The 
Cherokee Phoenix, where the circular appeared on January 6, 1830 alongside articles by 
both white and Indian men. The printing of Beecher’s circular in both periodicals, and its 
placement in each, speaks to the importance it was seen to have by both the leaders of the 
benevolent movement and the Cherokee Nation as well as the connections between those 
arguing against Removal. It also indicates that the actual, and perhaps intended, audience 
for the article was neither solely female, nor solely white. 
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 Beecher’s intention to aim for a wider audience than the one suggested in the title 
is supported by the inclusive language and presentation of events in Indian-U.S. relations 
throughout the piece. After defining an audience in the title, Beecher then challenges the 
very exclusivity she constructs by claiming treatment of the Indians “demands the 
immediate and interested attention of all who make any claims to benevolence or 
humanity” and the threats being leveled at Indians are “causes of alarm to our whole 
country.” While the use of “all” and “whole” can be read as a plea for women to be 
included, Beecher’s use of references to “forefathers” and “white men” that eventually 
lead to the phrase “our infant nation” indicate the argument made throughout the text is 
not going to addresses only a female perspective or reader. Over the course of the first 
four paragraphs of the text, Beecher follows a trajectory that takes the piece from 
addressing women, to including men, to creating a nation and government that is referred 
to using the possessive plural pronoun “our.” This collective identity and the wider 
audience for the piece are further confirmed in the way she chooses to present the case of 
the Cherokee Nation.  
 As a document intended for an audience of men and women, Beecher’s “Circular 
Addressed to Benevolent Ladies” contains many of the same defenses of Indians rights 
presented in memorials and letters written by the Cherokee Nation as well as white men 
who supported the cause. In these moments, the movements intersect in very visible 
ways. Like her male counterparts, Beecher recounts the history of U.S./Indian relations 
through the lens of treaty negotiations that fundamentally reshaped the two nations 
involved. Her account of first contact between Indians and whites echoes the use of the 
language of fathers and the contention that “when our forefathers sought refuge from 
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oppression on these shores, this people supplied their necessities, and ministered to their 
comfort” found in the “1829 Cherokee Memorial.” Beecher’s account of the treaty 
relation likewise calls to mind those Cherokee texts that emphasize the unevenness of the 
treaty process and the Jackson administration’s failure to keep its promises. As she 
explains, such failures now also portend continued hardship for the Cherokee in the 
future because “they are expected to take up their residence” in the new territory west of 
the Mississippi “with no other hope than that when they have made their lands valuable 
by cultivation, they again must be driven into still more distant wilds; for if our 
government cannot fulfill its treaties and protect them now, well they know it could not 
do it then.” For Beecher and the Cherokee, the current actions of the government make 
all future actions suspect. Removal is not so much a solution or end but simply the 
beginning of another series of dubious land deals that would strip the Cherokee of their 
“rights as independent nations and distinct communities” and their “national character.” 
This scenario also points to the problem of Indian land rights. In her description of 
potential actions after Removal Beecher alludes to the problem with American policy 
described by Jackson in his first Annual Address to Congress and taken up by the 
Cherokee in the 1829 memorial. In many ways, Beecher repeats the most effective 
arguments against Removal, thus showing the connections between and continuity across 
the appeals made by the Cherokee and their female supporters. Where Beecher most 
significantly differs from her male counterparts in depicting the Cherokee and the fight 
over Removal is in her use of other voices in the text.  
 Unlike her men, who could directly address Congress on legal matters because 
they could vote or were the leaders of a nation, speaking to an audience of men and 
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women, even in the pages of a periodical, proved risky for women because it defied the 
belief they should remain silent in public. As the gendered divisions of periodicals 
suggested, men and women were seen as fundamentally different audiences with different 
concerns, even if these divisions did not play out in actual reading practices or social 
activities.  Reaching an audience of men and women from the front page of a periodical 
demanded Beecher find a way to balance her need to uphold gender roles with being able 
to speak forcefully. Therefore, she decides to apply to print the coping strategy she uses 
in her public speaking career: a feminine delivery style. 
 In Regendering Delivery: The Fifth Canon and Antebellum Women Rhetors, 
Lindal Buchanan explains that “when antebellum women spoke for persuasive purposes 
in spaces gendered as masculine, they defied dominant gender ideals mandating their 
public silence, a rhetorical constraint that posed serious obstacles to the effectiveness” 
(78). Many women in the nineteenth century, including Beecher, chose to speak in public 
using a feminine delivery style, which meant they did not directly address an audience. 
Instead they used a variety of tactics to achieve their goals such as “asking male family 
members to support and promote women’s public efforts, employing conversation rather 
than oratory, and avowing a commitment to conventional gender roles while behaving 
contrary to them” (Buchanan 79). Beecher herself coped with the needs of going on 
lecture tours by either speaking to female-only audiences or by having a male family 
member read her speeches aloud while she sat quietly on the stage behind him. 
Essentially, Beecher must have a man introduce her work to other men and women as she 
sits silently in the background—an act that was interestingly replicated in both Evarts’ 
disclaimer that the “Circular to Benevolent Ladies” is written by a woman and Beecher’s 
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choice to remain anonymous beyond her gender. Thus, the acts of speaking and writing to 
an audience of men and women overlap in significant ways for her as she tries to 
successfully negotiate the gender divides in a way that still allows her to speak forcefully.  
 Within the circular itself Beecher creates a feminine delivery by introducing male 
voices who can speak for other men and challenge legal precedent because of their 
political roles. In presenting the cause of Indian Removal and the Cherokee to her 
audience Beecher includes both the testimony of an Indian and excerpts from Georgia’s 
laws limiting the rights of the Cherokee. Including such resources strengthens her 
argument in two ways. The first, and most obvious, is that it provides direct evidence of 
both the Cherokee sentiment and the harshness of the Georgia laws that they must fight. 
With such evidence, Beecher can appeal to both the sympathy and sense of justice she 
believes her audience to have. More importantly though, the introduction of presumably 
male voices in the form of a Cherokee man’s testimony and laws written by the white 
men of Georgia allows Beecher to let men make the overt political arguments but still 
demonstrate her grasp of the issues at hand.41 This tactical maneuver also provides a 
moment of shared positionality between women and Indians, both of whom are 
structurally dependent upon white men to create the laws that govern them. Here Beecher 
once again works within prescribed gender norms in order to obtain a means by which to 
question them.  
 In “A Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies” Beecher uses a feminine delivery 
style to present what is at heart a persuasive argument for women’s rights that, far from 
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  While such an approach is considered less powerful by today’s standards and the choice to employ a 
delivery style that upholds gender norms can be read as counterproductive in the fight for women’s rights, 
it is important to keep in mind that in the early nineteenth century “the feminine delivery style was often 
more effective…because it increas[ed] the likelihood of their messages’ positive reception and 
consideration” (Buchanan 103).	  
	   	   	  
 
	   129	  
wondering if, as she says “female petitioners can lawfully be heard, even by the highest 
rulers of our land,” lays out a case for women’s ability to successfully enter into debates 
on national, political issues and argue for their own rights. This argument shows up most 
clearly in Beecher’s depiction of Indians and their relationship to government. Beecher’s 
explanation of the relationship between Indians and the government largely hinges on 
two failures of representation: the form of the government itself and inaccurate 
representation of Indians. The key rhetorical strategy uniting these two failures is the 
rhetoric of paternalism. Beecher challenges the paternalistic rhetoric of the government 
and the exclusivity it creates by taking away its two defining factors: maleness and 
whiteness. In the opening paragraphs of the piece, after she has made the transition from 
women to men and nation, Beecher introduces not the gendered concept of paternalism 
but the shared concept of parenting. The first mention of parenting comes in her account 
of early interactions between whites and Indians where Indians, “when they saw the 
white man continually encroaching upon their land, fought bravely for their existence and 
their country, yet often too, the Indian has shed his blood to protect and sustain our infant 
nation.” The phrase “our infant nation,” with its use of “our” and image of the sacrifice 
made by parents to protect an “infant,” implies the shared responsibility of raising a child. 
The idea of shared parenting instead of paternalism is reinforced when Beecher describes 
the efforts of the government to persuade Indians to assimilate as “parental care.” The 
need for the parent to be white is also subtly erased through the presentation of the 
Indians as parents. For the first instance of this we return to the phrase “our infant 
nation.” This phrase is delivered as part of a sentence that emphasizes the fact that often 
the “Indian has shed his blood to protect and sustain” the nation, which again implies 
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parental sacrifice and a shared stake in the United States. Indians are again shown to be 
parents, this time in a more patriarchal way, when Beecher warns that the impact of the 
laws of Georgia being extended over the Indians is that “even their wives and children 
could be murdered before their eyes.” Use of the word “wives” indicates she is indeed 
viewing the Indians as collectively male, but this does not necessarily reinforce 
paternalism because she knows they too are excluded from the whiteness required by 
governmental definitions of the term. Gone are the references to the Great Father 
espoused by Jackson. In its place is an understanding, patient parent who has the 
obligation to protect all his/her children. Of course who those children are and how they 
should be protected is up for debate. 
 According to the paternalism encoded in American laws in the nineteenth century, 
women and Indians are both children in need of protection from white men. However, by 
erasing the gender and racial qualifications for being citizens and active parents, both 
women and Indians become capable parents obligated to be responsible for the raising of 
a country. Indians are also interestingly placed in the role of protecting and nurturing 
their own nation as part of their responsibility to the American nation. So, in Beecher’s 
estimation, if Indians continue to work to develop a strong Christian nation and women 
work to protect the Indian’s right to do so, the result will be a strong United States. 
Therefore, Beecher’s argument is centralized around the need of both women and Indians 
to be involved in the government if they are to protect the nation. What is at stake here, as 
evidenced in her claim that “If our government has not power to fulfill its treaties, it 
would be a most humiliating fact thus to be exposed before the nations of the earth,” is 
international standing and the ability to say that U.S. citizens have raised a country to be 
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proud of.  The question then becomes how are women to be involved in the raising of a 
nation and where are Indians to be included?  
 Beecher argues that, as parents, women have the responsibility to protect their 
children/nation: both the Cherokee Nation and the United States. Indians are likewise 
bound to their own nation and the US. She justifies Indian resistance to Removal and the 
role of women in facilitating this resistance as a means of protecting all of the people 
who make up the nation. In her argument for comprehensive protection, Beecher also 
alludes to the fact that the US has a representational government. Ergo, for the nation to 
truly function, it must be truly concerned with representing everyone. Beecher is 
particularly interested in the role of women in doing this. Her first example of direct 
female action in regards to government is that of Esther “the Jewish princess, who being 
sent to supplicate for a nation's life, was thus reproved for hesitating even when death 
stared her in the way.” In Beecher’s reading of events, Esther is critiqued by God, not for 
taking a step that is forbidden by law, but for hesitating to do such a thing when the fate 
of a nation depended upon it. Beecher argues then that the true danger is not in women’s 
actions but in their inaction. For if they do not speak, then an entire nation of Indian 
peoples will disappear and the righteousness of the US will be eliminated.  
  In another example of what she sees as a preferred role for women, Beecher 
claims that “[i]n the days of chivalry, at the female voice, thousands of lances would have 
been laid in rest to protect the helpless and oppressed.” By arguing that in the past the 
female voice would have had such a significant impact on male behavior, she points to 
what she sees as a deficiency in the attention men pay to women’s voices on issues of 
importance to the nation. The paragraph in which she makes such claims ends with a 
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rather ominous threat that God “records the malediction of those who either as 
individuals, or as nations, shall oppress the needy and helpless” and those found wanting 
will be treated accordingly. Thus, the risk inherent in women not taking action and men 
not listening to them, is no less than the loss or damning of not just one nation but two. 
The way to avoid this, as presented by Beecher’s examples, is to give women the means 
to directly address the government and have their voices heard. Ultimately, Beecher uses 
the concept of nationhood and the parent to make argument for women’s political 
participation based on their ability to more accurately represent others than men, and the 
fact that in order to raise a nation both fathers and mothers are required. 
 Nonetheless, Beecher runs into problems in her own schema when she must push 
against the fundamental problem of representing others. Like Jackson and the Cherokee 
men represented in the “1829 Memorial,” the dual aims of her rhetoric get in the way of 
creating a truly equal role for women and Indians. Women and Indians must present 
themselves as somehow superior so that their reasons are persuasive, but they must also 
appear inferior so as to create sympathy and support their cause. The complications of 
such a situation arise in the Indian voice Beecher chooses to present in her text. This 
voice reintroduces the concept of the Great Father and describes the Indian tribes as 
children. The Chief who is speaking in “A Circular Addressed to the Benevolent Ladies” 
explains the progress made by his tribe and the impact of removing to the west in terms 
of childhood: “We are like an infant so high, (here the chief bowed and extended his hand 
as low as his knee,) who has just begun to walk.” Here the need to make women co-
parents and equals in the raising of a nation requires that they have children to raise. 
Women’s rights are predicated on Indians retaining the subject position of a child. Yet 
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there is no indication that Beecher sees Indians as existing in a perpetual state of child-
like dependence since she advocates for them based on their success in acquiring 
education and Christianity and repeatedly refers to their “national character” and “perfect 
natural rights” to their land. The tension between the need to make Indians children and 
the fact that the success of the argument for Cherokee sovereignty depends on the 
Cherokee ability to prove their manhood is exposed in this moment.  
 Beecher’s inability to solve this tension stems, in part, from the need to make 
Indians part of women’s duty. If Indians are children, then they can be assumed to fall 
into the purview of women’s traditional roles. However, if women want to prove their 
own fitness for political rights, they need to be shown as capable of being equal in stature 
to men. Beecher offers a compromise by introducing a new temporality. She argues the 
US should not remove the Cherokee and “cause their final extinction” because they, as a 
sovereign nation, can grow into Christian adults. They are not yet adults, but they will be. 
Her movement away from Jackson or the Cherokee Nation’s use of the past toward a new 
vision of the future creates room for women as parents. And by presenting the nation as 
in its infancy, Beecher does not label the Cherokee as perpetual children. Admittedly, this 
is not a perfect solution, but it does allow room for continued maneuvering by women 
and Indians by offering up the idea that the Cherokee Nation’s need to define itself in its 
infancy is not entirely unlike the need of the U.S .to continue to define itself among the 
nations of the world. Both Indian identity and the United States’ reputation as a Christian 
nation are at stake. In this way, Beecher and the Cherokee Nation couch their fight 
against the patriarchal structures that deny them rights in a concern over the U.S. ability 
to stand in the world as a Christian nation. 
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 It is this very Christian nation and the implied issues of national identity to which 
the Cherokee Nation appeals in their “Letter to the American People.” Published on May 
28, 1830, after the passage of the Indian Removal act of 1830, this open letter adopts 
Beecher’s choice to directly address the American public, as well as her use of a position 
outside of the patriarchal structure, to respond to the bill’s passage and ask the public to 
avenge the injustices to the Cherokee Nation it represents. Unlike the “1829 Memorial,” 
which sought to balance the sympathy of whites with rallying against Jackson and Indian 
Removal by aligning Cherokee interests with those of government insiders, in the “Letter 
to the American People,” signed by members of the Cherokee government, the Cherokee 
stage an outright rejection of the Great Father and Jackson’s policies by appealing 
directly to the American public. 42  By moving outside of formal government procedures 
and systems, the Cherokee claim sovereignty on the grounds that they can govern 
themselves better than the U.S. government can. Using the language and constructions of 
the very patriarchal and racial institutions that excluded them from rights or sovereignty, 
the Cherokee prove they are capable of producing their own fathers and government. 
  In “Letter to the American People” the Cherokee leaders show their disgust and 
refute their role as children by stripping the relationship with the government of all 
pretenses of a familial or even familiar relationship and then refusing to be part of such a 
system. The Cherokee begin dehumanizing the government by referring to its 
administrators and Jackson only by their official titles. In fact, no one in the Jackson 
administration, Senate, or House of Representatives is addressed by their proper name. 
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  The “Letter to the American People,” which appeared first in an extra edition of The Cherokee Phoenix 
on July 24, 1830 was written by Jeremiah Evarts as a document to be signed by the Cherokee delegation as 
it left	  Washington. However, the delegates instead decided to take the document back to the Cherokee 
Nation where they later signed it and presented it as their own in the Phoenix.	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The only two proper names of white individuals mentioned in the entire piece are 
“General Washington” and Mr. Jefferson whose “frank and magnanimous conduct” is 
offered as a contrast to the impotence of Jackson who the authors say “could not protect 
us against the laws of Georgia.”  The American government becomes a depersonalized 
system that acts without the humanity, good will, or concern implied by the term father:  
More than a year ago, we were officially given to understand by the Secretary of 
War, that the President could not protect us against the laws of Georgia. This 
information was entirely unexpected, as it went upon the principle, that treaties 
made between the United States and the Cherokee Nation have no power to 
withstand the legislation of separate  States; and of  course, that they have no 
efficacy whatever, but leave our people to the mercy of the neighboring whites, 
whose supposed interests would be promoted by our expulsion or extermination. 
It would be impossible to describe the sorrow which effected our minds on 
learning that the Chief magistrate of the United States had come to this 
conclusion, that all his illustrious predecessors had held intercourse with us on 
principles which could not be sustained; that they had made promises of vital 
importance to us, which could not be fulfilled- promises made hundreds of times 
in almost every conceivable manner,-often in the form of solemn treaties, 
sometimes in letters written by the Chief Magistrate with his own hand, very often 
in letters written by the Secretary of  War under his direction, sometimes orally 
by the President and the Secretary to our chiefs, and frequently and always both 
orally and in writing by an agent of the United States residing among us whose 
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most important business it was to see the guaranty of the United States faithfully 
executed. 
In this passage the government, and Jackson in particular, not only act in ways that 
violate long-standing relationships and contradict their own words, but they do so with no 
emotion, or concern for those they would call their children.  The only words that evoke a 
direct emotional connection or reaction – mercy, sorrow, affect – are associated with the 
Cherokee and are the negative impact of government action. Jackson and his government 
violate the basic understanding of the Great Father offered by their predecessors and 
seem incapable of the interpersonal interactions the term connotes. Once the Great Father 
has been stripped of both his greatness and parental role, the Cherokee move beyond the 
system that would exclude them to offer a new view of the situation and a new model of 
fatherhood capable of delivering Cherokee sovereignty. Therefore, in place of the Great 
Father the Cherokee offer their own version of a father, one that is first and foremost 
Cherokee but also, compassionate, reasonable and rational.  
 The Cherokee father is not an authoritative figure that demands an adjective or 
capital letter. He is an historic figure equal to the ancestors of whites and a nineteenth 
century man concerned about the welfare of his family.  According to Ross and the 
Cherokee leaders, they “learned from [their] fathers” about the tensions and mistrust that 
once existed between whites and the Cherokee. These same fathers were also fierce 
protectors of their nation who “remained in possession of their country, and with arms in 
their hands.” In addition to being keepers of history and fierce protectors of Cherokee 
identity, Cherokee fathers were also closely associated with the land. This is evident in 
the Cherokee characterization of the land promised them in Arkansas as unsuitable 
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because, among other negatives, it contained “neither the scenes of our childhood nor the 
graves of our fathers.”  In language that echoes Boudinot’s description of this own family 
history and Beecher’s depiction of the Cherokee, these Cherokee fathers are also 
patriarchs of traditional nuclear families who do not want to leave the land they cultivated 
and homes they “reared for [their] wives and for [their] little ones.” By making their 
fathers central to Cherokee heritage and associating them with the land, the writers of this 
letter erase their political feminization and bring the Cherokee more in line with white, 
Christian views of manhood. This move toward manhood is important because it gives 
the Cherokee a way to rhetorically challenge the depiction of the nation as a collective of 
children and establishes a masculine line of inheritance. They are historically and 
structurally men. 
 Moving toward manhood as opposed to a more general adulthood is also an 
important distinction to be made. As adult women in the U.S. could attest, being white 
and an adult did not guarantee access to the trappings of citizenship needed for claiming 
property rights. Thus the Cherokee need to argue their manhood because only then can 
they, according to the gendered rhetoric of rights, attain property rights and the ability to 
inherit or pass property from parents to their children.  To reinforce the nation’s 
collective manliness, Cherokee acts of resistance such as the petitions signed against 
Removal are constructed as the actions of men. As the authors explain, petitions “signed 
by more than four thousand of our citizens including probably more than nineteen 
twentieths and for naught we can tell ninety-nine hundredths, of the adult males of the 
nation” had been sent to Congress. This explanation of the demographics of the 
petitioners indicates that it is the proportion of male signatures that matters the most, at 
	   	   	  
 
	   138	  
least to the American people. Such a distinction between genders occurs again in the 
explanation of Cherokee attitudes toward Removal. The authors claim that the Removal 
question “was distinctly before their minds when they signed their memorial” and that  
“if the people were to understand distinctly, that they could be protected against the laws 
of the neighboring States, there is probably not an adult person in the nation who would 
think it best to remove.” Due to the earlier classification of those who signed the 
petitions, the emphasis on the language of adulthood in this later expression of the 
Cherokee opinion toward Removal carries an implied maleness that extends to the entire 
tribe through the use of the collective pronoun our. This shared manhood is further 
reinforced by the fact that the petition and the “Letter to the American People” are 
written by men. Yet the gender of the authors alone should not be seen as the reason for 
such an emphasis on maleness, because in other documents written by the male leaders of 
the Cherokee Nation such prominent discussion of adulthood or manhood is absent. The 
denial of the Great Father and claiming of collective manhood for, not just the men who 
sign their name to the letter, but the Cherokee Nation as a whole is deliberately structured 
to build case for sovereignty and property rights and at same time make them the “fellow 
man” of whites who would advocate on their behalf. 
 Making the Cherokee the fellow men of whites erases the differences between 
whites and Indians so carefully maintained in the 1829 Memorial and Beecher’s circular. 
In removing differences, “Letter to the American People” marks a pivotal moment in the 
rhetoric of rights presented by anti-removalists. No longer are the Cherokee supplicants 
to the U.S. government or children who need to be raised to civilization. Instead they are 
men, who like their white counterparts, entered into voluntary agreements with the US 
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government under the presumption that it would result in rights to the property they 
already inhabited. The Cherokee expected that in exchange for their voluntary 
compliance with the duties and allegiances laid out in many treaties they signed they 
would receive rights.   As the authors of the letter explain, the Cherokee “have lived in 
perfect peace for the last forty years” with the American people “for whom [they] have 
willingly bled in war.” For this same people to now remove them from land represents a 
violation of the compact and the “immemorial privileges” that have “been acknowledged 
and guaranteed by the United States.” As the Cherokee reason, “we are the invaders of no 
man's rights-we have robbed no man of his territory-we have usurped no man's authority, 
nor have we deprived anyone of his unalienable privileges.” Jackson, however, has 
repeatedly taken these actions in order to deny the Cherokee the property rights, promised 
in the treaties and other voluntary agreements. Following the rhetoric of rights presented 
in the Declaration of Independence, it is Jackson, not the Cherokee that should be 
removed, for he has committed an act worthy of rebellion. Fighting for Cherokee rights 
then becomes a way to stand up to a corrupt leader.  Whereas Beecher is only able to say 
the righteousness of the country is threatened, by making the Cherokee the fellow men of 
whites, the Cherokee raise the stakes by proposing that removing the Cherokee 
jeopardizes the rights of all the American people. After all, if the government can usurp 
the property rights of the Cherokee and go unchecked, there is no guarantee that their 
fellow men might not face similar losses.  Standing up to Jackson becomes an exercise of 
their right as citizens. Moreover, as citizens of a Christian nation governed by “the great 
law of love” which says ‘“do to others as ye would that others should do to you,’” it is 
140	  
not just their right but their duty to stand up to a government that would persecute their 
fellow man. In this paradigm, duties are the proper expression of rights.  
For women, this reconfiguration of rights and duties opens the possibility for 
more overt political participation by more closely relating their actions to those of male 
citizens. Women had always performed the duties but never received the benefits of 
citizenship. Now that the two elements are interconnected, rights for women seem more 
plausible.  The Cherokee experience similar benefits in the reconfiguration of rights, 
duties and citizenship. Once duties and rights are no longer strictly gendered terms, the 
Cherokee argument for manhood and the property rights it confers prove plausible 
because the feminization upon which their exclusion was based becomes less relevant 
than their alignment with the duties performed by white men. Thus the new relationship 
between duties and rights allows white women and men and the Cherokee to interrogate 
the value of citizenship in the U.S. by asking what duties one has to a government that 
refuses to represent them or protect their rights. Perhaps most importantly, making rights 
and duties the domain of both men and women expands the reach of arguments made by 
women and the Cherokee and transforms Indian Removal from an issue of more local 
concern to one seen by many as exemplary of a larger, national discussion of rights and 
the merits of representative government. In this way, the intersecting rhetorics of women 
and the Cherokee Nation represented in the 1829 Memorial, “Circular Addressed to the 
Benevolent Ladies” and the “Letter to the American People” provide the impetus and 
means for acting in support of the Cherokee Nation’s sovereignty. 
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III. The American People Respond 
 In response to the “1829 Memorial,” “Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies” 
and “Letter to the American People,” the American public did indeed heed the call to 
protect their rights by performing their duties as citizens. Men and women flooded 
Congress with petitions; benevolent societies across the Northeast and Midwest met to 
pass public resolutions in favor of the rights of Indians; and defenses of Cherokee 
sovereignty appeared in a vast array of periodicals. Thanks to the active sharing of 
content between newspapers, these local events became the basis of a national 
understanding of the debate over Indian Removal. These meetings and the documents 
they produced drew on arguments provided by women and the Cherokee. Commonly 
shared elements include the Indian right to land based on immemorial inheritance and 
treaties, the kindnesses paid to early settlers by Indians, the civilized nature of the 
Cherokee, and the impact of Indian Removal on national character.  
 In Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities across the north, the public arranged 
meetings and the minutes of these meetings, along with the resolutions they produced, 
were published as examples of civic actions that might be emulated across the country. In 
one such instance, the oral arguments of four Philadelphia gentlemen are recorded by the 
Philadelphia Gazette. In the exchange, each man lays out his reason for supporting the 
Cherokee and the dissenter among the group who supports Georgia is quickly chastened. 
The actual memorial produced as a result of this conversation is deemed too lengthy to 
print, so the interactions of the men must suffice. Other accounts, such as the one offered 
in the Boston Centinel, also include not simply the resolutions adopted by the people on 
behalf of the Cherokee, but the speakers and arguments that set the resolve of the people. 
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At the February 17, 1830 meeting reported on in the Centinel, S.M. Worcester, professor 
at Amherst College, provided a lengthy address on the state of the Indian cause and he, 
along with the likes of Jeremiah Evarts, was elected to a board of citizens who would 
draft a memorial to Congress based upon the resolutions passed at the meeting. In both 
cases, it is the facts that the meeting itself happened and that public, oral arguments were 
made that were perhaps the most important. The organizing of citizens at public forums 
to discuss Indian Removal and its impact on the nation strengthened the argument that the 
government needed to represent them and that if it did not, then it was not entitled to the 
privileged place it claimed.  In short, the government failed to uphold its duties. This was 
the threat of Indian Removal: it could prove that even when citizens did their duty, 
representative democracy could be thwarted by politicians who ignored the will of the 
people. When the existence of a nation of people (Cherokee or American) was at stake, 
citizens must intervene.  
 The rhetoric of women and Cherokee not only gave citizens the reasons for 
intervening but it also provided particularly useful ways to do so. Constructions of 
sympathy, feeling and duty had been subtly, and at times overtly, woven throughout the 
documents produced by women and the Cherokee, and in the hands of the newspaper 
contributors, memorialists and petitioners who took up the charge they were 
universalized. Sympathy and duty were the mark of good, Christian citizens, male and 
female. Nonetheless, the reduction of gender difference in public responses did not 
necessarily lead to an equivalent amelioration of racial distinctions.  Even though it was 
generally accepted by those advocating on behalf of the Cherokee that they were civilized 
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and had natural rights, benevolent societies still needed to be able to point to some defect 
or deficiency to be corrected in order to garner public support and funding. 
 By placing emphasis on presenting the Cherokee argument to an audience of 
potential activists, articles written in response to Cherokee documents in particular drew 
heavily upon perceived racial and social differences to evoke “feeling” in their readers. In 
a response to the “1829 Cherokee Memorial,” an article published in the Boston Christian 
Herald and reprinted in The Phoenix in June 1830 the author begins the argument for 
Cherokee rights by making the audience aware that the memorial was written by a “full 
Cherokee.”  Including this racial designation and doing so in both quotation marks and a 
larger font points to the importance of authenticity in persuading whites to support the 
cause. For if a “full Cherokee” can produce a “lucid document” that “would do honor to 
any statesman in this enlightened Republic,” then proponents of Indian rights can once 
again claim success for the ideas of Christian civilization among the Cherokee and rally 
more supporters to the cause. The comparison of the Cherokee document to one written 
by a statesman lets the author subtly reference the claims of equivalence between leaders 
of the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. made in the Memorial itself.  
Yet such claims of political equivalence are not to be read as racial equality. Just 
as women need the Cherokee to remain children in need of saving, the author of the 
response needs to draw upon racialized ideas of civilization to show both the progress 
made and the progress still to be made by the Cherokee. The Cherokee are civilized, but 
they are still not white men, so they need to be shown as needing more guidance. 
Therefore, the language of the memorial is described as “plain, simple, energetic, and 
pathetically expressive; at the same time dignified, decorous, pertinent and respectful.” 
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Such a description balances defiance and deference in a way that makes the Cherokee 
competent speakers who still acknowledge in some subtle ways white superiority. 
Positioning the Cherokee in such a way flatters the sensibilities of the whites who might 
further the cause of Cherokee rights and reassures them that there will be no social 
ramifications of their support. In fact, creating racial and social distance between whites 
and the Cherokee, makes the cause of Indian Rights an appropriate way to act upon one’s 
Christian duties.  
The idea of Christian duties is more forcefully taken up in the response to “Letter 
to the American People” offered in the New York Advocate. In reacting to what is a 
notably more assertive piece, this article by white northerners equally heightens its 
rhetoric. However, what is elevated is not the assertion of Cherokee nationhood or rights, 
but the argument that sympathy and Christian duty demand action. After giving a brief 
outline of the context of the “Letter to the American People,” the author claims that “No 
man who is not doubly fortified by the degrading and demoralizing spirit of party against 
every feeling of justice or who is not governed by a sordid and selfish interest in the 
property of the Cherokees of which they are in a fair way to be plundered and despoiled 
can read this appeal without experiencing the deepest emotions.” These emotions are to 
be evoked by the “plain and simple eloquence” of the Cherokee of which he asserts 
“nothing can be more pathetic.” Here the author challenges readers to confirm their 
humanity by sympathizing with the Cherokee who are described as “despised and 
injured” as well as “weak and defenseless.” Later in the same paragraph the author uses 
the Cherokee’s reference to the golden rule in “Letter to the American People” to make 
readers prove their Christianity. He asks them, “Are the inhabitants of this professedly 
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Christian country to be taught their moral and religious duties, their responsibility as 
accountable beings by these despised, oppressed and persecuted Indians?” The idea that it 
would be shameful for white Americans to have to learn their own faith from Indians is 
based not simply on the shame of the pupil surpassing the teacher, but on the racial 
implications of this dynamic. To be taught Christianity by a racial other, is insulting and 
holds the potential to upset the differences upon which white charity and sense of duty is 
based. Yet, it is also a testament to the progress of the Cherokee. 
In the end, when the rhetoric of the Cherokee is reinterpreted by whites for a 
white, northern audience, what is ultimately at stake is not the political fate of the 
Cherokee but the spiritual fate of white Americans and the nation. Responding to the 
“1829 Memorial,” the writer for the Boston Christian Herald sums up reasons for 
supporting the Cherokee in this way: 
If their appeals are disregarded, we cannot doubt, that God will regard and treat us 
as altogether a faithless nation, and, sooner or later, will pour down the vials of 
his wrath upon our guilty land.  If the defenseless Indian is still pursued, robbed 
of his birthright, rooted out of his inheritance and driven from the graves of his 
fathers, it is infinitely easy for the Governor of Nations, by either or all of his 
‘four sure judgments,’ to root out the people of this land, and to sweep the nation 
with the besom of destruction. 
For the author of this response to “Letter to the American People,” supporting the 
Cherokee holds the potential to impact, not just the Christian character of the nation, but 
also the functioning of the nation itself. Drawing upon the Cherokee argument that the 
actions of the president and Georgia cannot possibly reflect the will of the American 
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people, the author points to the recent passing of the Indian Removal Act by a slim 
majority and asserts that “we are much mistaken if several individuals in that majority did 
not act in direct opposition to the sentiments, opinions, feelings, and principles of their 
constituents.” Thus he adopts Cherokee rhetoric to point to the ways not supporting 
Indian Rights can bring about the breakdown of the US government by creating a 
situation in which elected officials disregard the wishes of their constituents. If this 
fundamental element of representative government dissolves, then so does the nation. 
Thus the Removal debates and the eventual removal of the Cherokee, which depended on 
the need to define the US as the property of white men, come to haunt in significant ways 
how the nation functions, or rather fails to function, in relation to those people who are 
deemed incapable of participating in the white, patriarchal structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jesslyn R. Collins-Frohlich 2014 
147	  
Chapter Four 
Bad Beginnings 
While the American public’s response to the arguments made by women and the 
Cherokee was largely positive and the shifts in the relationship between duties and rights 
promoted by anti-removalists successfully linked the fates of the two nations, both failed 
to convince the federal government that the Cherokee had property rights. In his majority 
opinion on the 1831 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia case, which challenged Georgia’s taking 
of Cherokee land, Chief Justice Marshall forecloses many of the possibilities imagined by 
anti-removal arguments when he opens anew the savage/civilized debate, not by denying 
the Cherokee Nation’s attempts at assimilation, but by questioning their very ability to be 
represented by the court. According to Priscilla Wald, to be civilized is to be 
(re)presentable and to be savage is to lack this right, and both designations hinge upon 
“the natural right to own property” (65). In questioning whether the Cherokee even have 
the right to petition the court and ultimately ruling that “[i]f it be true that the Cherokee 
Nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be 
true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is 
not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future,” Marshall declares the 
Cherokee Nation un(re)presentable, savage, and by extension, unable to lay claim to their 
land against its seizure by the state of Georgia. In this sense, the idea of the savage 
encompasses cultural and racial difference as well as a legal status that confirms their 
exclusion from the benefits of political and property rights. 
 Marshall justifies his decision with a reading of the relationship between the 
Cherokee Nation and the U.S. government that uses ideas of the domestic to reinforce 
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property as the boundary between the un(re)presentable savage and civilized society. He 
admits that “much of the argument . . . intended to prove the character of the Cherokee as 
a State as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own 
affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of majority of the judges, been completely 
successful.” Yet he is unwilling to grant those arguments allowing for Cherokee Nation 
property rights, standing in the court, or designation as a civilized nation. Instead he 
attempts a compromise and declares that “the relation of the Indians to the United States 
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else” and according 
to which Indian tribes “may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic 
dependent nations.” As Amy Kaplan argues, the word domestic refers to “both the space 
of the nation and the familial home” (15) and is dependent upon “racialized conceptions 
of the foreign” that allows it to regulate “the borders between the civilized and the 
savage” (26). By using the term in the case of the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall 
evokes both meanings. In his ruling on the case, the term domestic functions as both a 
marker of location (within the geographical boundaries of the nation) and legal standing 
(outside of the requirements for citizenship). Despite their assimilation and persuasive 
arguments, the Cherokee once again become savages because their race means they lack 
the right to property ownership and therefore legal representation. Domesticity in this 
case uses property ownership to police the borders between savage and civilized and 
“regulat[e] the traces of savagery within its purview” (Kaplan 26). Letting the Cherokee, 
a people the government has deemed incapable of property ownership, assert sovereignty 
and remain inside the nation with the same rights as white men would open the door for 
other marginalized groups to argue for rights. Therefore, Marshall’s ruling results not 
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merely in the construction of the domestic as a “liminal realm between the national and 
the foreign” (Kaplan 27) but a legal category into which anyone not white or male might 
be placed. 
 If in the use of “domestic” Marshall recalls the legal, geographical, and racial 
implications of the term’s political use, then his pairing of it with the word “dependent” 
evokes its gendered meanings in particular to delineate the nature of this liminal space. In 
this description women’s rights and Indian’s rights once again intersect. And though 
Marshall claims that the “peculiar” relationship between the Cherokee and the federal 
government is “unlike that of any other two people in existence,” his descriptions of what 
it means to be a dependent clearly draw upon the patriarchal relationships of coverture, 
particularly the parent/child relationship it creates between adult men and women, in 
order to deny Cherokee rights by rendering them legally and economically dependent 
upon white men. Marshall declares the Cherokee dependent because first and foremost, 
“[t]hey occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must 
take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases.” In short, the 
Cherokee might occupy their land, but they cannot own it.  
After he has eliminated their legal right to property, he goes on to describe the 
closeness of the relationship between the U.S. and the Cherokee in terms that inscribe the 
relationships between women and men imagined by coverture into Indian policy. 
Marshall declares that the Cherokee Nation’s “relation to the United States resembles that 
of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its 
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief of their wants; and address the President as 
their Great Father.” In fact they are considered “so completely under the sovereignty and 
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dominion of the United States that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form political 
connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an 
act of hostility.” Like women who were continually “covered” by men, the Cherokee too 
find themselves to be, legally, children who are permanently under the control of the US 
government. As Marshall explains, Indian tribes are not considered ‘“foreign nations,’ 
not we presume because a tribe may not be a nation but because it is not foreign to the 
United States.”  Essentially, placing the Cherokee in the liminal space of the domestic 
allows the US government to deny rights because of race and gender. 
In ruling that the Supreme Court was not the proper venue for testing questions of 
Cherokee rights or mitigating the actions of the state of Georgia, Marshall’s use of 
domesticity aims to stabilize the terms of citizenship and national identity by defining the 
foundation of both as white and male and limiting the extent to which such definitions 
might be challenged by othered groups. If, as Susan Schekel argues, “[d]ebates over the 
status of excluded groups created anxiety not because they stirred confusion between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ but because they produced alternative, troubling visions of ‘us’ by calling into 
question the very principles by which white Americans defined their collective moral 
ascendancy and national legitimacy,” then moving beyond these “alternative, troubling 
visions” to establish “the nation as a homogenous union of citizens…depends on an 
essential denial of reality” (10-12). By defining Indians as “domestic dependents,” 
Marshall indulges in a denial of an entire history of legal recognition of Cherokee 
sovereignty and land rights and the moral, Christian grounds upon which the government 
had demanded assimilation. He also ignores the existence of other groups, namely 
women, who already inhabit the very legal gray area his ruling creates. In doing so he 
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successfully undermines the foundation of the argument against Indian Removal and 
makes Indians and women into “that which had to be denied for a coherent image of the 
nation to be recognized” (Scheckel 12). Ultimately, his ruling clears the way for the 
violent taking of Cherokee lands by Georgia and later the U.S. government in the Trail of 
Tears. Ironically, the actions his ruling precipitates mark the failure of his attempts 
because they bring to the forefront the destabilizing impact of the very social, moral, and 
legal questions he sought to erase. In particular his domestication of the ideas of savagery 
and civilization evoke ideas of gender, race and violence in ways that call into question 
the foundations of the nation and the systems that sustain it.  In the 1850s when Indian 
Removal was still happening, but without the fanfare of earlier debates, writers like 
E.D.E.N Southworth and Nathaniel Hawthorne exploit the weaknesses revealed by 
Marshall’s ruling in order to interrogate the idea of nation as home and its attendant 
relationships. 
Published serially in the National Era between January 4 and April 12, 1849, 
E.D.E.N Southworth’s first novel, Retribution, tells the story of Hester Grey, a wealthy 
orphan and heiress to a vast Virginian plantation whose generosity and naiveté are 
exploited by her guardian turned husband and Congressman Ernest Dent and her friend, 
the beautiful, cunning Juliette Summers. These betrayals lead to Hester’s untimely death 
and the marriage of Juliette and Ernest. This second tumultuous relationship ends in death 
for Juliette and political ruin for Dent. The family is eventually redeemed by the actions 
of Julie, Hester’s daughter, who frees the slaves, sells the land, and moves west to start 
over. Also centered in the home with its symbolic personal relationships, Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables tells the story of the fall of the prominent 
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Pyncheon family, whose violent and questionable seizure of land curses the men of the 
family with a mysterious physical condition and an obsession that leads them to endlessly 
repeat the past in pursuit of unclaimed riches. Both novels participate in the domestic by 
establishing the homes at the center of their plots as fronts, or places “for mediating 
cultural, social and political conditions” (Romero 6). And in their mediation of these 
conditions, Southworth and Hawthorne selectively indulge in domesticity’s anti-
patriarchal origins and its imperialist motives. Indian Removal is central to the way they 
do both. In E.D.E.N Southworth’s Retribution and Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of 
the Seven Gables, Indian Removal, with its violent taking of property and central 
question of what constitutes savagery and civilization, provides the vocabulary and 
theoretical strategies for talking about women’s rights and challenging the nation’s 
handling of people with liminal legal status. Through the use of curses, haunted houses, 
and violent personal relationships these novels create a complex exploration of race, 
gender, and class that questions the foundations of American history and identity.  
 
I. Cursed Houses 
The Vale 
In both Retribution and The House of the Seven Gables, the nation is represented 
by households whose homes and families are haunted by past violence that ties them to 
the Indian Removal in the form of familial curses. Retribution presents The Vale, the 
ancestral home of Hester Dent, as a model farm based on Jefferson’s ideas of gradual 
emancipation. Situated in the hills of Virginia, the farm has been passed down from 
mother to daughter for generations, but this pattern of conveyance is the result of past 
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violence rather than progressive ideas about women’s property. In a scene that Vicki L. 
Martin describes as “a long digression” (10) and one that was alternately included and 
excluded from Retributions’ various printings, Southworth outlines the root of the 
matriarchal inheritance and troubled relationships that mark its transference as related to 
the violent taking of Indian land. 43   
According to the “Legend of Leelo-Duskaro; or the Squaw’s Curse,” Hester’s 
ancestor Dugald Chandos was a “fierce partisan and persecutor in the reign of Cromwell” 
who escaped to Virginia. Once there he came into a large amount of land and was, at 
least by reputation, considered wealthy. Despite his vast holdings, Chandos became 
obsessed with a particular piece of land that was the “favorite haunt at the close of the 
hunting season” of “the remnant of a small and weak tribe of about fifty souls” called the 
Wicomicoes (53). Chandos repeatedly offered the sachem a hefty sum for the land, but 
the tribe refused to sell.  What started as “monomania…intensified into real insanity” 
when Chandos’ son wrote to say he was returning from England with his new bride, the 
titled but penniless daughter of an English earl.  Seeing that his offers of money were 
getting him nowhere, Chandos hatched a sinister scheme, the plot of which recalls the 
pretended friendships and economic exploitation of Indian Removal.  
 Described as having “the same sort of respect for these savages as he had for 
lions, bears, and tigers, and about as much conscientiousness in his dealings with the one 
as the other,” Chandos, like a trading house agent of the nineteenth century, buys a large 
amount of fur from them and stays among them until they supply the full amount (54).  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 When originally serialized in the National Era, Retribution did not include “The Legend of Leelo-
Duskaro; or the Squaw’s Curse”, “Extracts from Hester’s Letters” or the account of Ernest and Juliette’s 
“First Quarrel” due to a supposed lack of space (Martin 10). Southworth ensured that these episodes were 
included when the novel was published in book form in the same year. However, in the subsequent 1865 
reissue of the novel “The Legend of Leelo-Duskaro; or the Squaw’s Curse” was again removed, perhaps to 
better emphasize the novel’s anti-slavery potential.  
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reality he is laying a trap so that he might ensnare and destroy Wicomicoes and gain by 
treachery what he cannot by treaty or sale.  His plan comes to fruition on the night the 
tribe returns from a fishing expedition. Chandos has prepared for them a large feast 
complete with “plenty of ‘fire-water’” and underneath the tables where they will eat and 
drink, he has laid a trail of gunpowder.  The Wicomicoes, “delighted as children with the 
surprise,” sat down to the feast and “indulged immoderately in drink,” and while they 
“were reveling in their frantic orgies” Chandos slipped away and lit the fuse. The 
resulting explosion kills every tribe member and catches the vale on fire so that by 
morning it and the tribe are completely decimated.  With the tribe out of the way, 
Chandos “by an alleged purchase” becomes the owner of the land and builds his grand 
house, which he calls The Vale (54-56). 
 Yet this is far from the end of the tale, for legend maintains that in the midst of 
the explosion and fire an “old squaw, mortally wounded, ‘bleeding at every vein,’ with 
her garments blazing around her, sprang up in that scene of blood and flame with the 
bound of a wild beast, planting her feet firmly upon the heap of the burning and dying, 
raising her wild face and sightless eyes to Heaven, lifting her scorched and bloody arms 
on high, invoked the vengeance of God upon the destroyer” (55). The squaw first curses 
her murderer with blindness “that he who had burned out her eyes, might be blind for 
evermore, he and his children.” She then continues to curse Chandos and all his 
descendants with sonlessness and with the curse of the traitor so that when his children 
are with those they “most fondly loved and trusted might they still be most darkly 
betrayed, and, long as the shadow rested on the Vale, might the curse cleave to the 
traitor, to him as his children” (55). The “singular coincidence that leads the vulgar and 
	   	   	  
 
	   155	  
superstitious to give credence to the absurd story” is that no male heir has ever been born 
in the Vale (56-57). By labeling Chandos’ actions as history and the squaw’s as legend 
believed only by people who lack sound judgment, Southworth points to the difference in 
the ways women’s and Indians’ experience is written into the narratives of nation. While 
the actions of men good or bad are written down as the official record, women’s stories 
live on orally and haunt firesides. They provide what Lauren Berlant terms counter-
memory (6) and offer alternative, and at times disruptive, means of reading both past and 
present. Southworth draws on these ideas in her own use of the term history. 
 Dent, who is telling Hester about her family’s past, makes it clear that the story of 
Chandos “is history” (55). Southworth’s choice to italicize the word history emphasizes 
several important ideas. First, this is “his” story of what happened to a group of people 
that he knows little about, and therefore, it cannot ever fully be the truth. The italics can 
also be read as a sarcastic commentary on the presumed truth of history and the 
assumption it is always already in the past. Even though Southworth provides a footnote 
explaining that the actions of Dugald Chandos are based on a “piece of atrocious 
treachery…on the Eastern Shore of Maryland” of which “the names and locality are only 
changed” (54), the accompanying legend of Squaw’s Curse indicates that history is never 
really past and that official accounts that try to depict it as such fail to account for, or 
stubbornly ignore, the ways such actions have lasting, emotional and generational 
impacts because they refuse to incorporate the views of others. Therefore, when read in 
the context of the history of Indian Removal and Southworth’s own construction of 
history, the squaw’s curse becomes more than simple retribution enacted on one family. 
It serves as a critique and warning about the legacy of Indian Removal and the U.S. 
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approach to determining who belongs in the national family and who must be excluded. It 
is the alternative history, the counter-memory, which tells the truth about the violence 
that serves as the foundation of official history and the nation. 
 
The House of the Seven Gables 
 Hawthorne echoes these concerns about history, violence, and the national family 
in his introduction of the Pyncheon family in The House of the Seven Gables. Like 
Southworth, he provides readers with a parcel of land and a house that embodies the 
history of a nation and political dynasty. Using “lore” and “tradition,” Hawthorne tells of 
the Pyncheon family in ways that both contradict and enrich official history and opinion.  
In the opening pages of the novel, Hawthorne offer readers a “brief sketch… of the 
circumstances amid which the foundation of the house was laid” before beginning what 
he says is “the real action of our tale at an epoch not very remote from the present day” 
(6).  The sketch is then briefly forestalled by a moralistic warning that the events he 
describes, though considered history, “serve to illustrate how much of old material goes 
to make up the freshest novelty of human life” and that from this past readers might 
derive “a weighty lesson” (6). The lesson of which Hawthorne’s narrator warns is “the 
little regarded truth, that the act of the passing generation is the germ which may and 
must produce good or evil fruit, in a far distant time; that together with the seed of the 
merely temporary crop, which mortals term expediency, they inevitably sow the acorns of 
a more enduring growth, which may darkly overshadow their posterity” (6). This 
forewarning is immediately followed by a description of Colonel Pyncheon’s securing of 
the property upon which The House of the Seven Gables sits.  
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 In terms that recall the actions of Indian Removal, the narrator explains that the 
plot of land owned by Matthew Maule had once been remote from the town, but as the 
town grew, “the site covered by this rude hovel had become exceedingly desirable in the 
eyes of a prominent and powerful personage, who asserted plausible claims to the 
proprietorship of this, and a large adjacent tract of land, on the strength of a grant from 
the legislature” (7). Like the Indians living on land that had been guaranteed to them in 
treaties and through a long established understanding of occupancy as ownership, 
Matthew Maule’s ability to retain his land, despite having settled it, is jeopardized by 
Pyncheon’s legislative grant. For, as the McIntosh ruling established, only the 
government could ultimately validate land ownership. Matthew Maule managed to 
maintain his claim to the land for several years, but Pyncheon’s desire was not to be 
thwarted, so using a strategy that echoes that of removalists who claimed that Indian 
savagery excluded them from land ownership, citizenship, and the rights offered 
Christian men, Pyncheon seizes on the hysteria over witchcraft to turn a personal, 
property dispute into a religious prerogative. Matthew Maule, however, refuses to go 
quietly and “[a]t the moment of execution” he “uttere[s] a prophecy, of which history, as 
well as fireside tradition, has preserved the very words—‘God,’ said the dying man, 
pointing his finger with a ghastly look at the undismayed countenance of his enemy, 
‘God will give him blood to drink! (8).   
Thinking little of Maule’s words, Colonel Pyncheon dubiously claims the 
disputed property in what townspeople think might be an “unduly stretched” 
interpretation of the boundaries outlined in his land grant.  Pyncheon then proceeds to 
build his home, using Maule’s son as the head carpenter, and life goes on as planned until 
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the day the completion of the house is to be celebrated. On the day his scheme is to be 
honored, Colonel Pyncheon is found dead in his office, staring at a large map of his land 
claim with bloodstains on his beard and collar. Though deemed apoplexy by the local 
doctors, tradition held that Colonel Pyncheon had fallen victim to Maule’s curse—a 
condition that seemingly proved deadly for other Pyncheon men afterward. However, the 
real curse of the family is their endless pursuit of another Indian deed that mysteriously 
disappeared on the day of the Colonel’s death. It is this piece of paper “signed with the 
hieroglyphics of several Indian sagamores, and conveying to Colonel Pyncheon and his 
heirs, forever, as vast extent of territory at the eastward” that evokes the violent removal 
of Matthew Maule and the curse (Hawthorne 316).  The deed and the curse also serve as 
evidence of the “remainder of another ‘nation’ an Indian nation” (Dolis 43) that causes 
the Pyncheons to commit violence against one another for generations to come. 
Consequently, The House of the Seven Gables becomes a living memorial to the 
boundless greed of Colonel Pyncheon and “America’s ‘original’ debt” (Dolis 43). 
 The problems of The Vale and The House of the Seven Gables are further 
exacerbated by the very public roles held by their “modern” male residents. The Vale is 
home to Colonel Dent, a Revolutionary War veteran, senator, and potential Virginia 
governor. As a veteran and senator, Dent represents the history of American government 
and is seen by the public as “a pillar of strength” who is highly admired, for “[w]henever 
it was known that he would make a speech in the Senate Chamber, mechanics left their 
workshops, clergymen forsook their studies, judges descended from their benches, and 
ladies left their drawing-rooms and boudoirs, and all flocked to the Capitol to hear his 
words of eloquence—the eloquences of truth and justice” (20). He was equally admired 
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at home, where “[h]e seemed to his household what Christ is to the Church—their 
patriarch, priest, and friend—their best teacher and brightest example, the image and the 
glory of every exalted virtue and every beneficent affection” (20). The House of the 
Seven Gables is likewise marked by the ghostly presence of the original Pyncheon as 
well as his latest incarnation, the respected Judge Pyncheon, who is known locally for the 
“purity of his judicial character, while on the bench; the faithfulness of his public service 
in subsequent capacities; his devotedness to his party, and the rigid consistency with 
which he had adhered to its principles…his remarkable zeal as president of a Bible 
society; his impeachable integrity as treasurer of a Widow’s and Orphan’s fund” (230). 
This man whose “eminent respectability” is recognized by the church and state is also 
rumored to be the next governor of Massachusetts. Both Dent and Judge Pyncheon 
becomes stand-ins for the government and as such, both their public personas and private 
actions become representative of the state, while their homes become microcosms of the 
nation.  
 As models of the nation, The Vale and The House of the Seven Gables with their 
dubious land deals and curses present to readers a domesticated version of the 
savage/civilized debate that characterized Indian Removal. Neither Chandos nor 
Pyncheon obtained their land through purchase or treaty. Instead, both obtained property 
through socially condoned greed and violence. Chandos is not punished for his killing of 
the Wicomicoes because he hides his sins with a fire, and Pyncheon’s killing of Maule is 
sanctioned by religion. Neither is deemed a crime worthy of legal punishment. The curses 
leveled at each family for these actions are not mere retribution, but illustrations of the 
long term effects of violent beginnings on the legitimacy and success of a nation. Like 
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many other writers of the period, Southworth and Hawthorne seemingly find in Indians 
“the materials out of which Anglo-American writers…might articulate a sense of national 
identity” (Pacheco 188). Yet both also seem concerned with the ways in which Indians 
and the events of Indian Removal “called into question the moral foundations of 
American national character” (Pacheco 188), particularly ideas of civilized behavior in 
regards to those in liminal positions. In each household, the actions of the father are 
visited on succeeding generations in the form of confused property transference and 
familial violence, and women are at the center of both. 
II. Intimate Betrayals
The Ideal Wife and the Other Woman 
By placing women at the center of the curses, Southworth and Hawthorne investigate the 
ways in which “the use of the domestic and the home as a metaphor for a 
nation…simultaneously expand[s] women’s influence and contract[s] their role in the 
nation” (Kaplan 28). Southworth seems particularly interested in exploring the 
contraction of women’s roles, and does so by projecting the racialized violence and 
questions of gender raised by Indian Removal onto her white women and their marriages 
in order to critique the relationships of ward/guardian, husband/wife, and master/slave 
codified in the laws of coverture and attacked by the women’s rights movement. In the 
legend of “Leelo-Duskaro; or, the Squaw’s Curse,” Southworth particularizes Chandos’ 
violence from a general violence against others to one specifically against Indians by 
making the tale about the ways intimate relationships, economic exchange, and violence 
culminate in or are motivated by the gaining of property. The squaw’s curse of 
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sonlessness establishes a matriarchal system of inheritance, which means that upon the 
marriage of each daughter the family name dies and the plantation passes from one man 
to the next with no true guarantee that he will do right by the property or the woman to 
whom it belonged. Jeffory Clymer explains that this pattern of inheritance also “installs 
the racialized violence of property at the heart of white marriage” (79). I would add that 
the violence precipitated by the squaw’s curse is also gendered by its direct tie to Indian 
Removal and because of women and Indians’ similar positions of in the legal system. 
Both are capable of owning but not retaining their property, or sometimes their lives, in 
the face of the intimate relationships with the law indicated in the roles of 
ward/wife/domestic dependents. These relationships, which for Indians and women were 
“marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else” (Marshall), were 
not contracts but status relationships that obligated their guardians/husbands/providers to 
nothing. 44 The dangers of such relationships play out in the novel’s depiction of 
marriages where the violence of Indian Removal and the questions about the nature of 
savagery and civilization are represented in the domestic violence that characterizes 
relationships between white men and women. In both his marriage to Hester and later to 
Juliette Ernest Dent uses the relationships of guardian/ward and husband/wife, to justify 
the physical, emotional, and psychological violence that strips them of property and life. 
Thus Dent proves that true savagery—the ability to dispossess people of rights and 
property through violence—lies within the domestic space of a civilized nation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  In “Southworth’s Reimagining of the Married Woman’s Property Reforms,” Elizabeth Stockton explains 
that despite “the law’s increasing tendency to define other relationships in terms of contract, marriage 
continued to be seen as a unique, noncontractual arrangement” (246). This is due in large part to the fact 
that ideas of coverture allowed marriage to be “initiated as a contract but then became a relationship of 
status” by “foreclose[ing] for the wife the possibility of further contract” (246).	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 As the heir to The Vale and latest generation to fall victim to the squaw’s curse, 
the failure of Hester’s relationship with Dent is clearly foreshadowed. Therefore 
Southworth presents her tragic end as the expected outcome of a system that denies 
women property and representation. Throughout her life Hester is “covered” by Ernest 
Dent. In what the authors of the “Declaration of Rights and Sentiments” might describe 
as an effort to “destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and 
to make her willing to lead a dependent life,” Dent sets out to make Hester into a model 
wife through an almost continuous stream of critiques. His admonishments and insults 
espouse common ideas about religion and wifely obedience but, in Southworth’s hands, 
have the underlying purpose of exposing “how the various forms of violence…lurking 
under the guise of romantic love are not only physically dangerous for white women, but 
are also tied to women’s economic disenfranchisement” (Clymer 85). Dent’s criticisms 
cowl Hester by systematically removing mutual affection from his relationship with her. 
When Hester expresses sorrow and sympathy upon hearing about the impending death of 
his father, Dent launches into a religion lesson in which he chides her for her concern 
about his future loneliness by reminding her that “no human being need ever suffer 
loneliness” because they may always find companionship in God (37). When she screams 
and nearly faints upon hearing of the terrible actions of Dugald Chandos for the first time, 
Dent comes to her side but does not support her. Instead he answers Hester’s imploring 
looks with a stern declaration that she lacks self-control or a strong will. Likewise, on the 
night that Dent proposes he does so, not with kindness, but with violence. Hester sits 
writing to Juliette about her disappointment that Dent might be courting another woman 
when she feels her head “clasped by two large palms” (61). He then turns her around to 
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face him and taking hold of her wrists removes her hands from her face and holds them 
firmly in his hands (61). In language that evokes images of violent sacrifice and perhaps 
coyly references the “rule of thumb,” Dent declares “And Hester would give one of her 
litter fingers to become Ernest Dent’s wife” (62). In this instance and all others Hester 
responds to Dent’s abusive critiques like Job. In her letters to Juliette she writes that she 
is grateful to her parents “for leaving her in his care, and investing him with authority to 
guard and guide her.” More than that, “his slightest intimation has… a divine authority” 
and for Hester “it is happiness, enthusiasm, religion to obey it” (48). Such devout 
attention to Dent does not however lessen Dent’s criticism or lead to any mutual 
understanding between them. In what Cindy Weinstein might label one of the many 
instances in which “linguistic ambiguity” (265) culminates in marriage in Southworth’s 
novels, Dent completes his proposal by purposefully punning on the words accept and 
except to convince Hester to set aside her abolitionist ideals and marry him. 
“Humph! what, Hester, after all your asseverations that you would never marry, at 
least until you had freed all your people?” 
 “Yes; but I should have excepted you.” 
 “And will you accept me, ha! Hester?” 
 “Yes, I tell you.” 
“But, Hester, recollect Mrs. Wimsat’s caution. Are you not afraid; a little, weak, 
gentle  creature such as you is; to put yourself in the power of a great, strong man 
like me? How do you know but that I’ll misuse you; tell me that?” (63) 
Dent’s purposeful interchanging of words to trick Hester into disregarding her “people” 
again introduces racialized violence, and his question about his potential misuse of his 
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power indicates that he will indeed exploit Hester as he gains access to her property as 
her husband.   
 It is this aspect of the evolution from ward to wife that troubles Marcus Derby, 
who truly loves Hester and serves as her advocate and the voice of reason throughout the 
novel.  When Marcus hears of the engagement, he openly questions the motives of both 
Hester and Dent. “You just want to marry him because he is a colonel in the army and he 
wants to marry you for your money—that is it!” exclaims Marcus.  Hester attempts to set 
the record straight by saying, “Colonel Dent likes me because I am, as it were, his mental 
and spiritual child. I go heart and hand with him in all his aims and objects” (68). Such a 
defense of her choice to marry Dent reveals the depth of her naiveté, and her continued 
toleration of Dent’s cruelty shows the extent to which she represents the “ideal” wife. 
Even on their wedding day, as Hester tells Dent about an exchange with Marcus Derby 
during which he confessed his love, Dent downplays the trueness of the young man’s 
affection by reminding Hester that she is “not the girl to attract a young man’s 
admiration” and goes on to remind her that he never flatters. Thus after being told she is 
unattractive and can expect no admiration of her looks from her husband, Hester has her 
first moment of seeming recognition of what life as Dent’s wife might be. She admits that 
she “should like to have been flattered and petted a little just then,” and when Dent 
perceives this and calls her emotions “childish and puerile” Hester declares that she “felt 
provoked to bid him go about his business, and marry a cast-iron woman, if it pleased 
him” (70). Despite this moment of anger, Hester characteristically submits and ultimately 
bends to Dent’s vision of her.   
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 Only Marcus Derby serves as the voice of warning and echoes what is painfully 
clear to the readers—when it comes to Dent, Hester is, as the squaw foretold, blind. Thus, 
Marcus attempts to tear the veil from her eyes. Exasperated he declares, “He is not—this 
demigod of yours—what you take him to be. He is a cold, hard, black, marble Colossus, 
whose altitude will intercept the dear sunlight of heaven itself from your life, and in 
whose damping shadow you will wilt and wither and die”(71). What Marcus offers 
instead is a chance to break away from Dent even if it means causing a scene. He also, 
even after the wedding, offers to Hester male companionship of a kind she has never 
known—friendship, compassion, and true protection, which echoes Southworth’s own 
ideas about women’s need for advocates.45 Before he leaves The Vale, Marcus tells 
Hester “deeply injured as I have been, if ever you should need a friend, call upon me. 
You have no father or brother, Hester! No, not even a mother to take your part, or a sister 
to quarrel for you. Nevertheless, Hester, bad as you have used me, if you should need a 
protector—if that old Jeptha should take it into his head to offer you a living sacrifice 
upon some alter of his fanaticism, call upon me, and I’ll shoot him!” (73). Though 
offered from a place of hurt and violence, Marcus’ willingness to sacrifice for Hester is 
something unimaginable for Dent, who prides himself on a lack of emotion which he 
codes as proof of strength and maturity. Interestingly, by including the episodes with 
Marcus in her letters to Juliette, Hester’s attempts to show her devotion to Dent paint her 
as foolish and the ideals she represents as absurd because readers are already well aware 
from both the introduction and the curse that Hester will indeed be betrayed emotionally, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Stockton argues that in Southworth’s fiction she does not advocate complete privacy in the marital 
relationship nor does she endorse wives’ legal equality. Instead she aims for a middle ground and “depicts 
women as needing legal mediators who can convince the law to invade marital privacy when necessary” 
(247). 
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legally and financially. Marcus’ warnings will hold true even if Hester refuses to see 
them. 
 As much as Hester’s sad fate and lack of control over her own life are the result of 
a system of coverture and false ideas of marriage that placed her at Dent’s disposal, it is 
also a product of her utter inability to comprehend the world around her. Hester’s refusal 
to “see” is most obvious in her letters to Juliette, which make up the first seven chapters 
of the novel. The elaborate and near constant praise of Ernest even when he is cruel or 
unfair and the overblown comparisons of Ernest and her marriage to religious 
experiences indicate that, more than Hester simply being the perfect child/ward/wife, 
there is something seriously amiss. The dissonance created between what readers know to 
be true about her marriage and what Hester believes calls into question the sincerity of 
Southworth’s depiction of Hester’s devotion and domesticity as much as it does the 
character of Ernest Dent.  Perhaps no instance better demonstrates this than Hester’s 
literal blindness before the birth of her child Julie. 
  In her letter to Juliette, Hester begins her explanation of her temporary blindness 
by saying that “About three months since, it pleased Heaven to visit me with an 
affliction” (82). Pregnant and without Dent, Hester wakes one morning to find herself 
blind. She writes that “the truth rolled on my soul, and overwhelmed me!...I sunk back 
upon my pillow, and in an instant all this poured through my mind—the hereditary, but 
irregularly appearing, calamity of my family—sudden blindness from the paralysis of the 
optic nerve” (82).  Her fear is compounded when she remembers that her “great-
grandfather, on the very day after his wedding while crossing the river alone in a boat 
with his bride, was suddenly stricken with blindness” and that, upon her birth, her own 
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mother “suddenly lost her eyesight; and during the six weeks that she survived, never 
beheld the face of her child” (83).46 Both Hester’s great-grandfather and her mother 
suffer blindness at moments when they are about to enter into new social contracts and 
roles that bring another being into the family and facilitate the transfer of property, both 
of which are integral to the squaw’s curse. However, Hester does not relate her blindness 
to her impending motherhood or the curse, but to Ernest and her role as his wife. 
Tellingly, her first concern after discovering she is blind has nothing at all to do with her 
child. Instead, what causes her the most pain is “the thought that [she] should never be 
useful or agreeable to Ernest again” (83). In the midst of the anguish this thought causes, 
Hester has the revelatory thought that she is being punished for the sin of loving her 
husband too much. After all, she reasons, ‘“the Lord loveth whom he chasteneth’” (85). 
Who the lord is though is negotiable, for her affliction disappears just as quickly as it 
appeared when Dent returns home. The insight that her literal blindness might give her 
about truly seeing her life and relationships is entirely lost on Hester.  It is not, however, 
lost on the reader.  
 The extent of Hester’s symbolic blindness is confirmed when the format of the 
novel shifts from one of letters written by Hester to a narrated tale that “continue[s] their 
story upon the authority of tradition” (113).  The first order of business for the new 
narrator is to set the record straight about Ernest’s true character. According to the 
narrator, “Colonel Dent was undoubtedly a man of high honor, of sincere philanthropy, 
and of fervent piety; the county said it—all men gave credence to it—and Colonel Dent 
believed it most implicitly of all.” Furthermore, the “causes of Colonel Dent’s high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  In writing about her own life Southworth reveals that at twelve months old she “was attacked by an 
inflammation of the eyes that ended in total blindness—though happily temporary” (qtd. in Coultrap-
McQuin 52). It is perhaps this experience that inspired Hester’s circumstances.	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character for virtue were rather circumstantial and external than innate and self-
subsistent” (114).  Ernest’s father “had been a truly good man” (114) who believed in the 
cause of liberty and clung to ideas of emancipation even when they were not popular. His 
son was merely the mouthpiece through which his ideas were expressed to the public. In 
short, Dent is a hollow man incapable of embodying the virtues he preaches to Hester. 
Therefore, it is fortuitous for Dent that he marries Hester, “the pure-minded, warm-
hearted girl, who, with limited powers of perception, seldom thought of looking below 
the surface” (114). Such a description not only reveals the depth of Hester’s blindness 
and Dent’s dubious nature, but it also reveals the extent to which the picture of the 
perfectly submissive wife depends on a woman willfully ignoring the injustices she faces.  
Therefore, it is also telling that the only direct discussion of women’s rights comes from 
Hester.  
 Southworth’s treatment of women’s rights proves, at best, perfunctory lip service 
to popular ideas of the domestic woman made ironic by the fact they are delivered by 
Hester on her deathbed. Instead of gaining insight or clarity from her impending death, 
Hester remains as stubbornly ignorant as ever. Once again, when Marcus tries to explain 
to her what she cannot see about the relationship between Juliette and Dent, he is rebuked 
for being unfair to Ernest and for not understanding that Hester’s “little family circle is 
bound together by affection and confidence” and that her “home is an Eden of harmony, 
beauty and love” (171). When Marcus switches tactics and attempts to reveal the truth of 
Dent’s adultery by asking Hester leading questions about the relationship between Dent 
and Juliette, she clings almost irrationally to her false image of the world.  As the narrator 
says of Hester’s unwillingness to comprehend Marcus’s message, “[s]he had not the 
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slightest suspicion either of the treachery he had first intended to expose, or of the drift of 
his conversation; in fact she assigned a totally opposite meaning to his innuendoes” 
(172). Hester so misinterprets what Marcus says that his intended warning serves as 
fodder for a long soliloquy on the merits of submission and the unnaturalness of women’s 
rights. 
 In Hester’s estimation, “[l]ove married to veneration is ecstasy; love divorced 
from veneration is anguish. And this is in accordance with the laws of God and of nature. 
‘Man is the head of the woman, as Christ is head of the church.” Echoing commonly 
articulated religious arguments against women’s rights, she goes on to explain the 
naturalness of man’s dominance by contending that “God would not have made such a 
law without placing corresponding instincts in the heart of woman; and just so far as a 
woman’s soul possesses the distinctive lineaments of her sex, does she feel the force of 
these instincts” (173). She more directly addresses the power dynamics women’s rights 
activists hoped to disrupt when she claims that the bondage and chains of which women 
speak are those of protection and love and that a “husband’s authority is written on her 
heart, with the pen of nature, by the hand of God”  (173). Interestingly, after declaring the 
naturalness of women’s inferiority, Southworth offers a more cryptic statement about 
obtaining rights when she says that advocates “must not only change the laws of the land, 
but the laws of woman’s nature before they can improve upon Divine Providence, by 
changing her relations” (173). Here Southworth uses anti-feminist language to highlight a 
challenge and complaint frequently voiced by women’s rights leaders.  
As articulated by those gathered at Seneca Falls, one of the problems faced in the 
struggle for women’s rights is that man “has endeavored in every way that he could to 
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destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her 
willing to lead a dependent and abject life.” If women were going to advocate for their 
own rights, they needed to change how they saw themselves and their relationships. 
Changing laws and women’s self-perceived nature are not presented as markers of the 
movement’s impossibility, but rather are the two necessary components for improving 
women’s status and “Divine Providence.”  The rather odd end of Hester’s musings then, 
in many ways, comes to outline the challenge women’s rights advocates face if they are 
to convince women who believe as Hester does in the ideal marriage. In her final direct 
assertion about women’s rights Hester contends that “[w]oman’s subordination of love is 
not only a law of nature, a law of revelation, but a doctrine of all inspired books since the 
Bible.” Southworth follows this strange movement from nature, to revelation, to literature 
with a discussion of the depiction of women in literature read through the lens of Hester’s 
own misunderstanding of love. Referencing Shakespeare and Milton allows Southworth 
to show her own literary prowess and the dignity of her profession, and it also highlights 
the extent to which the idea of love and marriage supported by Hester is founded upon 
fictions written largely by men.  
 The seriousness of Southworth’s critique of women’s rights is also undermined by 
the fact that it is offered by a woman who is so submissive, so blind to the true nature of 
the people and relationships in her own life, that even on her deathbed when Ernest 
attempts to confess his sins she fails to understand what he says or how it contributes to 
her death.  In an attempt to confess his relationship with Juliette, Ernest asks Hester 
“suppose my heart had turned away from you, and set itself upon another woman. How 
then?” (185). Hester replies with incredulity “Heavens! Suppose the sun had been blotted 
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out, or the earth had rolled from beneath my feet—while we are supposing 
impossibilities. I don’t know, but I do think, Ernest, that your defection, supposing that it 
could possibly have occurred, would have killed me, annihilated me, soul and body!” 
(185). Readers know that, not only has Ernest given his heart, passion and money to 
Juliette, but he has also failed to give Hester’s illness the attention it needed. That 
Hester’s declining health coincides with Dent’s increasing obsession with Juliette hints to 
the larger significance of both his betrayal and Hester’s death.  Hester embodies the 
idealized image of the pure, devoted, submissive wife, but as her life and death reveal, 
such a model is dangerous to women because it offers none of the benefits of protection 
that it so loudly proclaims. Moreover, as a Senator and representative of the government, 
Dent’s relationship with Hester also carries overt references to the expected relationship 
of women to the government. Using socially promoted visions of marriage and the laws 
of coverture, he has exacted from her endless devotion, an heir, and now her life.  
 In the final act of betrayal Dent also exacts from Hester her property and legacy. 
As her guardian and later husband, Dent had the ability to control Hester’s finances, but 
The Vale and her slaves had been left in trust until she reached her majority on her 
twenty-first birthday so her husband might not waste them. It had long been Hester’s plan 
to complete the process of gradual emancipation the Dents had begun on her farm by 
freeing her slaves when she reached her majority, and Dent had, in the past, encouraged 
such actions. Yet he increasingly lost his fervor for the cause as he sought higher political 
office.47 Unfortunately, but predictably, the kind mistress dies before her slaves might be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 According to Vicki L. Martin, Dent’s shift in opinion concerning emancipation presents an historical 
reality. When veterans of the Revolutionary War no longer found the metaphor of slavery an apt 
description for their position and became more interested in furthering their own fortunes, emancipation 
lost priority (52). 
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freed. However, unlike many such plots, it is not because of forgetfulness, illness, or a 
change in fortune but because the law and her husband actively prevent it.  When Hester 
realizes she is dying, she summons Mr. Jenkins, an attorney who is aware of the Dents’ 
plans to emancipate their slaves as well as the clause in her father’s will that will not let 
her do so until she is twenty-one.  In one of the only assertive moments of Hester’s life, 
she directs Mr. Jenkins to prepare the deeds of manumission for all of their slaves.  
Jenkins is hesitant and reminds Hester that, legally, even after she reaches her majority 
she can do nothing without her “husband’s presence and co-operation” (180).  Assured of 
Dent’s support, Hester responds by outlining what is really at stake: 
Oh! I know that; but then Colonel Dent can do nothing at all, if I die without 
affixing my signature to these deeds, for the property would then go to our 
daughter, and he would have to wait until she was of age, when many of the poor 
creatures whom I wish to emancipate would be dead, and others would be old. 
Then, Colonel Dent himself might 
 die before our daughter grows up, and Julie and her property fall into other hands, 
and so  my poor people and their children, remote generations, remain in slavery. (180) 
For Hester, the drafting and signing of the deeds is not merely a question of today or her 
own life but preserving the lives of others. Therefore, she valiantly stays alive until after 
midnight on the day of her twenty-first birthday so that she might sign the papers and 
legally free her slaves.  She has as faithfully as ever done her part and must once again 
trust Dent to do the right thing.  
 Once again, her trust is misplaced. The morning after Hester’s funeral Dent meets 
with Mr. Jenkins to sort out the bills of manumission Hester signed.  Dent declares them 
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invalid. According to Dent, “they could not pass in any court of law” because even had 
they “been drawn up with the utmost legal precision, other causes would have invalidated 
the deeds not among the least of which is the fact that Mrs. Dent had not attained her 
majority when she signed them, or even indeed when she died” (190-191). He the 
explains to the astonished Mr. Jenkins that  
Hester Grey was born at ten o’clock P.M., on the—day of December 1782, the 
day upon which peace was proclaimed: and Hester Dent affixed her signature to 
these papers at twelve o’clock, and died at seven o’clock, P.M., on the twenty-
first anniversary of her birth day; so that she really wanted twenty-two hours of 
her majority at the hour that she signed these deeds. (190-191) 
 Cruelly, Dent’s understanding of the law is correct. Though the explanation of being 
hours short of her majority is certainly a detail added by Southworth to emphasize his 
depravity and the extent to which he betrays Hester, the larger premise that excludes the 
manumission papers is that Hester did not have his permission to sign them, and with no 
legal right to make a will, Dent has no obligation to honor his wife’s wishes. The slaves 
and The Vale are to be passed on to their daughter Julie.  In the end, he controls Hester in 
death as in life and, as Marcus warned, he makes Hester the sacrifice to his fanatical love 
of self and in doing so becomes the primary vehicle for fulfilling the Squaw’s Curse. In 
her relationship with Dent, Hester is blind, sonless, and betrayed when she loves the 
most. 
 Dent’s role as husband and representative of the government give his actions 
added significance. His use of Christian principles to cruelly belittle Hester, his betrayal, 
his violence, his willingness to break promises when advantageous, and his appropriation 
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of her property all echo the political and social violence of the patriarchal relationships 
women sought to change in Indian Removal and Women’s Rights. Dent’s actions 
undermine the argument that women are fairly represented in the government by their 
husbands, fathers, and brothers, for such relationships hinge on compassion and 
advocacy.  He speaks only for himself, exacts from Hester exactly what he wants, and 
disregards her reactions to everything as emotional and inconsequential. Under the veneer 
of the benevolent husband, guardian and lord, he cruelly mistreats people, by using 
violence to strip them of property and legal representation. And though his actions are 
morally reprehensible, they are perfectly legal. For these “intangible crimes—sins against 
mind, heart, or happiness” cannot be punished by law.  Interestingly, Dent fails to do any 
better by his independent second wife Juliette.  
 
The Other Woman 
 Offered as a contrast to Hester, wild, willful Juliette, who Southworth alternately 
depicts as admirable and purely evil, provides readers with another model of womanhood 
that is no less constrained by social expectations than the first. Like Hester, Juliette is a 
dark complected orphan with no living relative and is intensely desirous of finding a 
place in society. Unlike Hester, Juliette embodies “an exaggerated ideal of feminine 
allure with qualities patriarchal culture normally associates with maleness” (Entzminger 
3). She is ambitious, determined, capable of reading the people around her, and willing to 
do whatever it takes to find financial security because, unlike Hester, she lacks a 
prestigious pedigree and wealth. It is this access to property that perhaps most clearly 
shapes the differences between the two women. Hester’s goal in life is to be loved, and 
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though her looks do not make her an object of desire, her money ensures that she will 
garner attention. Juliette on the other hand has a beauty that can more than compensate 
for her poverty and unknown past. So, while Hester uses money to attract admirers, 
Juliette uses admirers to attract money. Both search for security, and both wrongly 
believe they find it in Ernest Dent.  
 For Juliette, Ernest Dent is a necessity, not a choice. In Hester, Juliette finds a 
potential source of financial security, but that money source is threatened with each 
change in Hester’s life. When Hester marries Ernest, Juliette declares that he is “the worst 
man she could have selected to suit my purposes” (115) because, according to Hester’s 
letter, Ernest’s morals are above being manipulated.  She likewise thinks her designs are 
all but ended when Hester gives birth to Julie.  However, a second more careful reading 
of Hester’s letters reveals to Juliette what Hester never learns—Ernest Dent’s weakness. 
Delightedly, Juliette exclaims ‘“the weak point in his character is his self-confidence; the 
object that he most admires, in secret, is himself. Yes! Self-righteous, self-admiring and 
self-confident; he lies or will lie in my power’” (116). In one night Juliette uses her 
beauty, dress, and cunning to wrap Dent as securely around her little finger as she has his 
wife. He showers her with attention, amusements, and finery.  When Conscience, “a 
faithful monitor as she is,” causes Ernest to momentarily question his budding obsession 
with Juliette, he answers her with the same condescension shown to Hester when he asks 
“whether she had the impertinence to suppose that he, he, Ernest Dent could possibly be 
in danger? And demands to know whether Conscience had not known him long enough 
to have confidence in him” (118).  In response, Conscience sighs and remains silent. 
Even as he falls into a dangerous trap masterfully laid by Juliette, Ernest clings to his 
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vain conviction that he is above moral reproach. He reacts exactly as Juliette would have 
him to her beauty and proves a willing dupe. 
 Southworth accompanies these models of womanhood with two different 
depictions of Dent and of love. According to the narrator, love is “a heavenly influence 
when it unites, pervades, and blesses a family circle; a diabolical agency, when, allured 
beyond its legitimate bound by a forbidden object, it endangers or consummates the 
destruction of family confidence, peace and union” (156). It is the second type of love 
that characterizes the relationship between Dent and Juliette.  Dent makes this abundantly 
clear in a confession of love that melds together government, ownership, and violence. 
Upon the night that Hester faints at a party because of her worsening health and must be 
rushed home, Juliette comes to Dent’s office under the guise of telling him about Hester’s 
condition. She bids him go to bed because he must deliver a speech before the senate the 
next day. Dent, with admiration, asks Juliette, “but Miss Summers, would you have me 
leave the bedside of a sick and perhaps a dying wife, to make a speech in the senate?” 
(156). Juliette replies by asking him what a Roman senator would have done. By evoking 
Rome, Juliette introduces ideas of democracy as well as conquest, violence, and tragic 
downfall.  Dent obliges with a possessive, violent declaration of love that, even to 
Juliette, portends a bad ending.  When her glance meets his he holds her eyes “fixed, as 
the magnet holds the needle.” She attempts to leave, but Dent “seize[s] her wrists with his 
burning hands and [holds] them, keeping his eyes fixed upon hers with the power of the 
loadstone” (157). For the first time, Juliette feels the power and weight of Dent and is 
both mesmerized and terrified.  She is “under the influence of a spirit and a passion even 
mightier than her own” and its grasp is inescapable. She again tries to leave, but he 
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tightens his grip using his fingers to “encircle her wrists like red-hot fetters” while his 
eyes hold her in a spell.  In this position he utters the words “I love you,” but instead of 
inciting passion they breed fear in Juliette.  As she struggles to break free and bring him 
to his senses, Dent’s need for possession and his violence only intensify.  
 In this escalation, a love that begins as merely extraordinary progresses to one in 
which she is his captive, and ends with pure cruelty. When Juliette calls his declaration 
that he will not release her even if “the heavens should recede and leave [them] alone in 
space” “ungenerous, unmanly, cruel,” Dent responds with a truly terrifying threat that 
turns his love into a curse. In a fit, he says, “And my love is cruel! exacting, fierce, and 
cruel! If I were about to die this moment, Juliette, I should kill you, lest anyone else 
should have you. If I were condemned to eternal misery, I should try to draw your spirit 
down to perdition with mine, from the love I bear you!” (158). Dent accentuates this 
declaration by wrapping his arm around her waist. Juliette responds to this new threat of 
possession by biting him. Yet an animalistic action that should evoke his ire heightens his 
attraction. Only when she resorts to sobbing and declaring his power over her does he 
release her and admit her power over him. In a reversal of his earlier declarations of love, 
he declares himself her slave and a dog that sits at her feet. Dent proves incapable of 
declaring affection unless he controls the situation. In this case he gains through 
impassioned violence what he exacted from Hester by cruel detachment and disdain. 
 Despite the impassioned and tempestuous nature of their first declarations and the 
first year of their marriage, over time the relationship fails due in large part to the mutual 
suspicion its beginnings cause. Neither party trusts the other to remain faithful or proves 
truly capable of understanding each other, so Dent and Juliette live through “years of 
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domestic wretchedness…united by no tie of mutual affection or esteem, but fettered fast 
by pride, custom, and expediency” (269). Even though both are miserable, neither finds 
an advantage in separating, for their personal failures are accompanied by political and 
social achievement. Dent is promoted to general, and Juliette becomes the belle of every 
ball in Philadelphia and France. Therefore, they choke back their disgust and continue on 
even as their relationship spirals downward toward increasingly dark places and their 
chief interaction is to torment one another. It is at this point that the narrator makes 
obvious the comparison between wives that has been building throughout the novel.  
And now, while I say this, it occurs to me, that to Ernest Dent, Hester and 
Juliette—the  first, pure love, the last, insane passion—represented the principles 
of good and evil. To the first his faith had been pledged, and his allegiance was 
due; but she was plain, simple, quiet, quakerish, and unattractive and he let her 
die. The second was bright, beautiful, alluring; he gave himself up to her 
fascinations, was bewildered, caught, tortured.  The  parallel is perfect, as you will 
find, if you pursue it. (270) 
Yet Southworth is not interested in pursuing this parallel or perfecting it at any point in 
the novel. She repeatedly insists that Juliette be read as more than the “belle gone bad” 
who undermines the traditional, virtuous behaviors of Hester because in doing so 
Southworth gains the ability to highlight the hypocrisy that underlies the ways virtue is 
differently constructed for men and women. After all, the actions that would label Juliette 
as evil require the participation of Dent. So, censuring Juliette would mean participating 
in the creation of  “a false public sentiment, by giving to the world a different code of 
morals for men and women, by which moral delinquencies which exclude women from 
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society, are not only tolerated but deemed of little account in man” (Declaration of 
Sentiments). Instead, Southworth depicts Juliette as what Lydia Fischer terms a “savage 
in the house” (53). Unlike Hester who had always been inscribed in the domestic setting 
of The Vale and willingly conformed to societal expectations, Juliette is a woman from 
outside this system, one who, with her wildness and unwillingness to conform “could 
suggest the potential for transformation in accepted gender roles” and revitalization of the 
nation (65). As part of her transformative properties, Juliette “possesses Southworth’s 
talent for writing, along with other artistic accomplishments,” which “indicates the 
writer’s identification with the character and suggests a commentary on her region’s 
attitude toward all powerful women” (Entzminger 35). In contrast to Hester, who has “a 
passion for acquiring, but no tact in appropriating knowledge to the development of her 
mind,” Juliette easily understands complex tasks and accurately reads a social landscape 
(20). She also adeptly defies gender roles in order to guarantee her inclusion and gain 
power. With this combination of skills, Juliette gives Southworth the ability to expose 
vanity and greed as the true machination of government and its leaders. Perhaps most 
importantly, Juliette holds the most power and potential to change history and the curse 
that haunts The Vale and its inhabitants by participating in the fight against Indian 
Removal.  
During one of the legislative sessions, Dent is to speak before the Senate on the 
issue of Indian Removal and requests Hester’s assistance in gathering the information he 
will need to write his speech. When Hester utterly fails to understand the research Dent is 
asking her to conduct for him, Juliette “comprehend[s] the subject fully” and eagerly 
steps in to help Hester and herself (140).  Juliette completes “the task admirably, bringing 
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all her astute intellect and brilliant wit into the serve of the subject; using here the acute 
comment, here the skillful comparison, and here the cutting sarcasm” (146). The value of 
her work is not the ability to simply record details but to interpret them in ways that cut to 
heart of the issue and offer valuable insights. Juliette in many ways seems made for such 
work. Her ability to read people and assess situations allows her to just as easily navigate 
the political landscape as the ballroom. What’s more, Juliette enjoys the work. Occupied 
with her research, she momentarily drops her guard and stops calculating her next move. 
In this moment, Southworth offers the most positive assessment of Juliette, or any 
woman, found in the novel.  
Three hours had passed and Juliette was still bending over her work. She was now 
quite alone, she had laid off her bonnet, and it was thus her beautiful hair, half out 
of curl, her cheeks glowing, her eyes sparkling, her countenance highly 
intellectual, with the excitement of her work that Ernest Dent after the 
adjournment of the Senate, found her. 
Sitting in the Library of Congress conducting research for Dent, Juliette is truly beautiful 
because she is committed to a purpose beyond herself and has found a way to put her 
beauty and intelligence to good use.  She is after all researching an issue that will impact 
thousands of American Indians and the country—one that, as we have seen, women like 
Beecher and the thousands of women who petitioned Congress actively wrote against.  
Juliette becomes, at least momentarily, a woman to be respected by women and the 
political establishment for her brains and her beauty. She seemingly embodies what a 
politically active woman and wife should be in a way that Hester never will. 
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 In her work on Indian Removal Juliette becomes Dent’s political equal, and 
Southworth can show women resisting their exclusion by stepping outside of their 
prescribed roles and into the halls of government. It also provides an opportunity to 
critique the way women’s political action is co-opted by men and turned to their own 
needs.  When Dent returns to the library after having read Juliette’s brilliant summary of 
the issue, his admiration of her achievements is quickly interpreted as a marker of his 
own accomplishments. It is “his late political triumph, his surprise at finding Juliette 
alone in the library, engaged so successfully in his service, his admiration of her genius, 
his gratitude, his flattered self-love” (146) that give Juliette’s work merit in his eyes. Dent 
interprets Juliette’s success as an indicator of his own worth. By making her success his, 
he perverts her actions and makes her his property. He might use her intellectual property 
to aid his public life; he might also use her body as he wishes. Even challenges to 
domesticity and patriarchal government, in this novel, only reinforce the inequality 
between men and women and blur the distinctions between affection, love, and property. 
 The impact of these confused categories nearly erupts in murder when Juliette and 
Dent quarrel about Juliette’s decision to send a favorite house slave, Minny Dozier, to the 
field because she suspects a sexual relationship with her husband. Juliette’s suspicion and 
outrage stem from the fact that she knows firsthand the true nature of her husband’s 
character, but more than that, it underscores the extent to which she too has been made 
into a type of property by the laws and social norms. While Dent could easily find what 
he was not getting in his marriage to Juliette in an extramarital affair, even with a slave, 
and escape censure, Juliette cannot do so without social and economic ruin. At this point, 
she is unwilling to jeopardize either. The fact that Juliette suffers under this double 
	   	   	  
 
	   182	  
standard and finds herself so utterly dependent and unhappy makes her a sympathetic 
character.  For, as Southworth explains, “Bad, as she was, she was a woman and loved; 
and what woman, the proudest and fiercest, can bear her hearth and home and heart made 
desolate, and by her own rash hand? She was a woman, and her woman’s nature amply 
avenged itself. Her anguish was as deep and as hopeless as her anger had been fierce and 
deadly” (261). This fear of loss and recognition of love prompts Juliette to sincerely ask 
for forgiveness. In a scene reminiscent of so many acts of submission performed by 
Hester, Juliette throws herself at Dent’s feet. He responds by scooping her up like a child 
and wiping her tears. Yet he holds back his kisses and instead of offering her any comfort 
true comfort in the form of genuine empathy, Dent lectures her as he used to do Hester. 
He preaches to her about religion, strength, and self-possession and outlines a new 
relationship for them: “Yes, Juliette, poor child of passion and impulse, it shall 
henceforth be my care to guard you from your own impetuosity, as from all other 
dangers” (264). Unlike Hester who would have happily accepted the criticism and role of 
a child, Juliette is furious. From this moment forward she actively seeks Dent’s political 
ruin and achieves it by disregarding every social rule for a woman and living as she 
pleases, even at the cost of her own life. When juxtaposed with Hester’s willing 
submission, Juliette’s willingness to fight against the restrictions governing women’s 
relationships to their husbands and the state gives female readers the ability to perhaps 
see themselves somewhere between the two extremes of the “angel in the house” and the 
“savage in the house.” 
 That both Hester and Juliette are brought to ruin by the same man despite their 
different approaches also raises questions about the true heroine of the novel. At different 
	   	   	  
 
	   183	  
points in the novel each woman might meet the description of the heroine offered by 
Southworth in the novel’s introduction. And this is precisely the point. Both women have 
in the midst of their souls “a tiny sapling, that, as it grew, cleared and charred a wide 
space around it; sweet shrubs withered, bright flowers faded unblown, and fruit fell 
unripe and blighted…and the name of the Upas in her soul was Vanity” (20). Though 
titled Vanity, this sapling might also be named Ernest Dent. He is after all the source of 
Hester’s pride and the person that most encourages Juliette’s pride in her powerful 
beauty.  It is their association with him and belief that he can offer them what they need 
that ultimately brings about their tragic deaths.  Women, whether submissive or 
rebellious, are at the mercy of a patriarchal system that, like Dent, proves absolutely 
incapable of the emotion, introspection, or moral rectitude required of one who seeks to 
represent others. Thus, when the ideas of savagery and civilization that marked the debate 
over Indian Removal are domesticated, they not only call into question the grounds upon 
which the nation is built, but the systems that would, generation after generation, recreate 
the violence and unlawful taking of property in the name of Christianity or benevolence.  
 
 
 Mesmerized Maidens 
 If Southworth aligns liminal figures (women and Indians) in the American legal 
and social system to ultimately comment on the relationships that form the foundations of 
“America,” then Hawthorne likewise uses liminal characters (women and the Maules) to 
serve as the figures through which the foundations of the nation are tested. For 
Hawthorne, women become the medium through which he explores ideas of history, race, 
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and class. This begins with their ability to see beyond the public image to the true nature 
and intentions of a man. The narrator declares that in order to understand the true nature 
of a man “[i]t is often instructive to take the woman’s, the private, domestic view, of a 
public man; nor can anything be more curious than the vast discrepancy between portraits 
intended for engraving and the pencil sketches that pass from hand to hand, behind the 
original’s back” (122). This turn to the domestic, to the woman’s view of the public man, 
also allows the narrator to comment on the internal violence of the Pyncheon family and 
the nation in a new way. He explains that Colonel Pyncheon, “an autocrat in his own 
household, had worn out three wives, and, merely by the remorseless weight and 
hardness of his character in the conjugal relation, had sent them, one after another, 
broken hearted, to their graves” (123). Judge Pyncheon “had wedded but a single wife, 
and lost her in the third or fourth year of their marriage. There was a fable, however—for 
such we choose to consider it, though, not impossibly, typical of Judge Pyncheon’s 
marital deportment—that the lady got her death-blow in the honey-moon, and never 
smiled again, because her husband compelled her to serve him with coffee, every 
morning, at his bedside, in token of fealty to her liege-lord and master” (123). The 
description of the Pyncheon women as “worn out” and heartbroken by the mistreatment 
of their husbands/liege/master, echoes the legal relationships imagined for women in 
marriage and the potentially horrifying outcomes women experienced and argued against 
in the nineteenth century.  Moreover, centering the true savagery in the home and, more 
specifically, in the relationships between men and women, places women squarely in the 
middle of the Pyncheon and Maule feud.  
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 As individuals who can read the true nature of the public man by stripping away 
physical and social trappings to reveal the spirit or soul of man but have limited tools of 
resistance, women become the medium through which generations of Pyncheon and 
Maule men show their power and attempt to gain wealth and revenge. This is most 
clearly demonstrated through the strange possession of Alice Pyncheon and the marriage 
of Phoebe and Holgrave. In both cases, Pyncheon women find themselves inextricably 
intertwined with Maule men by a connection rooted in the very seat of their emotions and 
character.   The lovely, proud Alice becomes a pawn in the family’s ancient feud when 
her father, Gervayse Pyncheon seeks to uncover the location of the Indian deed. Gervayse 
Pyncheon is already a wealthy man when he seeks the deed, for he “married a lady of 
fortune” in England (190). However, this fortune “gives symptoms of exhaustion,” so he 
would like to extend his empire to include the ever-elusive eastern claim. In actively 
seeking the Indian deed, Mr. Pyncheon demonstrates an “unconditional commitment to 
‘symbolic’ wealth, the value of ‘paper’ [that]…aligns his “Old World” lineage with the 
cutting edge of ‘New World’ economics” and turns his daughter into a currency to be 
exchanged (Dolis 42). Convinced that the young Matthew Maule (grandson of the 
original Maule) might be able to reveal the secret of the deed’s whereabouts, Mr. 
Pyncheon summons that proud man to his home.  The initial exchange between the two 
indicates the different grounds upon which they see themselves and their intertwined 
past. The tension between the two men has been read as representing both class and racial 
differences. In “Haunted Houses” Shelley Streeby argues that the exchange between Mr. 
Pyncheon and Maule is about class boundaries, while Kristin Herzog contends that the 
Maule’s represent a “primitive” people with a “demonic power that becomes destructive 
	   	   	  
 
	   186	  
only when they are repressed and deprived of their rights” (26). I would argue that both 
are at play here. As a removed person, Maule certainly represents the natives who once 
inhabited the land, and such a designation also makes him of a lower social class as much 
as his role as a tradesman does.  This combination of class and race makes Maule a threat 
in both his rightful claim to The House of the Seven Gables and his “primitive” 
mesmerism and powerful sexuality. 
  By way of trying to pinpoint Matthew Maule’s lineage Mr. Pyncheon, who has 
already been surprised by Maule’s disregard for social norms, casually asks if he is the 
grandson of the man who built the house. Matthew Maule responds that he is not only the 
son of the carpenter who built the home but “the grandson of the rightful proprietor of the 
soil” (194). Gervayse senses the anger in Matthew Maule and attempts to assuage it by 
presenting the feud between the families in legal terms. 
I am well aware that my grandfather was compelled to resort to a suit at law, in 
order to establish his claim to the foundation-site of this edifice. We will not, if 
you please, renew the discussion. The matter was settled at the time, and by the 
competent authorities— equitably, it is to be presumed—and, at all events, 
irrevocably. (194) 
Mr. Pyncheon attempts to turn what he knows is a blood feud and long record of violence 
into seemingly simple legal matter. Likewise, he frames his obsession with discovering 
the Indian deed as nothing more than the completion of a legal process begun long ago by 
his grandfather. Yet, Mr. Pyncheon seems incapable of believing or fully ascribing this 
view to the past or present.  “Popular belief,” “fire-side talk,” and even Mr. Pyncheon’s 
own memory of the day his grandfather died connect the Maule family to the 
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disappearance of the deed.  In fact, the popular belief that the original Pyncheon traded 
away his vast eastern claim for the site of The House of the Seven Gables and the rumors 
that “miles and miles of the Pyncheon lands had been shoveled into Maule’s grave” are 
so powerful that lawyers searching for the will order the exhumation of the original 
Matthew Maule (196).  The two men find themselves inextricably locked in the same 
battle as that played out by their grandfathers. Cursed to be forever linked by the past and 
the missing deed, the two men barter for land. In exchange for helping Mr. Pyncheon 
locate the deed for the eastern claim, the young Matthew Maule demands The House of 
the Seven Gables. Having no personal attachment to or fondness for the mansion, Mr. 
Pyncheon agrees to the deal. However, the matter is complicated when Matthew Maule 
demands an audience with Alice Pyncheon. 
 While Mr. Pyncheon seems fine with the deal to exchange his ancestral home for 
the Indian deed, he is startled and hesitant to grant Matthew Maule an audience with his 
daughter. Perhaps recalling the “talk among the neighbors, particularly the petticoated 
ones, about what they called the witchcraft of Maule’s eye,” Mr. Pyncheon wonders at 
Maule’s intentions. However, he eventually ceases protesting when Maule tells him that 
“the only chance of acquiring the requisite knowledge was through the clear, crystal 
medium of a pure and virgin intelligence, like that of fair Alice” (200). With sexualized 
descriptions of her “virgin intelligence,” “unsullied purity,” “preservative force of 
womanhood” (203) and impenetrable sphere, Alice becomes the virginal sacrifice to her 
father’s greed and Maule’s vengeance, which takes the form of a “quasi-sexual 
transgression” (Streeby 463). Little expecting what is to come, Mr. Pyncheon sells his 
daughter, body and spirit, to Matthew Maule for the mere promise of future reward.  To 
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persuade Alice to participate, and perhaps to satisfy his own conscience, Mr. Pyncheon 
tells her that the importance of the document “renders it advisable to neglect no possible, 
even if improbable, method of regaining it” (202). He further assures her that he “shall 
remain in the room” to ensure she receives “no rude nor unbecoming deportment on the 
young man’s part” and that “the investigation, or whatever we may call it, shall 
immediately be broken off” if she does (202). Pyncheon’s assurances earn a 
condescending sneer from Matthew Maule, who mocks him by stating that Alice “’will 
no doubt feel herself quite safe in her father’s presence, and under his all-sufficient 
protection’” (202). Maule’s sarcasm points to his ill intentions and the insufficiency of 
Pyncheon’s ability to play the role he describes. He is a bad father who cannot perform 
the primary function of protecting his daughter. Instead he gives her over to the control of 
his enemy and, like his grandfather before him, trades a human soul for the promise of 
riches. The transaction with its exchange of a piece of land for the life of a daughter 
evokes not just the transaction between the first Pyncheon and Maule, but it also mimics 
the property exchange and sexual relationships that marked the marriage process for 
many nineteenth century women—but with one difference. Alice Pyncheon was to be, 
not legally or physically, but spiritually betrothed to a darkened, native figure, meaning 
her soul, her psyche were his to control. 
  Mr. Pyncheon’s musings as Maule begins his mesmerism reinforce the marital 
nature of this arrangement as well as its imperialistic overtones. He rationalizes his 
acquiesce by claiming his actions were, after all, more for Alice than himself because the 
discovery of the Indian deed would allow him to give her a dowry that might enable her 
to “wed an English duke, or a German reigning-prince, instead of some New England 
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clergyman or lawyer” (204).  Mr. Pyncheon’s reference to marriage as social mobility for 
Alice is also another indicator of his own social climbing and pursuit of wealth.  By 
claiming Indian lands and expanding his own empire, Pyncheon imagines he can marry 
Alice to European nobility, which means he too advances and might “purchase that 
elevated dignity from the British monarch. Lord Pyncheon!—or the Earl of Waldo!” 
(199). The currency with which Mr. Pyncheon plans to “purchase” this title is unclear, for 
it might refer to the property gained by discovering the deed or the status he might gain 
by trading his daughter in marriage. At this moment, the two are interchangeable because 
both require him to sacrifice Alice. Maule himself makes this point when Mr. Pyncheon, 
realizing he has underestimated Maule’s power and overestimated Alice’s ability to stand 
against evil, demands Maule returns her lest he follow the same fate as his grandfather.  
Cutting Mr. Pyncheon to the core, Maule asks “[i]s it my crime, if you have sold your 
daughter for the mere hope of getting a sheet of yellow parchment into your clutch?” 
(206).  
 Mr. Pyncheon’s willingness to trade Alice for land has engaged her in a spiritual 
marriage with Matthew Maule who declares her his “by the right of the strongest spirit” 
(206). When Alice and Matthew Maule first meet she is “struck with admiration—which 
she made no attempt to conceal—of the remarkable comeliness, strength, and energy of 
Maule’s figure” (201). Maule however lacks a woman’s ability to accurately read a 
person’s true spirit and misinterprets the admiring look. He reads it as another 
manifestation of the haughty pride of the Pyncheons. Incensed, he sets out to humble 
Alice by making her bend to his will. Alice complies with his directions assured of her 
own strength and “high, unsullied purity, and the preservative force of womanhood—that 
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could make her sphere impenetrable, unless betrayed by treachery within” (203).  Armed 
with all of the trappings of true womanhood, which she has been told by society will 
protect her from evil, Alice attempts to match Matthew Maule’s strength of spirit. When 
she fails, the implication is that her womanhood could not protect her because there was 
something in her own character that betrayed her.  Perhaps it was her attraction to Maule, 
her fault of pride, or the inability of purity to overcome vengeance; regardless, she is 
punished.  But it is the medium of the punishment that is more perplexing than the fault 
that lets Maule in, for as much as Matthew Maule is in control of Alice, she too affects 
him.  
 Maule’s ability to mesmerize Alice hinges on a connection that requires, not just a 
control of her spirit, but also a merging of hers with his. Nineteenth century manuals on 
mesmerism variously described the connection between mesmerized and mesmerist as 
“between mind and mind,” or in more feminist approaches, between spirits, which were 
seen as functioning independently of the body (Beam 86, 91). The idea of mesmerism as 
between two spirits offers a way for women to leave behind their bodies, their spheres, 
and find a new way to relate to the world. Yet this connection is mediated by a man, 
which complicates the outcome by reinforcing the gendered power structure of marriage. 
When Maule releases Alice from her initial trance, she seems connected to him in a new 
way that retains very little of the misread pride of their first encounter. Looking on his 
face for the second time she exhibits a “gentle dignity” (208).  By controlling her spirit, 
Maule makes Alice his “slave, in a bondage more humiliating, a thousand-fold than that 
which binds its chains around the body” (208). From the comfort of his own home, 
Maule could control Alice’s emotions and actions and did so for his own amusement and 
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pride. However, it is clearly pointed out that his intentions were not entirely evil. Rather 
“[i]t seemed to be Maule’s impulse, not to ruin Alice, nor to visit her with any black or 
gigantic mischief, which would have crowned her sorrow with the grace of tragedy, but 
to wreak a low, ungenerous scorn upon her” (209).  In controlling Alice’s spirit he hopes 
to bring it more in line with his own, and give her a new way of relating to the world by 
making her experience the position of a Maule.  This spiritual and implied sexual 
connection between the two is important for understanding the circumstances under 
which Alice is released from his grasp and the role marriage plays in both her possession 
and death.   
 If it was her father’s supposed desire to marry her well that placed her in the 
power of Maule, it is another marriage that releases her. On the night Matthew Maule is 
to be married to the daughter of a local laborer, he calls forth Alice. Dressed in a 
“gossamer white dress and satin slippers” that evoke images of a bride coming to her 
intended, Alice arrives at the laborer’s house to wait upon the bride.  This act of 
demanding the diminished Alice wait on his bride makes her the fallen woman, the 
mistress. She is joined to Maul spiritually, and perhaps sexually, but is not to be legally. 
Therefore, when Maule is married and “the twain were one,” Alice awakes from her 
“enchanted sleep” (209).  Maule’s marriage means that he is now joined with another and 
can therefore no longer be wedded to Alice. Ironically, this separation leaves Alice “all 
steeped in sadness” and also powerfully impacts Matthew Maule.  When Alice Pyncheon 
dies days later from taking cold after her walk home on the night of Matthew Maule’s 
marriage, no one mourns her death more than he who caused it. On the day of her funeral 
the newlywed Matthew Maule walks at the end of the procession “gnashing his teeth, as 
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if he would have bitten his own heart in twain; the darkest and woefullest man that ever 
walked behind a corpse” (210). Maule’s sorrow comes from a miscalculation: “He meant 
to humble Alice, not to kill her—but he had taken a woman’s delicate soul into his rude 
gripe to play with; -- and she was dead!” (210). Not only is this the first direct mention of 
the heart instead of a more general spirit, but his willingness to split his own heart for 
Alice recalls the language of his marriage ceremony.  Maule would break his marriage 
and give part of his heart to Alice to regain her and atone for his actions. In the end 
Maule seemed to love Alice because, in many ways, she was his other half. Sadly 
misused by both the man who controls her spirit and the father whose job it was to 
protect her, Alice comes to literally embody the feud between the Pyncheons and the 
Maules. With her spirit split into two pieces, Alice becomes the specter that haunts The 
House of the Seven Gables. 
  The two halves of Alice’s soul are seemingly rejoined with the marriage of 
Phoebe Pyncheon and Holgrave Maule. The relationship between the good, industrious 
Phoebe and mystic Holgrave is offered up as a satisfactory close to generations of 
animosity, but it too is haunted by a past that must be overcome. As a descendent of the 
original Maule, Holgrave has inherited two things, the power of mesmerism and 
knowledge of the whereabouts of the Indian deed. Phoebe on the other hand has inherited 
little of the Pyncheon pride that so doomed Alice. She is cheerful, simple, and capable of 
some household magic that transforms those people and spaces around her. In a scene 
that literarily and metaphorically recalls the interactions of Matthew Maule and Alice 
Pyncheon, Holgrave tells the story of Alice’s mesmerism and finds that in his efforts to 
bring the tale alive with dramatic hand gestures he has inadvertently begun to mesmerize 
	   	   	  
 
	   193	  
Phoebe. In what is perhaps the clearest description of how the mesmerism works and its 
dangerous effects, the narrator explains that “[a] veil was beginning to be muffled about 
her, in which she could only behold him, and live only in his thoughts and emotions” 
(211). Like his ancestor, Holgrave’s “glance as he fastened it on the young girl, grew 
involuntarily more concentrated; in his attitude, there was the consciousness of power” 
(211). It is the exercise of this power, not maliciousness that Matthew Maule gave in to 
and that Holgrave must resist if he does not want Phoebe to meet the same end as Alice. 
The choice not to proceed with mesmerizing Phoebe is not easy because “there is no 
temptation so great as the opportunity of acquiring empire over the human spirit; nor any 
idea more seductive to a young man, than to become the arbiter of a young girl’s destiny” 
(212). Yet, Holgrave resists due to his “reverence for another’s individuality.”  His 
respect for Phoebe’s individuality is important because “Holgrave becomes a ‘mature 
man’ and exorcises the ghosts of the past only when he learns to respect the sanctity of 
Phoebe Pyncheon’s ‘sphere’” (Streeby 463). In recognizing Phoebe’s individuality, 
Holgrave has learned to set aside the past.  
 The change rendered to Holgrave’s usually dark view of the world by his 
newfound maturity is sudden and surprising. He sees the world anew and finds in the 
decay and mold of The House of the Seven Gables a type of beauty that, if he could 
preserve it, would turn the piece of property over which Maules and Pyncheons have died 
into “a bower in Eden” (214).  Phoebe however responds to his newfound maturity and 
love by saying, ‘“I have been happier than I am now—at least much gayer.” Eventually, 
she does admit that there is something in the moonlight that night that she has never felt 
before.  Yet she fails to meet Holgrave’s excitement or understand his meaning. Instead 
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she explains that “life does not look the same” and that she “shall never be so merry as 
before [she] knew Cousin Hepzibah and poor Cousin Clifford” because she has “given 
them [her] sunshine” (214). The reversals in attitude exhibited by Holgrave and Phoebe 
after her near mesmerism hint at the toll the house has taken on her and the existence of a 
new spiritual connection. Like Alice and Matthew Maule, Holgrave’s and Phoebe’s 
spirits have become intertwined and the impact on each varies. Holgrave has new feeling 
of youthfulness and love while Phoebe recognizes only the loss of her own cheerfulness 
and a feeling of being used up by those around her. Holgrave explains this away by 
saying that “[t]his bemoaning of one’s self (as you do now) over the first, careless, 
shallow gaiety of youth departed, and this profound happiness at youth regained—so 
much deeper and richer than that we lost—are essential to the soul’s development. In 
some cases, the two states come almost simultaneously, and mingle the sadness and the 
rapture in one mysterious emotion” (215). Whether or not Holgrave is correct or the 
“mysterious emotion” to which he refers is love, what is clear is that, in this moment, 
Holgrave and Phoebe each represent one element of this process. Only together can they 
produce the greater emotion. However, the potential of their union cannot be realized 
while Judge Pyncheon is still alive, for if the two are really to be united and in so doing 
end the curse, the Indian deed must be taken out of play. 
 Surprisingly, it is Hepzibah who brings the search for the Indian deed to an end by 
bringing on an attack of the Maule curse. Hepzibah’s power to do this lies in her subtle 
alignment with the Maule’s. Despite her unreasonable pride in the Pyncheon’s 
aristocratic past, haughtiness, and unwillingness or inability to perform basic domestic 
tasks she deems beneath her, Nina Baym points out that throughout the novel Hepzibah 
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becomes increasingly aligned with the Maule’s. She becomes the “savage in the house.” 
Destitute, she opens a cent shop and enters into the realm of what Streeby would term a 
working-class existence and Herzog would declare an ‘“ethnic’ life” (26). Hepzibah also 
rents a room to Holgrave; therefore, “she has let him into her space (or, allegorically 
speaking, he has sprung up in her space) (Baym 613). In doing so, Hepzibah becomes 
“marble and mud” in that she combines the aristocratic pride of Alice Pyncheon but 
tempers it with Maule-like tendencies (Hawthorne 41). It is this combination that gives 
her the ability to reshape the roles of women in the house and the defiance to stand up to 
Judge Jaffrey Pyncheon.  
 As the newest incarnation of the autocratic Colonel Pyncheon, Judge Pyncheon 
combines the single-minded focus of his ancestor with the cover provided by a 
government position that allows him to mete out justice according to his own 
predilection. The Judge’s ability to feed his private greed and to do so with the blessing 
of the public, hinges upon creating for himself the persona of a benevolent man. As the 
narrator explains, men like Judge Pyncheon “possess vast ability in grasping, and 
arranging, and appropriating to themselves, the big, heavy, solid unrealities such as gold, 
landed estate, offices of trust and emolument, and public honors. With these materials, 
and with deeds of goodly aspect, done in the public eye, an individual of this class builds 
up, as it were, a tall and stately edifice, which, in view of other people and ultimately in 
his own view, is no other than that man’s character, or the man himself” (229). It is not 
the Judge’s merit or dedication to justice that have made him the man he is but his 
grasping at wealth and the willingness of the public to forgive and perhaps even praise 
such actions when they are accompanied by the perfunctory practice of so-called good 
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deeds. The problem for Judge Pyncheon is that in his interactions with Hepzibah he is not 
dealing with the public. He must face a woman who knows his true nature and is 
therefore able to undermine the foundation of the “tall and stately edifice.” 
 When Judge Pyncheon pushes his way past Hepzibah and into the house to 
demand an audience with Clifford, he uses his supposed acts benevolence to Clifford to 
justify his presence. Hepzibah is unconvinced. She assures him that Clifford knows 
nothing of the deed and that there is no reasonable motivation for his keeping it secret for 
this long. It is then that the Judge reveals the truth of Clifford’s release. It was not 
benevolence or “public justice and the welfare of society” (227) that motivated the Judge 
to release the man whom he had imprisoned. It was greed.  While Clifford was in jail he 
had no incentive to reveal information that would contribute to Judge Pyncheon’s 
financial and social prosperity. By releasing him, Judge Pyncheon hopes to extract from 
Clifford the information he desires through the threat of psychological violence. If 
Clifford does not offer up the Indian deed, Judge Pyncheon will have him imprisoned by 
declaring him insane and a threat to public safety. The evidence the Judge will use is his 
own conviction that Clifford’s refusal to give him the information he desires stems “from 
mere malice, and hatred of one whose interests ought naturally be dear to him” and not 
honoring these bonds is insanity. In this moment Judge Pyncheon, despite his best 
attempts to feign kindness, shows himself to be an “iron man” so like Colonel Pyncheon 
that Hepzibah “almost adopt[s] the insane belief, that it was her old Puritan ancestor, and 
not the modern Judge,” (232) she faced. Therefore Hepzibah vents upon him her anger 
for the present and the past.  
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 In a speech that attacks his humanity, vanity, and greed, Hepzibah delivers a 
scathing indictment of Judge Pyncheon and the private vice he represents. She begins by 
outlining his cardinal sin, which is to forget “that a woman was your mother!—that you 
have had sisters, brothers, children of your own!—or that there was affection between 
man and man, or pity from one man to another, in this miserable world!” (236). By 
moving from a very specific relationship with a woman to a more generalized idea of 
emotion between fellow men, Hepzibah’s rebuke of his actions links to questions of 
women’s rights. He has forgotten the women, and his inability to remember this most 
intimate and pure of familial relationships leads to a general breakdown in his ability to 
justly treat others. Without these human connections, his efforts to constantly expand his 
empire fail to benefit anyone, and his violence becomes pointless. After all, he has 
disowned his only son and sent his wife to the grave. The only legacy he can leave is to 
pass on to another generation a commitment to violence and senseless destruction in 
pursuit of wealth. With mournfulness Hepzibah closes her case against him: “Alas, 
Cousin Jaffrey, this hard and grasping spirit has run in our blood, these two hundred 
years! You are but doing over again, in another shape, what your ancestor before you did, 
and sending down to your posterity the curse inherited from him!” (237). Hepzibah’s 
giving voice to the curse combined with her willingness to defy him by exposing his true 
nature brings on a deadly attack of Maule’s curse that kills Judge Pyncheon. Like Juliette 
in Retribution, Hepzibah draws upon her status as the untamed woman to shift gender 
roles and clears the way for a new future. 
 In the end, the pursuit of wealth and public acclaim sought by Colonel Dent and 
the Pyncheons is all for naught. Dent is left a broken man and his wives are dead because 
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his vanity does not allow him to conceive of any relationship that would recognize a 
woman as his equal. Mr. Pyncheon loses his daughter to his greed, and Judge Pyncheon 
loses his life. And instead of building legacies and homes that would last for many 
generations, these men confirm the shakiness of their own foundations and prove their 
own lack of fitness to govern. Thus, when forced to live with the consequences of a past 
that includes Indian Removal the nation/family home proves incapable of surviving 
intact. It must be rethought and relocated both geographically and theoretically. 
 
III. Revisions and Removals 
 Both Retribution and The House of the Seven Gables end seemingly happily with 
marriages and removals. The modern generation seems to have thrown off the burden of 
the past by revising their roles with each other and within society. However, the extent to 
which either cast of characters truly breaks with the past to provide a new vision of the 
nation is ambiguous at best. Though largely neglected by her father in her early years, 
Julie Dent, with the benefit of Marcus Derby as her advocate, grows into a woman who 
combines the piety of her mother with the strength of will of her namesake Juliette. Thus 
Julie Dent does what her father was incapable of doing and fulfills her mother’s dying 
wishes by freeing her slaves, even when doing so causes a loss of fortune and a fiancé.  
When Julie decides to free her slaves, the change in fortune it will precipitate causes her 
suitor, Henry Bland, to abandon her. Confronted with the evidence of Henry’s 
abandonment, Julie responds with a willingness to have her personal life martyred for the 
cause: “Jesus was crucified. ‘Even so, Father, for it seemed good in thy sight’” (303).  
Her willingness to suffer for others does what nothing else in the novel has; it teaches 
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Ernest Dent how to truly love. Instead of chastising her for her show of emotion Ernest 
Dent looks upon his child “with a growing love” and “in a glow of enthusiasm…open[s] 
his arms to her” (303). He provides to the child the comfort and protection he refused the 
mother and in doing so finally becomes the advocate for women he was always supposed 
to be as a father, husband and representative.  With the support of her father, Julie 
emancipates the slaves and sells the plantation. The curse of The Vale is broken, and 
Julie and Dent are able to start over. In the west, Dent reinvents himself as what readers 
must assume is a more benevolent politician, and Julie marries a Congressman and gives 
birth to the next Hester Grey who might inherit her property from her mother without also 
inheriting violence and betrayal. 
  For the inhabitants of The House of the Seven Gables, the curse is broken by a 
marriage in which both parties significantly revise the past. Not only does Holgrave resist 
mesmerizing Phoebe, he learns to recognize her strength and respect her “sphere” by 
correctly reading her character. Holgrave says to Phoebe, “[i]f I read your character 
rightly…gentle as you are, and seeming to have your sphere among common things, you 
yet possess remarkable strength. You have wonderful poise, and a faculty which, when 
tested, will prove itself capable of dealing with matters that fall far out of the ordinary 
rule” (301). According to Streeby, “Phoebe’s ‘poise’—her ability to balance and 
reconcile opposites—is the most powerful force in this novel for it allows her to tame 
wild artisans and thereby to exorcise the specter of class conflict” (464). In bringing 
together the Pyncheon and Maule families, Phoebe also manages to reconfigure the 
Maule’s racialized status by sharing her “sunshine” with Holgrave and giving him a 
home and permanence. Her down-to-earth approach to the world brings to The House of 
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the Seven Gables “the old ethnic Maule element as it lived…before being deprived of its 
place and its natural rights” but adds to it the beauty and refinement of a 
Pyncheon(Herzog 25). More importantly Phoebe’s ability to, as a woman, determine the 
private nature or spirit of a man gives her the ability to match Holgrave’s “strength of 
spirit” and ensure that marriage is offered on equal terms. Phoebe and Holgrave are two 
pieces of the whole, and when joined, they manage to release Alice’s ghost and the hold 
of the house on the two families. Most importantly, Phoebe’s marriage to Holgrave 
initiates a property exchange. Not only does Holgrave finally reveal the location of the 
crumbled, irrelevant Indian deed, but the Judge dies with no heir. So, “[b]y this 
misfortune, Clifford became rich; so did Hepzibah; so did out little village-maiden, and 
through her, that sworn foe of wealth and all manner of conservatism—the wild 
reformer—Holgrave!” (313). If women had been used in the past by Pyncheons and 
Maules to perpetuate the feud, then in this instance, they become part of the resolution. 
With The House of the Seven Gables once again within the control of a Maule, the well 
runs clear, Alice’s posies bloom, and the descendants of the two families can leave 
behind the past and the house.  
 By revising their intimate relationships and the relationship of individuals to 
property, both casts of characters remove the curses that had long governed the 
inhabitants of the familial homes. However, the homes are uninhabitable precisely 
because the family dynamics have changed.  With the transfer of property that ends the 
novels, everyone enters into liminal status because of the way access to property has be 
re-gendered. In Retribution, Dent has finds himself financially bankrupt, politically 
ruined and without access to property because The Vale and the slaves have been left to 
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his daughter in a trust. Similarly, Clifford and Holgrave find themselves unable to 
directly control property—Clifford because of his mental health and Holgrave because 
any money he might acquire from his marriage to Phoebe is not immediately accessible. 
For the moment the men have become the dependents who have no property. Thus the 
families are feminized.  Therefore, the sale or abandonment of The Vale and The House 
of the Seven Gables is not a choice; it is a necessity because their inability to fit into the 
patriarchal structures embodied in their ancestral homes, means that they will not be able 
to survive where they are socially and perhaps economically. More importantly the 
relationships they have established cannot remain intact because such relationships are 
dependent upon mutual affection, not the ability to gain property or status. So, they 
remove themselves to spaces beyond the bounds of their civilized pasts.  
For both families, removal offers a chance to start anew with homes based on 
their reconfigured relationships. By making property the domain of women, it is the men 
who are changed. Women retain their roles as daughters, wives and mothers, but the men 
now have a new appreciation for them.  In Retribution the co-creation of a new, 
multigenerational home using Julie’s money and Dent’s political prowess as a truly 
benevolent representative allows the family to thrive and produce a new generation of 
women—a fact that is praised not lamented. The House of the Seven Gables also enacts a 
revision of the structure of the home/nation by placing liminal characters in the home of a 
government representative so that it can be transformed into a representation of 
inclusiveness. For Holgrave, who previously had no clear attachment to people or a fixed 
sense of home as belonging, this change causes him to find home and permanence 
appealing. He comes to wonder why the Judge “should not have felt the propriety of 
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embodying so excellent a piece of domestic architecture in stone, rather than wood” 
(314). The changes made by the men in the novels seem to reflect a successful revision of 
the domestic ideal and by extension the nation. 
 However, as Dent’s return to politics and Holgrave’s reasons for selecting stone 
rather than wood reveal, the permanence of these new models is questionable. Holgrave 
declares stone a superior choice for a piece of “domestic architecture” because “[t]hen, 
every generation of the family might have altered the interior, to suit its own taste and 
convenience; while the exterior, through the lapse of years, might have been adding 
venerableness to its original beauty, thus giving that impression of permanence” (314-
15). Both families might rearrange their internal relationships, but it would do little to 
impact the outside structures. They can only revise domesticity’s function in their own 
space. So, even though removing west allows the Dents to overcome political and 
financial ruin and gives the Maule/Pyncheon household the economic and social security 
needed to move into the middle class, the fact that both are dependent upon reconfiguring 
the role of women calls into question the extent to which they offer feasible models for 
the nation.    
 In drawing upon ideas of the west and removals Southworth and Hawthorne 
seemingly admit to the limitations of their own models. This comes, in large part, 
because the rhetoric of Indian Removal and westward expansion both draw upon the idea 
of the west or the country as a blank space. Yet constructing the west as an empty space 
relies upon its inclusion in the domestic space of the United States.  If the conferral of 
national identity equates to personhood and personhood in the US is dependent upon the 
right to own property, then domesticity with its gendered and racialized property rights, 
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theoretically opens the west to white expansion and empties it of Indians by stripping 
them of their legal personhood and land. Only if the west is already contained in the 
domestic can it be empty. This theoretical emptiness is what allows proponents of Indian 
Removal to make the claim that in the west the Cherokee and other tribes might be 
protected from civilization while simultaneously promoting white migration. Therefore, 
the west becomes a sanctioned space for the spread of civilization. Certainly, the 
government did not expect the Cherokee and other tribes to move west and revert to 
matriarchal societies that practiced communal property rights. It expected and, through 
the use of treaties, guaranteed that that nations established in the west would follow the 
structures of white, patriarchal society. While the west theoretically offers the new 
possibilities for those with liminal status, it is still constrained and circumscribed by ideas 
of the domestic, which means it likewise carries the past into the new territory.   
 In both Retribution and The House of the Seven Gables, the fact that the homes 
are always within the conscribed boundaries of the domestic US territory, means that they 
are forever tied to the past and past models of domesticity. Therefore, while the families 
can repair the relationships between whites within their home by selling slaves or ending 
blood feuds, they cannot completely repay the original debt to the Indians whose land 
they took or remove themselves from the process of economic and social exploitation it 
represents. Julie ends slavery on The Vale, but this does not erase racialized violence 
from her relationships. The money she gains from the sale of the land, though meager, is 
still the product of the violent removal of the Wicomicoe tribe. Likewise, though 
Phoebe’s marriage to Holgrave transfers The House of the Seven Gables back to a Maule 
and reunites the two parts of Alice Pyncheon’s soul, it does not settle the problem of the 
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Indian deed. Even though the deed “has long been worthless” to the Pyncheons, the 
“ancient deed, signed with the hieroglyphics of several Indian sagamores” still remains as 
a reminder that the land was taken from Indians, and for nineteenth century readers this 
evokes the past of Indian Removal. The inability to erase the original debt and the 
gendered violence it precipitated means that, despite changes to their own homes, the 
women of the novels still find themselves in precarious situations. Julie, though married 
to a prominent senator, does not appear to have sons. Her daughter, Hester bears the 
name of her timid grandmother, which begs the question of whether she will have the 
ability to stand on her own. Phoebe though involved in what is assumed to be a 
companionate marriage, has remains a means for a Maule to garner wealth and perhaps 
revenge for his ancestors and enact in reverse the removal perpetrated by generations of 
Pyncheons. Neither woman has any guarantee that her husband will not misuse her and/or 
her property. In short, each woman still finds herself in a relationship “marked by 
peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else” (Marshall). This is the 
problem with being always already contained in the domestic. It becomes a space, a 
boundary that limits identity. Female identity becomes equated with a particular space, or 
piece of theoretical property in the same way that Cherokee identity becomes equated 
with living inside a particular geographic boundary. In the 1850s neither group moves 
beyond their liminal position because these spaces never fully confer on them the rights 
of personhood in a nation.  
Copyright © Jesslyn R. Collins-Frohlich 2014 
205	  
Chapter Five:Conclusion 
The completion of this project comes at a moment in the relationship between the 
Cherokee Nation and the United States government when the very questions of 
sovereignty, cultural and racial identity, and property that marked the nineteenth century 
debate over Indian Removal are once again being debated. On April 24, 2014 Judge 
Thomas F. Hogan of the United States District Court in Washington D.C. heard oral 
arguments in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Nash et. al, the newest lawsuit to address 
what is a decades long fight between the Cherokee, the Freedmen and the Department of 
the Interior about the sovereign right of the Cherokee Nation to determine its own 
membership.  The Nash case seeks to settle the debate over a 2007 amendment to the 
Cherokee constitution that stripped an estimated 28,000 Freedmen of their tribal 
citizenship and rights by requiring proof of blood lineality, meaning that in order to be 
granted Cherokee citizenship an individual must prove the presence of an ancestor listed 
as Cherokee “by blood” on the Dawes Rolls—a set of rosters that listed everyone residing 
in Cherokee territory in the 1890s as Cherokee “By Blood”  “Intermarriage” or 
“Freedmen” in order to determine who received allotments of land.48  Ostensibly, the 
case is about testing the legality of the 2007 amendment using the 1866 treaty, which 
declared all Freedmen “and their descendants, shall have all the rights of native 
Cherokees” (944).  However, by evoking the 1866 treaty and the Dawes Rolls, the debate 
puts into conversation two foundational pieces of modern Indian policy in order to 
present a public debate about the relationship between rights, race, gender, property and 
Indian sovereignty. If the 1866 treaty embodies the problematic outcomes of the Indian 
48	  Passed in 1887, the Dawes Act used allotment to make land available for whites by forcing the Five 
Civilized Tribes to abandon communal property ownership practices. As a result of the Dawes Act Native 
Americans lost approximately 90 million acres of land or 2/3 of its 1887 land base. 
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Removal debate, then the Cherokee v. Nash case demonstrates the legacy of Indian 
Removal in the twenty-first century.  
Using a close reading of the 1866 treaty as the basis of their arguments, the 
Freedmen contend that the 2007 amendment is illegal because it violates Article 9 of the 
1866 treaty, which they argue plainly gave Freedmen the “rights of native Cherokees” in 
perpetuity.  As proof that their interpretation is correct, the Freedmen use historical 
interactions between the Cherokee Nation and the federal government to determine how 
the crucial phrase “all the rights of native Cherokees” was understood at the time the 
treaty was signed. According to the Freedmen, not only was the phrase understood to 
confer all rights, including property rights, but also the Cherokee and the federal 
government understood that such rights would be inheritable by all generations of 
Freedmen (Freedmen’s Reply 5-7, 9). Perhaps most important to their argument is the 
claim that under Article 12 of the treaty the amendment is illegal because it violates the 
mandate that “[n]o law shall be enacted inconsistent with the Constitution of the United 
States or laws of Congress, or existing treaty stipulations with the United States”  (944). 
In short, the Freedmen maintain that ultimate authority over this case rests with the 
United States government because its laws may supersede those of the Cherokee Nation, 
and its role as arbiter of treaties gives it the right to decide this case. 
For their part, the Cherokee argue the 2007 amendment was legal by creating a 
narrative of Cherokee legal history that emphasizes the issue of sovereignty. The 
Cherokee claim that the 1866 treaty expressed an agreement between the Cherokee 
Nation and the U.S. that rights would be granted, but it was the Cherokee constitution, 
not the treaty, that actually bestowed these rights and continues to determine what rights 
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are available to native Cherokee and by extension the Freedmen.  As such “all the rights 
of native Cherokee,” includes the obligation to live by the terms of the constitution as it 
evolves, even when it runs counter to their own interest. The Cherokee Nation reasons 
that since the constitution applies to all Cherokee, then the 2007 amendment is not aimed 
solely at excluding Freedmen. The Freedmen like any native Cherokee “can always lose 
their citizenship status by a vote of the people instituting a minimum blood quantum” 
(Cherokee Nation Reply 12). In fact, the Cherokee Nation argues that extending 
citizenship rights to the descendants of Freedmen in perpetuity would in essence give 
Freedmen rights beyond those of native members who do not receive the same guarantee. 
These narratives of Freedmen rights and native sovereignty constructed on the 
premises of the 1866 treaty carefully plot the history of interactions between the 
Freedmen, Cherokee Nation and United States making sure to avoid the questions of 
gender, race and property rights raised by the 2007 amendment’s use of the Dawes Rolls. 
While the Dawes Rolls certainly categorized people by race, they also made use of 
gender to civilize. The patriarchal inheritance established by the Dawes Commission 
meant that maternal Cherokee ancestry was devalued and unaccounted for on the “By 
Blood” rolls—a fact that could drastically alter not just the blood quantum registered for 
an individual but also determine on which list they were included. Women’s right to 
property was also restricted by the requirement that only married women could receive an 
allotment. Thus the commission effectively eliminated any remaining vestiges of 
traditional, matrilineal inheritance and reinforced the “covered” position of women in a 
way that determined racial categories. The gendered, and by extension racialized, 
classification of individuals on the Dawes Rolls undeniably altered the Cherokee Nation. 
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True to its intentions, the Dawes Act successfully brought the Cherokee Nation in line 
with white America by erasing communal property ownership and ideas of citizenship 
based on residency in a shared space and replacing it with private ownership based on 
gender and race.49 In doing so it also drastically redefined the Cherokee Nation’s 
approach to citizenship and rights. Gone were ideas of citizenship based on location 
within a common territory, matriarchal kinship ties or clans. As Theda Purdue argues, 
these more traditional affiliations were replaced by “a racialized identity that was drawn 
right out of late 19th century Anglo American racism” (Interview par. 18). It is this act of 
assimilation that has caused the most impassioned public outcry as well as the most 
problematic discussions of the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation.  
Writing on Cherokee Nation v. Nash for the Washington Post, Courtland Milloy 
describes the case as one in which “some members of the Cherokee Nation want to 
revoke the citizenship of the black members and prohibit their participation in the 
political and economic life of the tribe—all based on race and bloodlines.” In Milloy’s 
estimation, this is a black/white race issue and “an unvarnished attempt to disenfranchise 
blacks” that can be likened to “the move to suppress the black vote through voter ID laws 
or question the citizenship of the president in a way that would never have been done if 
he was white” (par.3).  In likening the Freedmen case to violations of civil rights by the 
U.S. government, Milloy confirms what he sees as the whiteness, of the Cherokee 
leadership while also calling them uncivilized for their failure to uphold ideals already 
adopted by civilized nations. The appeal of this line of argument is upheld by those who 
engage in an ongoing conversation held in the comments section of the article. One 
commenter declares that “[t]he Cherokee Nation might want to be really, really careful 
49	  For examples of definitions of citizenship based on residency see articles 4, 9, and 19 of the 1866 treaty.  
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about defining membership in their nation based on blood and race. Traditionally, 
civilized nations are defined by citizenship, open to people based on their birth or 
naturalization within that nation’s boundaries, not based on their race” (Catken1). While 
this individual’s comments cannot be held to represent the ideas of all, they do identify a 
significant blind spot for the Freedmen and non-Indian commenters on the case. Namely, 
it marks a failure to recognize that those racial categories employed by the Cherokee 
Nation are not of their own making, nor are they used exclusively by the nation. Rather, 
the categories are the constructs of the “civilized” U.S. government, and they have, since 
the creation of the Dawes Rolls, been used as a tool for determining a person’s rights.  
In fact, the very government to which the Freedmen are appealing still uses these 
categories to determine both the rights and duties of tribal citizens. As the Cherokee 
Nation points out, “[t] he Department of Interior has always differentiated in its treatment 
of Freedmen and Indians ‘by blood’ and continues to do so” in both criminal cases and 
especially in allotting economic benefits (Cherokee Nation Reply 23). Not only does the 
Department of Interior (DOI) use such distinctions itself, but it also issues the Certificate 
of Degree of Indian Blood (CDIB), required by many tribes to prove eligibility for 
citizenship. As the Cherokee point out, the “USA is demanding that the Cherokee Nation 
do something that it has refused to do: treat the Freedmen and their descendants as 
Indians” (Reply 23).  If the Freedmen’s argument construes the 2007 amendment as 
unconstitutional because it violates U.S .law, the Cherokee counter that, even if it were 
found to violate a treaty article, it is in keeping with U.S. practice. Ironically, the very 
attitudes that the Freedmen supporters argue make the Nation uncivilized are in fact proof 
of their assimilation of the models laid out by the federal missions to civilize the Indians. 
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Therefore, the Cherokee Nation asserts that, as a sovereign nation, their actions are no 
less legal or civilized than the past or present actions of the U.S.  By pointing out the 
discrepancy between US narratives of its commitment to equality and actual practice the 
Cherokee point to the fact that framing the Cherokee Nation as white, not Indian, allows 
for a collective forgetting about the past and continued discriminatory treatment of 
Indians, particularly in regards to their sovereign status.  
If the Dawes Act and 1866 Treaty set the precedents for the handling of race and 
gender, they also dictate the ways in which such categories are related to property. Both 
documents sought to limit Cherokee sovereignty by controlling property rights within the 
Cherokee Nation.  Just as the treaty and rolls were the product of the need to control 
property in the face of continued expansion and potential economic gain, so too is the 
Nash case. As Milloy correctly surmises, the current case “coincides with an increased 
flow of money into the Cherokee Nation—including billions of dollars from U.S.-
sanctioned casinos and hundreds of millions more in federal appropriations for housing, 
health and employment services” (par. 13). In 2010, the entity that oversees gaming, 
Cherokee Nation Entertainment, reported $455 million in revenue, and in 2009 it posted a 
profit of $88.1 million (“Where the Casino Money Goes”). Such numbers have led 
prominent Freedmen, including Marilyn Vann who is a named defendant in Cherokee 
Nation v. Nash, to unabashedly proclaim “[y]ou bet this is about the [money]. Overall 
voter participation is small; but percentage wise, freedmen tribal members vote in much 
greater [percent] than others such as adopted Delaware. Chief and tribal council control 
billions of casino revenue and Federal [money], determine who gets high [money] jobs, 
contracts, etc.” In her response, Vann offers a clear articulation of the connection 
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between rights, property and power in the Nash case.  Vann also underlines a truism of all 
sovereign nations: if you control citizenship, you control the distribution of property.  
Thus the Nash case is not merely about rights of the Freedmen, but the rights of 
the Cherokee Nation to regulate property. It is on this point that the Cherokee Nation and 
U.S. find themselves the most at odds and the most entrenched in the past.  Reminiscent 
of the economic guidelines set out in the1866 treaty, today, the US dictates how the 
Cherokee Nation might spend the money it gains from gaming. As Dwanna L. Robertson 
explains, the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which established the 
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) and established regulation governing tribal 
gaming, net profits from gaming may be used only for four purposes: “the funding of 
tribal government operations or programs, providing for the general welfare of its 
members, promoting tribal economic development, donating to charitable organizations, 
and funding the operations of local government agencies”  (par. 8). Since they lie within 
the domestic space of the US, tribes are also obligated to pay federal and state taxes on 
their revenue, which means that a large portion of the revenue generated by tribal casinos 
returns to state and federal governments.50 Despite its revenues, once taxes are paid and 
government agreements are fulfilled, Indian gaming has not generated enough profit to 
create economic independence. Tribes, including the Cherokee, are still heavily 
dependent upon federal aid to subsidize housing, education, and healthcare within the 
Nation. The economic dependency created by such an arrangement, allows the federal 
government to continue to assert what it sees as its right to control tribal citizenship, as it 
50	  In her 2009 testimony before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Tracie Stevens, Chairwoman of the 
NIGC, claimed “Indian gaming…generated $6.2 billion in federal taxes, $2.4 billion in state income and 
$100 billion in local income through payroll, sales taxes, and direct revenue sharing through government 
agreements” (Robertson par. 10).	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did when in 2011 HUD withheld housing money over the Freedmen litigation. So while 
the Cherokee might own property in the form of casino revenues, they are unable to 
dispose of it as they see fit. Likewise, they might amend their constitution, but cannot 
enforce those amendments without the approval of the federal government. Despite their 
so-called sovereign status, they are still obligated to the US.  
The ability of the federal government to stipulate how the Cherokee Nation 
spends its money, invalidate laws and elections it sees as conflicting with US law, and 
manage educational and economic benefits—all the rights the Cherokee Nation and 
Freedmen claim are part of citizenship— means the Freedmen find themselves in an 
equally liminal space. Practically, their ability to claim Cherokee citizenship depends as 
much on the relationship between the Nation and the US government as between 
themselves and the Cherokee Nation. In order to have their rights permanently restored, 
Freedmen must essentially ask the US government to continue to treat the Cherokee 
Nation as a domestic dependent because they cannot argue that the Nation made the 
wrong decision without also arguing that it did not have the right to make it. Yet such an 
argument will ultimately undermine their own ability to claim and exercise rights as 
members of the nation. In the end, the Freedmen too are trapped by the relationship 
between the Nation and the US dictated by the 1866 treaty and the Dawes Act. That 
Cherokee Nation v. Nash case is to be “resolved” through a summary judgment in which 
a white, male representative of a government with vested interests in curtailing Cherokee 
sovereignty is poignant for its historical repetition. The fact that he is asked to rule on the 
case by determining the legal merits of a treaty that enshrined the racialized and gendered 
constructs of rights that characterized the Indian Removal only further highlights the 
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extent to which the Nash case marks a return to discussions of Indian Removal even as it 
seeks to determine who is eligible for not just the duties but the rights and duties of 
citizenship in the twenty-first century.  
Copyright © Jesslyn R. Collins-Frohlich 2014 
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